

# *World Cup for whom and for what?*

A look upon the legacy of the World Cups in Brazil, South Africa and Germany

Marilene de Paula and Dawid Danilo Bartelt (Organizers)

Christian Russau • Glauca Marinho • Laura Burocco  
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■■ HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG  
BRASIL

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# *Introduction*

Dawid Danilo Bartelt





## Introduction

In 2010, Ernst & Young consultants, in a partnership with Fundação Getúlio Vargas, published a study called “Sustainable Brazil: social and economic impacts of the Soccer World Cup 2014”. In this paper, the two renowned institutions state that the World Cup would inject R\$142 billion in the Brazilian economy, and would generate 3.63 million jobs a year, between 2010 and 2014, besides an income of R\$63 billion for the population. Those estimates are based in “comparable experiences” and on “public organs financial planning”, as well as “specific criteria” like the difference between expenses made on scenarios with and without the World Cup. Costs were evaluated as stable, disregarding eventual “oscillations” in the macro-economical environment.

In March 2014, I asked a representative from Ernst & Young if he would still stand for his prognostic. The answer was evasive – economical conditions may have changed. But even with methodological reserves, and considering that the Gross Internal Product growth collapsed from 7.5% in 2010 to 0.9% in 2012, estimates seemed absurd. Regarding job posts, for example, the concrete number broadcasted by the government is 24,500 workers employed in the stadium constructions. Evidently, these job posts are transient, and not structural.

These prognostics, dressed up in economi-

cal formats and language, are political in essence. They are flawed suppositions but uneducated guesses, representative for legitimizing speeches with which the International Soccer Federation (Fifa) and the respective governments address the populations of the countries about the World Cup legacy.


In order to discuss the social and economic legacies, there are a series of methodological problems to be considered. For example: road infrastructure works are specific for the World Cup or would have been conducted anyway? Elevated expenses compromise other budget items from cities, states, or Federal, or will they be compensated, for example, through private investments? How do we account for indirect financing forms, like tax exemptions (of which FIFA almost fully benefits) or subsidies? Are public expenditures in the context of a mega-event considered cost or investment? The answers for these kinds of methodological questions depend highly on political interests and priorities. That means: in the name of which economical and social groups ARE these questions made?

Besides, in the middle of the debate there are clear findings to be made. First of all: World Cups are expensive to the public vaults, and, consequently, to tax payers of the hosting country. Contrary to what President Lula announced in 2007, Brazil World Cup will not be “the private initiative World Cup”. About 20% of costs are being funded by private companies. Second: regardless the polemic question of the high expenses compromising budgets in the

social, health and education areas (for some, a mere question of logic), the huge social costs are undeniable.

It is in this perspective that this publication offers a comparative look between Brazil’s World Cup preparations and the actual results of the two previous ones: South Africa (2010) and Germany (2006). We inquire HERE what the mega-events bring to the hosting countries populations, especially for the less favored by public policies, the ones at the bottom of the social pyramid. It also inquires in what measure the transformations caused by mega-events or introduced in their names respect or restrain – or even violate – rights assured by national and international legislation. The three articles make a comparison of financial and social costs, analyzing legal and financial exception regimes, legislation changes, national and local interventions in the economy of host countries. Changes in different levels are highlighted: on security legislation, on basic rules of social policies, on bidding and contract regimes, on budgeting legislation, which are structures of the installation of a mega-event in a country. It must be considered the real costs of a mega-event are hard to evaluate. There are different cost forms, hidden or indirect: tax exemptions or subsidies for Fifa and other companies, bidding and hiring processes that are manipulated, low interest loans, city debts by acquiring loans at market interests. Not to mention corruption.

For this comparative study, we invited authors with long history of work with the social movements in the countries about which they



write. Christian Russau, German journalist and activist in Berlin, and Italian International and Development Politics specialist Laura Burocco, living in Johannesburg between 2011 and 2014, working for the South African Cities Network, have already come and worked in Brazil. The authors responsible for the Brazil chapter, Glucia Marinho, Mario Campagnani and Renato Cosentino, compose the communications team of the Human Rights Global Justice, and are involved in the activities of the World Cup in Rio de Janeiro and in the Popular Committee's National Articulation for the Cup (Ancop).

Not for few times – and this was the case of Germany, and everything indicates it will be Brazil's too – a World Cup serves the purpose of installing a new, more repressive security regime. The 2006 World Cup led to the biggest security operation of the post-war period in Germany, involving 250 thousand police officers, the military, NATO fighter planes, private security, etc. According to members of organized roter groups in Germany, repression against roters increased substantially right before the Cup in 2006. Repressive police behavior seemed to be one of the structuring factors that earned prominence in the other two articles. In Brazil, during the June 2013 riots, an unprepared, disproportionately violent police was seen, while the government and media recently engaged in criminalizing protests, afraid that they would ruin the party. After all, image benefits, and not economical effects, can be more profitable in the medium term.

In Germany, the “fairy tale summer” pre-

sented to the world a surprisingly festive, loose, tolerant German people. South Africa too, in a certain way, was able to present itself as the “rainbow nation”: modern and tolerant in the year of 2010. Well, the Brazilians do not need to prove to the world they like to party and dance, and that they are a welcoming people. But the protests against the mega-expenditures and the misery remain in the main areas of social politics, threatening to show counter-productive images to the political marketing strategies.

If we look at Fifa, the World Cup's legacy will undoubtedly be positive. It does not cease to impress how this private non-profit entity can impose its interests and rules over sovereign states. It must be said that sovereignty restrictions, at the end of the day, are only possible because the sovereign's representatives (the people) allow them, because they meet their interests. It must be analyzed if these are the population's interests.

According to official data of the organization itself, Fifa's income with World Cups has constantly increased: from US\$3.9 billions in Germany World Cup, in the period of 2003 to 2006, and US\$4.2 billion in South Africa from 2007 to 2010, and it is estimated in US\$5.4 billion for the Brazil World Cup.

The enterprises responsible for the construction or renovation of the 12 Fifa-standard stadiums (justice be made that it demands only 8 home-stadiums and it was Lula's government decision to raise the number to 12) are the other great beneficiaries, with exceptions opened by laws like the Hiring Differentiated Regime,

that reduced the transparency and the principle of lower cost on construction bids related to the event. In a market sector marked by the cartel formation tendency, four big Brazilian companies with international presence stand out: Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez, OAS and Camargo Corrêa<sup>1</sup>.

It will be a different scenario if we look at the residents, mainly on poor neighborhoods or slums (favelas), that are being removed to accommodate the constructions, or if we look to small tradesmen in public markets whose areas were taken by the renovations and constructions. It happened in South Africa and it is happening in Brazil. For these people, the World Cup means losing their home and/or economic basis for survival. In most cases, the responsible do not respect international rules for forced removal, like timely information, participation, proper indemnification or equivalent homes, if possible, close to the old ones.

Public opinion also questions the overall earnings balance. The government promised considerable direct and indirect effects in terms of economic growth and occupation rates, which the economists doubt or refute. The World Cup in Germany, in 2006, cost around € 3 billion; South Africa's in 2010, € 4 billion; and in Brazil the actual official provision is of € 8.5 billion, of which 85% come from the public vaults. The stadiums alone may devour € 3 billion. The chances of being used with similar economic profit after the World Cup is reduced – or even void – for at least half of them. These “white elephants” are also seen in South Africa.

It is rightful to observe that, in these events, public resources mobilization uses to happen over time pressure, which takes to accelerated licensing and construction processes. On its turn, lack of transparency increases, limiting social control and expenditure auditing possibilities, increasing deviations due to corruption, as well as work accident risks, lower quality constructions that will present defects in a few years, resulting in new costs.

A study conducted by the Metropolis Observatory Group Nucleos at University of de Brasília in 2012 concludes: “In general, these events produce votes for some people, improve the economy for some time, bring profit to constructors, sports business and tourism companies, but may leave abandoned or underutilized equipment, start real state imobiliary speculation, exclude and remove many that do not have means to face high prices in the places they previously occupied, or, even though the bill is paid by all, they intrude with their presences the predicted constructions that must happen.”

The World Cup in Brazil already stands out as the most expensive of all times. But it can make history. Both in Brazil and abroad, it is common opinion that the Brazilians are crazy for soccer and will not mind anything else as soon as their team makes it into the field. But this Brazilian people has surprised the world during the Confederations Cup, by organizing mass pacific riots for a more oriented policy to the population needs, and against mega-events. There were protests in and out of the stadiums,

regarding what a FIFA standard stadium means. After all, if your son is sick, there is no use taking him to the stadium, he must go to the hospital, like many posters used during the riots pointed out. Brazil's World Cup could serve as a good example for a global awareness that mega-events cannot be held at any cost over social development. Is this why Fifa conceded the following Cups to non-democratic countries?


**Dawid Danilo Bartelt,**  
Director of Heinrich Böll Foundation -  
Brazil

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[1] See also article by researcher PINTO, João Roberto Lopes. “Os Donos do Rio”. Available online at: <http://www.brasildefato.com.br/node/13506>. Access in 21.03.2014.

**Glaucia Marinho, Mario Campagnani e Renato Cosentino** are journalists for the organization **Justiça Global**

**Opposite page photo** emoved Community Vila Recreio II, West Side, Rio de Janeiro  
(Photo: Renato Cosentino)



# *Brazil*

Glaucia Marinho  
Mario Campagnani  
Renato Cosentino





**Joseph Blatter** announcing Brazil as the World Cup host country (photo: Wikipedia Commons)

**Photo on the opposite page:** Juscelino Kubitschek (a former Brazilian President) statue in Brasilia, wearing the Brazilian Team jersey after the official announcement made by FIFA with the confirmation that Brazil would be the host for 2014 World Cup. (Photo: Walter Campanato/ABr. Creative Commons License Attribution 3.0 Brasil)

## The Cup began in 2007

14

It was during the first year of president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's second term that Brazil was chosen as the host country for the 2014 World Cup. That year, 2007, was marked by the continuation of a political project that had suffered hard blows, having been denounced for corruption in the affair that came to be known as Mensalão,<sup>1</sup> but also for a significant increase in Brazilians' income, which led Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) to call it the "Middle Classes' Year".<sup>2</sup> Inserted in a project that tried to assert itself politically and economically, both domestically and internationally, the conquest of the right to host a World Cup was seen as a chance to send the world the message that the country was on the right path.

"We will do absolutely everything to show that Brazil is a civilized country, not only where football is concerned, but also as a whole", said Ricardo Teixeira, then-president of CBF, the Brazilian Football Confederation, right after the official announcement at the FIFA (Inter-

national Football Federation) headquarters, in Zurich, Switzerland.<sup>3</sup> The announcement took place on October 30th, 2007, and Brazil was the only candidate, since in April of that same year Colombia had given up on its intentions of hosting the World Cup, alleging it had no conditions of complying with FIFA's demands. After hosting the World Cup in 1950, Brazil had applied again in 1994, 1998 and 2006, being defeated every time. But in 2003, FIFA announced South America would host the Cup in 2014, due to the implementation of a new rotation policy among the continents. That was how Brazil, one of the main countries in world football, became the "natural" candidate.

Teixeira promised a World Cup funded by private companies, which did not become true during the seven-year preparation for the event. The same happened – or didn't happen – in regard to the budget forecasts, which had been set at R\$ 5 billion (approximately US\$ 2.2 billion). The actual expenses, in the first months of 2014, are closer to R\$ 30 billion (approximately US\$ 13.4 billion).

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- [1] *Mensalão* is the name given by the media to the political corruption affair that allegedly happened between 2005 and 2006, in which congresspersons were given money in exchange for their votes. The scandal had, as its main actors, politicians who were part of President Lula's government and who belonged to PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores, the Labor Party) and to other parties of the coalition, and was the object of a criminal action filed by the Prosecution Office at the Supreme Court.
- [2] Available at [http://gl.globo.com/Noticias/Economia\\_Negocios/0,,MUL766681-9356,00-PESQUISA+DA+FGV+APONTA+COMO+O+ANO+DA+CLASSE+MEDIA.html](http://gl.globo.com/Noticias/Economia_Negocios/0,,MUL766681-9356,00-PESQUISA+DA+FGV+APONTA+COMO+O+ANO+DA+CLASSE+MEDIA.html). Access in 10/12/2013.
- [3] Disponível em <HTTP://esporte.uol.com.br/futebol/ultimas/2007/10/30/ult59u135237.jhtm>. Access in 02/20/2014.



## *From rocket to Spam Can: Brazil as a world power*

The land of football and Carnival, but also a country of violence and inequality. Brazil's image abroad has always been about hyperboles, in an exaggeration that at once charms and shocks anyone who is from other places. For a developing country, some challenges have already been overcome, such as tackling inflation; others are still advancing slowly, such as the income improvement, which, over the last ten years, has grown five times quicker among the poorer half of the population than among the 10% richest.<sup>4</sup> Many others, though, are still very tentative, such as the access to basic services – sewage systems are available to only 48% of homes.<sup>5</sup> It is possible to show change via numbers, but society's perceptions of those changes do not follow the same gauge. If Brazilians themselves perceive those changes as slow, the situation gets even more complex when we deal with foreigners' point of view, since their vision is built and crystallized by decades of sporadic access to news concerning Brazil. Nevertheless, that may change now, with this huge event that will attract massive attention from around the world.

Over the last few years, some facts have worked in favor of the country, projecting the image of a “new Brazil”. One example is the financial crisis that swept the world on 2008's

second semester: while dozens of countries have suffered – and still do – its effects, Brazil managed to achieve a quick recovery, going from a 0.6% downturn in 2009 to a 7.5% growth in 2010; the highest number in 24 years.<sup>6</sup> The numbers were so surprising that, in November 12th, 2009, *The Economist* magazine published a large-repercussion cover story, with a picture showing the iconic statue of Christ, the Redeemer, as a rocket being launched from the top of Corcovado Mountain, with the headline “*Brazil takes off*”.

In the story – which starts with references to Brazilian Carnival and football (soccer) –, the magazine reminds the readers of the importance of mega events as a means of self-affirmation: “In short, Brazil suddenly seems to have made an entrance onto the world stage. Its arrival was symbolically marked last month by the award of the 2016 Olympics to Rio de Janeiro; two years earlier, Brazil will host football's World Cup”.<sup>7</sup>

That way, Brazil reached the end of the millennium's first decade with expectations of finally becoming the country that would make true its most boastful national dreams – which have been historically stimulated by every government.



[4] Available at <http://www.cartacapital.com.br/sociedade/brasil-reduz-desigualdades-de-forma-acelerada-mas-diferenca-ainda-e-grande-diz-presidente-do-ipea>. Access in 10/10/2013

[5] IBGE. Social Indicators Synthesis (SIS), 2013.

[6] Available at <http://www.brasil.gov.br/economia-e-emprego/2011/03/pib-crece-7-5-em-2010>. Access in 10/10/2013.

[7] *The Economist*, November 2009. Available at <http://www.economist.com/node/14845197>. Access in 10/10/2013.

Besides getting to host the mega events, the country adopted an expansionist strategy, in a fashion very similar to the one applied to Brazil itself by the United States and by European countries. That led to the creation of the terms “Brazilian imperialism”, illustrating the reproduction of the exact vices Brazilians used to criticize in other nations.

### Adopting nasty vices

Brazil’s relations with less developed countries in Africa and Latin America receive direct stimulus from the federal government, who funds projects through its National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES). Major Brazilian building companies, such as Odebrecht and Andrade Gutierrez, who have been historically involved in huge contracts with the federal government – and who are also involved in the building of the World Cup stadia – work in infrastructure constructions in countries like Angola and Mozambique, where they are accused of collusion and corruption of public agents, as well as of mistreating their workers.<sup>8</sup>

Trying to add power to its international political standing, Brazil has also launched a campaign to obtain a permanent seat at the UN Safety Council. One of its strategies in the search for visibility in that context was assuming the coordination for UN’s peace mission in Haiti in July 2004, when that country was going through a dispute between then-president Jean-Bertrand Aristide and rebel forces. Then,

football ended up being used as a “weapon” for local control. In what was announced as a goodwill gesture toward the Haitian people, Brazil’s national team went to the Caribbean country to parade the capital in war tanks and play against the local team. The match took place in August 19th 2004, in the capital, Port-au-Prince, and was called “The Peace Game”, with a winning score of 6 to 0 for Brazil.

The increase in the number of Brazilians traveling abroad also ended up contributing to project the country’s image internationally. In 2003, 2.36 million Brazilians traveled to foreign countries. In 2013, those numbers leaped to 8.12 million, a 244% growth. If that alone was a strong hint that the country was economically stronger, the amounts spent by those tourists leave no doubt: US\$ 23,125 billion between January and November 2013, which represents 1025% more than the US\$ 2,055 billion spent over the same period of 2003.<sup>9</sup>

Brazilian faces started to show up more frequently in other countries’ streets, but the increase in the tourists’ influx to Brazil did not grow proportionally. They were 4.13 million in 2003 and went up to 5.67 million in 2013, a 37% growth. And the tourism segment is among the ones who expect the higher increases in 2014. Brazilian government’s expectation is that during the World Cup only, 600 thousand international tourists come to the country, spending R\$ 6.8 billion (approximately US\$ 3.04 billion).<sup>10</sup>

[8] BBC news story. Available at [http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2013/12/131219\\_odebrecht\\_inferno\\_jf\\_lk.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2013/12/131219_odebrecht_inferno_jf_lk.shtml). Access on 02/10/2014.

[9] “Brazilian tourists’ spending increases tenfold in ten years”. Folha de S. Paulo. Available at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2014/01/1391988-gastso-de-turista-brasileiro-sobe-10-vezes-em-10-anos.shtml>. Access on 02/10/2014.

[10] “Brazilian tourists’ spending increases tenfold in ten years”. Folha de S. Paulo. Available at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2014/01/1391988-gastso-de-turista-brasileiro-sobe-10-vezes-em-10-anos.shtml>. Access on 02/10/2014.

### The bright image begins to fade

The expectations of projecting the image of a new world power, in full economic and social development, which seemed to be more and more solid by the end of the last decade, begun suffering some serious setbacks in the new one. In October of 2013 The Economist featured a new story about Brazil, spoofing its own earlier, optimistic cover: this time, the rocket-like Christ the Redeemer seemed to be completely lost, spiraling around the sky without direction. The picture came with the headline “Has Brazil blown it?”


Besides criticizing Brazilian economy, which grew only 0.9% in 2012, the magazine highlighted the protests that, from June 2013 on, started to happen all around the country. If Brazil had been drawing more attention gradually, the context during that month made its international visibility suddenly explode. Journalists from several countries were covering the Confederations Cup and, consequently, the protests. After the people had taken the streets in countries like Egypt and Turkey, it was Brazilians’ turn to surprise the world by showing their dissatisfaction with what had been sold as a total success, up to that point.

Once it started being featured in the international news more due to the protests than to the football tournament, Brazil kept appearing in reports that detailed the national complaints. By then, the ample use of internet by the population of the major Brazilian cities had a great importance, especially through videos, photos

and texts telling stories that were hugely different from the ones presented by the domestic news media and defended by the government. Through the Web, citizen-generated news was spread not only throughout the country, but all around the world. At the time, a search for “Brazil protests 2013” in YouTube would yield over 190 thousand results.

In July of that same year, it was Pope Francis’ turn to draw the world press’ attention to Brazil, because of the World Youth Day, that happened in Rio de Janeiro. The protests, which had dwindled after the end of the Confederations’ Cup, came back with a vengeance, getting headlines all around the planet. It was now clear that the reasons for the uprising were much deeper than they had seemed at first, and that there was no possibility of a miraculous solution for them.

The world, therefore, looks at the World Cup’s Brazil with expectations that go way beyond football, since there is no more way of hiding the dissatisfaction of a significant part of the population with the event. According to Kantar Sports agency, 3.2 billion viewers, the equivalent to 46% of the Earth’s population, watched the tournament in South Africa.<sup>11</sup> The possible repetition, or even surpassing, of that number in Brazil, will be a landmark for the country. It is yet uncertain whether that will improve or tarnish Brazil’s image abroad, but it will definitely change the way it is perceived.



**Protest** around Maracanã stadium (in Rio), June of 2013 (Photo: Felipe Werneck)

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[11] “South Africa World Cup watched by 32 billion viewers”, available at <http://globoesporte.globo.com/futebol/copa-do-mundo/noticia/2011/07/copa-da-afrika-do-sul-foi-vista-por-32-bilhoes-de-telespectadores.html>. Access in 03/10/2014.



**Photo 1** Public event 'Maraca is ours'  
(Photo: Renato Cosentino)



**Photo 2** Protest on the Confederations' Cup final.  
(Photo: Henrique Fornazin)



**Foto 3** Protest on the Confederations' Cup final.  
(Photo: Henrique Fornazin)

## The self-proclaimed 2014 World Cup champions

State banks – especially BNDES – are the top funders of the infrastructure currently being built for the event in Brazil, both for buildings that will be privatized after their conclusion, like Itaquerao, a stadium that will host World Cup games in São Paulo, but actually belongs to a city team (Corinthians) and for those that will remain public. Together with Caixa Econômica Federal, the second largest funder, BNDES released in November of 2013, R\$ 400 million (approximately US\$ 178.6 million) for the stadium, which will be built by Odebrecht, a company that has won most of the contracts

related to the preparation for the games.<sup>12</sup>

2013 data from the federal government, featured in its official website, Portal Brasil, show that in the Responsibility Matrix – infrastructure and service-oriented projects to be built in the country for the World Cup, such as new stadia and investments in tourism – the private sector provides 20% of resources (R\$ 5.6 billion out of R\$ 28.1 billion), and the rest comes out of the public coffers.<sup>14</sup>

And the constructions that have received the largest amounts of money for the tournament are exactly the ones that already are in

### Funding by public financial institutions<sup>13</sup>

| Financial Institution                           | Budgets (in R\$)      |                      |
|---|-----------------------|----------------------|
|   | Contracted            | Released             |
| <b>Total amount</b>                             | <b>10,334,131,739</b> | <b>7,869,757,995</b> |
| Caixa Econômica Federal                         | 3,595,850,000         | 2,180,655,950        |
| BNDES   | 5,540,707,910         | 4,837,080,635        |
| Banco do Nordeste do Brasil - BNB               | 1,014,173,829         | 677,791,410          |
| Banco do Brasil                                 | 91,700,000            | 87,115,000           |
| Banco do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul - BANRISUL | 91,700,000            | 87,115,000           |

[12] Available at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/folhanacopa/2013/11/1377082-bndes-acerta-financiamento-para-itaquerao.shtml>. Access on 02/20/2014.

[13] Source: Portal Transparência Brazil, available at <http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br/copa2014/financiamentos/assunto.seam?assunto=instituicao>. Access on 03/15/2014.

[14] Available at <http://www.brasil.gov.br/economia-e-emprego/2013/06/estimativas-de-investimentos-geracao-de-empregos-e-renda-durante-a-preparacao-do-pais-para-a-copa-do-mundo-da-fifa-brasil-2014>. Access on 03/10/2014.



**Maracanã** renovations under way  
(Photo: Renato Cosentino)

the hands of the private sector, or will be soon. Of the three main segments (tourism development, stadia and urban mobility) to receive investments, the one that had the largest budget was mobility, with an estimate of R\$

4.470 billion (approximately US\$ 1.99 billion) expenditure. Still, only 59% of that amount (R\$ 2.671 billion, or US\$ 1.19) was actually used. Meanwhile, in the stadia segment, R\$ 4.049 billion (approximately US\$ 1.8 billion), or

#### Public funding by segment <sup>16</sup>

| Operating area      | Budgets (in R\$)     |                      |
|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                     | Contracted           | Released             |
| <b>Total amount</b> | <b>9,757,824,974</b> | <b>7,189,270,656</b> |
| Tourism Development | 1,144,108,731        | 469,135,867          |
| Stadia              | 4,143,407,283        | 4,049,128,713        |
| Urban Mobility      | 4,470,308,960        | 2,671,006,076        |

[15] Available at <http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br/copa2014/financiamentos/assunto.seam?assunto=tema>. Access on 02/20/2014.

[16] Available at <http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br/copa2014/financiamentos/assunto.seam?assunto=tema>. Access on 03/15/2014.

97.7% of the budget have already been spent.<sup>15</sup>

Another very important market that may be affected by a World Cup surrounded by protests and criticism is the electoral market. In Brazil, campaigns are funded mostly by private donations. For Dilma Rousseff's election, in 2010, PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores, the Labor Party) spent R\$ 176.5 million (approximately US\$ 79.4 million). Among the biggest donors were Itaú Bank (with R\$ 4 million) and Ambev brewery (with R\$ 2 million), both of whom are official sponsors for the World Cup and also for Brazilian Football Confederation (CBF). There were also two building companies directly involved in the World Cup preparation constructions: Camargo Corrêa (with R\$ 8.5 million) and Andrade Gutierrez (R\$ 5.1 million). Those amounts represent only what was directly donated to the campaign, not taking into account indirect donations, made to the party and not to the campaign itself.

The most important and well-known stadium in Brazil, Maracanã, is also the one that best illustrates the way investments have been made in preparation for the World Cup. According to a survey made by the People Committee for the World Cup and Rio de Janeiro Olympics, after three consecutive renovations over the last 15 years, which have consumed over a R\$ 1.5 billion (approximately US\$ 670 million), the stadium was sold to a private company. The contract stipulates the payment of 33 annual R\$ 5.8 million (US\$ 2.59 million) installments, totaling R\$ 181.5 million (US\$ 81.1 million), which means a little more than 15% of all of the

public money spent in the stadium.

What could be seen as appalling is, nevertheless, considered normal by Rio de Janeiro state government, to whom the stadium used to belong: "I do not presume to recover the amount spent in the renovations, that's just Math. It is good business. It will benefit the population, attract more tourism, and it will become the most visited spot in Rio, I have no doubt. It is going to be a great improvement in terms of modernity and services for the people", said the state government chief of staff, Régis Fichtner, on April of 2013.<sup>17</sup>

The government has also defended the low price in the contract, arguing that the buyers will have to invest another R\$ 594 million (US\$ 265.4 million) in the stadium over the next 35 years. Investments that will benefit only its new owners, which are the building company Odebrecht, stadium-managing company AEG and a company called IMX. The latter was also hired by the state government to elaborate the feasibility study upon which the public tender for Maracanã concession was made, i.e., IMX created the very same bidding procedure it wound up winning.

### Lots of publicity at stake

Beside the companies that profit from the World Cup building spree, there are others that use the event as a springboard to increase their sales. Those are the official tournament and national teams' sponsors, as well as the networks



**Who will foot the bill?** Graffiti in Catete street, South Side of Rio de Janeiro. (Photo: Felipe Werneck)

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- [17] "The government does not care about recouping R\$ 1.2 billion spent in Maracanã". Lance newspaper, available at [http://www.lancenet.com.br/minuto/Governo-preocupa-reaver-gastos-Maracana\\_0\\_898710304.html#ixzz2qa4kVeYe](http://www.lancenet.com.br/minuto/Governo-preocupa-reaver-gastos-Maracana_0_898710304.html#ixzz2qa4kVeYe). Access on 02/20/2014.
- [18] "From Cup to Cup, Globo's football income goes up 130%", PropMark website, available at <http://propmark.uol.com.br/midia/45356:de-copa-a-copa-faturamento-da-globo-com-futebol-sobe-130>. Access on 02/20/2014.
- [19] Available at <http://noticias7.com/sao-paulo/reporter-da-globo-e-cxpulso-de-concentracao-no-largo-da-batata-18062013>. Access on 02/20/2014.

that detain the rights to broadcast the matches. Rede Globo, the largest Brazilian TV network and one of the two (the other is TV Bandeirantes) that hold the rights of exhibition of the World Cup matches, will gross R\$ 1.438 billion (US\$ 642 million) with the commercialization of sponsorship shares for the transmission of 2014 World Cup.<sup>18</sup> And the network will add to it another R\$ 1.113 billion (US\$ 505 million)

in shares with a different advertising package, called “2014 Football”, which airs the matches between competitors for the national and state championships.

Considering that during the South Africa World Cup Rede Globo cashed in R\$ 490 million (US\$ 218.9 million), with six shares of R\$ 81.8 million each, the Brazilian-hosted tournament represents an increase of almost 200% in its revenue. The heavy criticism the network is currently facing is not gratuitous: the kind of journalism it has adopted has caused its reporters to be booed away from street acts by protesters.<sup>19</sup> Associating their main marketing product for 2014 to bad news – such as overpricing in constructions and the eviction of poor families – would not make for good business.

The level of proximity between these companies and the government can be illustrated by the meeting that happened between Ambev and Itaú representatives and President Dilma in September 2013, when the private companies pressed the government for actions designed to avoid problems (such as protests) during the event. The information leaked in an ESPN feature, which read: “President Dilma listened to the concerns of the companies’ representatives. Ambev and Itaú stated they have high stakes in the World Cup and asked for a guaranty that they wouldn’t lose money because of possible protests. The President promised them she would do ‘whatever is needed’ so that there would be no protests.”<sup>20</sup>

## Surefire money for FIFA

Even though it is a not-for-profit organization, in 2012 FIFA had, according to its annual report, a net profit of R\$ 178 million (approximately US\$ 80.1 million) and a financial reserve of R\$ 2.6 billion (approximately US\$ 1.1 billion). For 2014, the organization already has its profits assured with Brazil World Cup. To grant Brazil the right of hosting the tournament, FIFA demanded a tax exemption on the contracts regarding the event, which should mean savings of around R\$ 1 billion.<sup>21</sup> That way, world football’s top entity will gross R\$ 9.7 billion (approximately US\$ 4.36 billion) with the competition, a veritable record, since it obtained R\$ 7 billion (US\$ 3.15) in 2010, in South Africa; and R\$ 4.4 billion (US\$ 1.98) in 2006, in Germany.

The high profits of FIFA in Brazil, with practically no costs, have already called the attention of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, which has filed two actions demanding that FIFA and the Local Organizing Committee (COL) assume responsibility for the costs of temporary structures and telecommunications during the World Cup, which should total around R\$ 1.2 billion (US\$ 540 million).<sup>22</sup> The prosecutors believe the costs of canopies, covered walkways, lighting and furniture, among others, should not count as infrastructure expenses, but as urban mobility investments, which bring real and permanent benefits to the country.

[20] Available at <http://www.folhapolitica.org/2013/10/temendo-protestos-na-copa.html>. Access on 12/12/2013.

[21] Available at <http://esportes.r7.com/futebol/copa-das-confederacoes-2013/isenta-de-pagar-r-1-bilhao-em-impostos-fifa-garante-lucro-recorde-na-copa-de-2014-25062013>. Access on 12/12/2013.

[22] Available at <http://globoesporte.globo.com/futebol/copa-do-mundo/noticia/2013/10/copa-mp-quer-que-fifa-e-col-paguem-por-estruturas-temporarias.html>. Access on 12/12/2013.



## The owners of Rio de Janeiro



- 1- Campinho Community removal
- 2- The removal area at Restinga gave way to three car lanes, not for BRT
- 3- Card delivered to residents threatened of removal with the Olympic brand
- 4- Maracanã under renovations (Photo: Renato Consentino)

[23] Government program that defined a series of enterprises considered essential for the Country development, in fields such as housing and transportation. See further information at <http://www.pac.gov.br/>. Access on 18/03/2014.

[24] Available at <http://oglobo.globo.com/rio/construcao-da-linha-4-do-metro-custara-70-mais-do-que-estimado-inicialmente-6906779>. Access on 18/03/2014.

The way the public contracts for works related to the World Cup and the Olympics are being made raises strong evidence of the existence of a cartel formed by Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez, Camargo Correa and OAS, building companies responsible for over 20 enterprises being conducted in the state of Rio de Janeiro. Conducted by Instituto Mais Democracia (More Democracy Institute) and EITA - Cooperativa Educação, Informação e Tecnologia para Auto-gestão (Education, Information and Technology Cooperative for Self-Management) through the campaign 'Who are the owners of Brazil?' the survey 'Who owns Rio?' shows that in important works, such as the construction of the Olympic Village (estimated at R\$ 2.5 billion – approximately US\$ 1.1 billion), there is a merger of the companies through a consortium or a previously agreed relay between them.

The campaign, which continues collecting data on the supposed cartel, reminds us that the Ministry of Justice points out as evidence of cartel 'The existence of a clear pattern of rotation among the winners of bids' and 'bidders who would be able to attend the event alone present their proposals in consortium'. Considering this and analyzing the buildings erected in Rio de Janeiro, one comes to the conclusion that several of them fit this pattern: Subway Line 4; Light Rail Vehicle (VLT) of RioCentro; the

Olympic Village; Galeão Airport; TransCarioca and TransOlimpica expressways; the waterfront revitalization project, called 'Wonder Port'; the works of the Accelerated Growth Program (PAC)<sup>23</sup> in the favelas of Manguinhos and Complexo do Alemão; Maracanã; and João Havelange Olympic Stadium, among others.

Another practice adopted by these companies is the one of systematically reviewing the budgets, which invariably occurred in all of them. One example is Subway Line 4, whose initial budget was R\$5 billion (approximately US\$ 2.25 billion), but is now \$ 8.5 billion (approximately US\$ 3.8 billion), i.e., a 70% increase.<sup>24</sup> The explanation for the disparity is the same for all ventures: the initial design did not anticipate all the necessary expenses.

Political scientist and researcher at Instituto Mais Democracia João Roberto Lopes Pinto explains that these companies are usually fragmented into several subsidiaries to take on so many contracts. He said that although the study is focused on what happens in Rio de Janeiro, the evidence of fraud and cartelization extends to other states: 'It is a model that applies nationally, no doubt about it. There may be one or another regional company also benefitting from this scheme, but those are the four major companies that lead it.'

# Mega events, mega operations and (in) security

- [25] Ministry of Justice and Extraordinary Office of Security for Major Events. Strategic Plan for Security during FIFA Brazil World Cup 2014. Brasil: 2012, 63 p.
- [26] In Rio de Janeiro, the term “militia” is associated with illegal practices. Militias are usually groups composed of (former) policemen, who control, through violence, urban low-income communities such as projects and slums, under the pretence of fighting drug trafficking, but getting their upkeep with money that comes from selling protection to the population and from charging them for services like cooking-gas and cable TV sales.
- [27] Dias, Rafael Mendonça; Carvalho, Sandra; Mansur, Isabel (orgs). On the frontline: criminalization of human rights defenders in Brazil (2006–2012). Rio de Janeiro: Global Justice, 2013. See also: “Pan Games security will be guaranteed by 25 thousand men”, available at <http://esportes.terra.com.br/panamericano2007/interna/0,,OI1711831-EI8332,00.html>. Access on 02/15/2014.
- [28] Dias, Rafael Mendonça; Carvalho, Sandra; Mansur, Isabel (orgs). On the frontline: criminalization of human rights defenders in Brazil (2006–2012). Rio de Janeiro: Global Justice, 2013. See also: “Pan Games security will be guaranteed by 25 thousand men”, available at <http://esportes.terra.com.br/panamericano2007/interna/0,,OI1711831-EI8332,00.html>. Access on 02/15/2014.
- [29] Brazilian Public Security Forum. Brazilian Public Security Yearbook 2013. São Paulo: 2014.
- [30] NGOs criticize colonel who called the police a “social insecticide”. Available at <http://br.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idBRB29927520080416>. Access on 02/15/2014.

## History

According to the Strategic Plan for Security during FIFA Brazil World Cup 2014, the Extraordinary Office of Security for Major Events (SESGE), “What accredited Brazil to host the 2014 World Cup was the success of the Pan American and Parapan American Games in Rio, in 2007. They left a mark in public safety by shifting paradigms, overcoming the traditional contention-and-exclusion policies and adopting instead inclusion and control, under the Democratic State rule of law, with strict observance of human rights”.<sup>25</sup>

SESGE’s assessment, nevertheless, is at odds with reality. Before the games, during the preparation period, documents showed the multiplication of militias<sup>26</sup> in favelas (slums) located near the roads that led to the sites of the 2007 Pan American Games. During the event, heavy military apparatus was used in the streets.<sup>27</sup> Not long before the beginning of the Games, on June 27th, 2007, a police operation with 1350 policemen in the favelas of Complexo do Alemão, North Side of Rio de Janeiro, killed 19 young persons and injured another eight. Police had been occupying Complexo do Alemão since May 2nd of that year, and the entire in-

tervention ended with 43 people killed and 81 injured.

The Human Rights Committee from Rio de Janeiro’s chapter of OAB (Brazilian Bar Association) commissioned independent forensic experts to examine the circumstances of those deaths, which gathered strong evidences that most of the victims had been shot at 45° angles, while on their knees or sitting. Violent stab wounds and “a large number of bodies shot from the back”<sup>28</sup> have also been found.

In Brazil, the police-caused death rates are very high. According to a study carried out by Brazilian Security Forum, the country’s police kills an average of five people every day. The highest numbers are in the states of São Paulo (563 deaths in 2012), Rio de Janeiro (415 deaths in 2012), Bahia (344 deaths in 2012) and Paraná (167 deaths in 2012), all of them World Cup hosts.<sup>29</sup> In 2008, Colonel Marcus Jardim, with the Rio de Janeiro Military Police, said that “The PM is the best medicine against dengue fever. There isn’t one mosquito left standing. It is SBPM. The best social insecticide”.<sup>30</sup>

## Government in arms for the World Cup

SESGE was the federal government's main measure regarding the World Cup's public security. Operating under the Ministry of Justice, SESGE is divided in four parts: Operations, Intelligence, Logistics and Special Projects. Their goal is to integrate security actions in the 12 host cities, which includes the joint action of police and private security forces.<sup>31</sup> In 2011, then-secretary Valdinho Jacinto Caetano, who was in charge of the Office, announced that even the Army would be on call, in case the security forces weren't able to guarantee the peace during the events.<sup>32</sup> An ordinance issued by the Ministry of Defence on August 20th, 2012, authorized the deployment of the Army, Navy and Aeronautic in the World Cup security, in cyber security, anti-terror and "other Armed Forces' constitutional attributions, in all the host cities during the Grand Events".<sup>33</sup>

Confederations' Cup was like a dress rehearsal for the joint action of the police and the Armed Forces in mega events. "Approximately 3700 servicepersons were deployed, beside more than 500 military vehicles, such as armored and mechanized vehicles, anti-aircraft, cyber defense, command and control, troops transporters and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense vehicles. Two anti-riot cavalry squadrons, a platoon of war dogs and eight Armed Forces helicopters were also

deployed, one of which was equipped with an 'Eagle Eye' camera."<sup>34</sup>

According to a document from the Planalto Military Office,<sup>35</sup> in the eventuality of "incidents that might go beyond the control of the police and security agents, and endanger the population and public properties", another 8 thousand military servicepersons would be summoned to increase the manpower. The "Strategic Plan for Security during FIFA Brazil World Cup 2014" divulged by SESGE in January of 2012 also determines that "public security forces" must remain on call.

The segment of public security for the mega events will receive more than R\$ 2 billion in federal investments: R\$ 1.17 billion for Confederations and World Cups and R\$ 1.15 billion for the Olympic Games.<sup>36</sup> Almost 50 million have already been spent on "non-lethal" weapons for the Confederations Cup and World Cup (see chart)<sup>37</sup>. Even with all these hefty investments in security for the World Cup, the government will still have to bear the costs of private security in the stadia.

FIFA demands that the security inside the stadia is done by private companies. An estimated 25 thousand guards will be employed in the 12 arenas. Foreign policemen will also be working at the games. "Public security forces remain on call and only intervene when serious disturbances occur and they are needed for the maintenance of public order, or when there is need for the use of police power, i.e., they only take action inside the sports facilities when and if necessary", according to the Strategic Plan



**Protest** on the Confederations Cup Final. (Photo: Henrique Fornazini)

- .....
- [31] Decree No. 7538, from August 1<sup>st</sup>, 2011. See more at "Government creates a Major Events Office for the World Cup and Olympic Games", by Portal Brasil. Available at <http://www.brasil.gov.br/esporte/2011/09/governocria-secretaria-de-grandes-eventos-para-copa-e-olimpiadas>. Access on 01/30/2014.
- [32] Armed Forces will help with security of mega events, like the Olympic Games and World Cup. Available at <http://extra.globo.com/esporte/rio-2016/forcas-armadas-ajudaraona-seguranca-de-megaeventos-como-olimpiadas-copa-do-mundo-2471046.html>. Access on 01/30/2014.
- [33] Ministry of Defence. Regulatory Ordinance No.2221, from August 20<sup>th</sup>, 2012.
- [34] 3.7 thousand Army servicepersons will be deployed in the Confederations Cup. Available at [http://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/app/noticia/cidades/2013/06/12/interna\\_cidadesdf,371040/3-7-mil-militares-do-exercitovao-atuar-na-copa-das-confederacoes.shtml](http://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/app/noticia/cidades/2013/06/12/interna_cidadesdf,371040/3-7-mil-militares-do-exercitovao-atuar-na-copa-das-confederacoes.shtml). Access on 02/30/2014.
- [35] Ministry of Defence. Regulatory Ordinance No.2221, from August 20<sup>th</sup>, 2012.
- [36] Security equipments for the Cup and Olympic Games will be donated to host cities. Available at <http://www.ebc.com.br/esportes/2013/09/equipamentos-de-seguranca-para-copa-e-olimpiadas-ficariao-como-legado-para-cidades>. Access on 02/15/2014.
- [37] *Turks Feel a Brazilian Bomb Firsthand*. Available at <http://www.apublica.org/2013/06/gas-lacrimogeneo-brasileiro-utilizado-pela-policia-na-turquia>. Access on 02/15/2014.



ATENÇÃO

1-0018

BATALÃO DE POLÍCIA DE RUA

POLÍCIA MILITAR

109

A look upon the legacy of the World Cups in Brazil, South Africa and Germany

for Security during FIFA Brazil World Cup 2014. The Military Police (PM) will patrol the stadia surroundings.

### World Cup Weapons<sup>38</sup>

|                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
| 2.2 thousand kits | With pepper sprays and foams, tear-gas grenades with traceable chips, moral effect grenades for indoor and outdoors use and sound and light exploding grenades |
| 8.3 thousand      | Moral effect grenades  |
| 8.3 thousand      | Sound and light grenades   |
| 8.3 thousand      | Tear gas triple smoking grenades   |
| 50 thousand       | Pepper sprays  |
| 449 kits          | With rubber bullet cartridges and impact-expandable cartridges   |
| 1.8 thousand      | Tasers   |

The 12 host cities will also receive a guidebook with public security project suggestions, to help in their preparation for the event. The “Safe Cup Guidebook”<sup>39</sup> was created by Brazilian Public Security Forum, in partnership with the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and it features “Best practices” suggestions for the municipal managers.



**Photo on the opposite page:** Caveirão (Big Skull), an armored vehicle used for police intervention in Rio de Janeiro favelas. (Photo: Gláucia Marinho)

### Portal da Copa infographic

[38] Detailed expenses available at <http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br/despesasdiarias/empenho/documento=20024800012012NE800082&pagina=3#paginaao>. Access on 02/15/2014.

[39] Safe Cup Guidebook. Available at [http://www.soudapaz.org/upload/pdf/guia\\_copa\\_segura.pdf](http://www.soudapaz.org/upload/pdf/guia_copa_segura.pdf). Access on 12/10/2013.

## *Laws are changed to accommodate FIFA*

Rio de Janeiro City Council, during the October 15th protest. (Photo: Felipe Werneck)

[40] Available at <http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/Legislacao/leis/2010/lei12350.htm>. Access on 02/20/2014

[41] Available at [http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil\\_03/\\_ato2011-2014/2012/Lei/L12663.htm](http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/Lei/L12663.htm). Access on 01/10/2014.

[42] “Ambush marketing is an illegal marketing activity, which seeks to benefit from the huge interest and the large visibility of an event like the FIFA World Cup™ to promote a product or service through an unauthorized commercial association”. Available at <http://pt.fifa.com/worldcup/organisation/marketing/brand-protection/prohibited-marketing/index.html>. Access on 12/12/2013.


[43] A practice in which the seller conditions the sale of one product (the “tying” product) on the buyer’s agreement to purchase a separate product (the “tied” product) from the seller, as well as imposing quantity limits without fair cause, which are both forbidden in Brazil, by its Consumer Defense Code

[44] Available at [http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p\\_cod\\_mate=103652](http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_cod_mate=103652). Access on 12/20/2013

[45] Institutional Act No. 5, or AI-5, went into force on December 13<sup>th</sup>, 1968, during the Military Dictatorship in Brazil, and it authorized the President to: decree Congressional Recess; intervene on states and municipalities; remove Congresspersons from office; suspend any citizen’s political rights; order the confiscation of assets considered to be illicit; and to suspend the habeas-corpus writ. The Act was in force until December 1978. Source: CPDOC/FGV. Available at <http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/FatosImagens/AI5>. Access on 12/20/2013.

On December 20th, 2010,<sup>40</sup> went into force the Law No. 12.350/2010, which exonerates FIFA, its partners, services providers and authorized broadcasting network from taxes. That was not the only law created specifically for the benefit of FIFA. The General World Cup Law – Law No.12.663, from June 5th of 2012<sup>41</sup> – set the rules for the realization of 2014 World Cup in Brazil. The text provides protection for the brand FIFA and for the Cup’s symbols, creates a new type of crime, namely the “ambush marketing”<sup>42</sup>, which did not exist until then in Brazilian legislation, and creates two-kilometer radius zones exclusively for FIFA around the matches’ sites. The new law also tramples Brazilians’ lawful rights. General World Cup Law’s article 27 allows FIFA to make tying arrangements,<sup>43</sup> which are forbidden by the Brazilian Consumer Defense Code.

Other bills linked to the Cup are being analyzed by the Senate. The bill No. 728/2011<sup>44</sup> determines the prohibition of strikes during the tournament period. “The Cup’s AI-5”<sup>45</sup>, as it is popularly called, defines the crime of terrorism and carries sentences of up to 30 years imprisonment. Bill No. 394/09 “establishes FIFA as the exclusive owner of rights pertaining FIFA Brazil World Cup 2014 and FIFA Brazil Confederations Cup 2013, including all media, marketing, licensing and tickets rights” and the



“obligation to define clean zones and clean transportation zones during the 90 days before the beginning until the end of the event”.<sup>46</sup>

In a note divulged by the National Articulation of the World Cup Popular Committees (ANCOP), Thiago Hoshino, member of Curitiba World Cup Popular Committee, states that the “Clean zones” aim to “regulate the excluding and sanitizing city policies”. And he goes on: “Clean of what, that is the question: of poor laborers, of informal commerce, street vendors, and above all, of competition from unauthorized publicity”.<sup>47</sup>

André Rodrigues, special consultant to the Ministry of Justice for major events, announced that the government intends to create “special courts” to try and punish crimes and misdemeanors related to the event. That made international news.<sup>48</sup> Special courts were implemented for the first time in 2010, in the South Africa World Cup. Alexandre Moraes da Rosa, in his article “World Cup’s exceptional courts only benefit FIFA”, emphasizes that, besides being abusive, these norms have a very clear objective, which is to protect the interests of FIFA, who detains the power of monopoly over the commerce of brands that sponsor the event”.<sup>49</sup>

## *Militarization of poorer quarters legitimized by the mega events*

Police intervention in the poorer areas of Rio de Janeiro, through the UPPs (Pacifying Police Units), permanent police forces that are stationed exclusively in favelas, is a strategy to grant military control of the land by the State, so it can socially dominate it and open the favelas for the capital. UPPs give the market a legal and property security it didn’t usually have in those areas. That policy is sold as one of the great legacies of the mega events to Rio, and it is presented to the population as a project based on a neighborhood patrolling model. Its goal is supposed to be “the recovery of areas that had been taken over by drug dealers”.<sup>50</sup>

UPPs already have over 9 thousand men. Five years after their implementation, the policy also proves to be a process of reorganizing the city, socially and ethnically, for the mega events. Currently there are 37 units spread around the city. Most of them are in tourism areas: the South Side, where most of the hotels are; the North Side, close to sports equipments – around Maracanã Stadium; and there are rumors that new units will be stationed in roads that lead into the city, such as the compound of favelas da Maré, one of the access roads to Tom Jobim International Airport (formerly called Galeão).



**Message to the police** placed in a door in slums of Complexo do Alemão (Photo: Renato Consentino)

- .....
- [46] Available at [http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p\\_cod\\_mate=93019](http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_cod_mate=93019). Access on 10/10/2013.
- [47] Available at [http://www.portalpopulardacopa.org.br/index.php?option=com\\_k2&view=item&id=223:direitode-greve-de-defesa-e-de-locomo%C3%A7%C3%A3o-emperigo-o-ai-5-da-copa](http://www.portalpopulardacopa.org.br/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=223:direitode-greve-de-defesa-e-de-locomo%C3%A7%C3%A3o-emperigo-o-ai-5-da-copa). Access on 10/10/2013.
- [48] Copa 2014: will Brazil have exceptional courts? Available at <http://www.cartacapital.com.br/blogs/outras-palavras/copa-2014-brasil-tera-tribunais-de-excecao-7783.html>. Access on 02/15/14. See more in: Brazil plans ‘World Cup courts’. Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/football/2013/dec/04/brazil-world-cup-courts>. Access on 02/16/2014.
- [49] Moraes da Rosa, Alexandre. World Cup Exceptional Courts only benefit FIFA. *Consultor Jurídico* magazine, November 2013. Also available at <http://www.conjur.com.br/2013-nov-09/diario-classe-tribunais-excecao-copainteressam-fifa>. Access on 02/16/2014
- [50] Excerpt from the text “O que é?” (What is it?). UPP official website. Available at [http://www.upprj.com/index.php/o-qu\\_e\\_upp](http://www.upprj.com/index.php/o-qu_e_upp). Access on 01/20/2014.
- [51] Favela da Maré will have 4 UPPs, with at least 1.5 thousand men, says Beltrame. Available at <http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2013/11/favela-da-mare-tera-4-upps-com-pelo-menos-15-mil-policiais-diz-beltrame.html>. Access on 11/05/2013.

**Estado promete pacificar mais 43 favelas até 2010**  
 Prioridades serão as comunidades localizadas no roteiro da Rio 2016

■ O governo do estado planeja até 2010 ampliar o programa de Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) em mais 43 favelas do Rio de Janeiro, com foco em comunidades localizadas no roteiro da Copa do Mundo de 2014 e no carnaval de 2010. O plano prevê a pacificação de 43 favelas até o fim de 2010, com o objetivo de garantir a segurança pública durante o evento. O plano prevê a pacificação de 43 favelas até o fim de 2010, com o objetivo de garantir a segurança pública durante o evento. O plano prevê a pacificação de 43 favelas até o fim de 2010, com o objetivo de garantir a segurança pública durante o evento.

RIO

## Paz nas favelas para os Jogos

Estado planeja ampliar para 47, até fim de 2010, o número de comunidades com UPPs

**CONHEÇA OS PLANOS DO GOVERNO**

Estado planeja ampliar para 47, até fim de 2010, o número de comunidades com UPPs

■ O governador do estado planeja até 2010 ampliar o programa de Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) em mais 43 favelas do Rio de Janeiro, com foco em comunidades localizadas no roteiro da Copa do Mundo de 2014 e no carnaval de 2010. O plano prevê a pacificação de 43 favelas até o fim de 2010, com o objetivo de garantir a segurança pública durante o evento. O plano prevê a pacificação de 43 favelas até o fim de 2010, com o objetivo de garantir a segurança pública durante o evento.

[52] Demographic Census 2010 – subnormal urban clusters. Available at [http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2010/aglomerados\\_subnormais/agsn2010.pdf](http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2010/aglomerados_subnormais/agsn2010.pdf). Access on 12/12/2013.

[53] One example is “resolution 013”, from 2007, issued by Rio de Janeiro Public Security Office, that gave military policemen full powers to forbid the realization of any social, cultural or sporting event, without previous notice. Last year, the state government revoked the decree, but in reality the cultural activities, even when legally approved, keep being forbidden by the police. See “UPP Commander forbids Funk ball nights in Rocinha”. Available at <http://odia.ig.com.br/noticia/rio-de-janeiro/2014-02-11/comandante-de-upp-proibe-funk-na-rocinha.html>. Access on 12/12/2013.

[54] Vila Cruzeiro and Alemão inhabitants denounce Police abuses. Available at [http://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/app/noticia/brasil/2010/11/29/interna\\_brasil,225344/moradores-da-vila-cruzeiro-e-do-alemao-denunciam-abusos-dos-policiais.shtml](http://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/app/noticia/brasil/2010/11/29/interna_brasil,225344/moradores-da-vila-cruzeiro-e-do-alemao-denunciam-abusos-dos-policiais.shtml). Access on 10/14/2013. See also: NGOs denounce police abuse in Complexo de Alemão to the UN and OAS. Available at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/849053-ongs-denunciam-abusos-da-policia-no-complexo-do-alemao-a-onu-e-a-oea.shtml>. Access on 11/14/2013.

[55] In 76% of Rio’s UPPs there are complaints about policemen. Available at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2013/09/1335523-em-76-das-upps-no-rio-ha-denuncia-contra-algum-policial.shtml>. Access on 02/15/14.

**TUDO PARA VOCE GARANTIR UMA BOA VIAGEM**

COMO VIAGRAR COM SEGURANÇA E COMERTEZAS? NÃO É DIFÍCIL, SE VOCÊ SEGUIR ALGUMAS RECOMENDAÇÕES. A FOLHA DE VIAGRANTE É O SEU MELHOR AMIGO PARA GARANTIR UMA BOA VIAGEM.

**UPPs fazem festas para o Dia das Crianças**

PM e comunidades se unem

■ Apesar de não ser uma tradição, as UPPs estão realizando festas para o Dia das Crianças em várias comunidades. O objetivo é proporcionar momentos de lazer e alegria para as crianças das favelas. As festas são realizadas em parceria com as comunidades e incluem jogos, brincadeiras e distribuição de doces. O objetivo é proporcionar momentos de lazer e alegria para as crianças das favelas.

In Rio de Janeiro there are 763 favelas, where approximately 1.3 million people live.<sup>52</sup> Beyond intervening militarily, the UPPs aim to rule over the behavior of favela inhabitants – with the government support – by imposing discipline and controlling the people through excessive use of force and exceptional laws.<sup>53</sup> The first UPP was established in 2008 on Santa Marta Hill, in the South Side.

Their entrance in each territory is a media show, combined with a civic-military parade and the raising of Brazil and Rio de Janeiro flags. Operations include the participation of Armed Forces’ war staff and equipments, and special battalions. Reports of authority abuse and disproportional use of force are commonplace when the police arrive at the favelas, where they invade people’s homes without any kind of court order. When they took over the favelas that compose Complexo do Alemão, in the North Side, Military Police colonel Mario Sérgio Duarte declared that “the order” was to “search each and every house”, implying also that anyone who tried to stop the police from invading his or her home would be treated as a suspect.<sup>54</sup>

UPPs are presented as a highly effective model of security enforcement, but reality does not confirm that. A survey made by the newspaper Folha de São Paulo, with accounts by people who live in the areas under military intervention and documents from Civil and Military Polices, show that there are complaints about the policemen’s behavior in 25 of the 33 UPPs, that is, in 76% of them.<sup>55</sup> Their violent





attitude and control of people's daily lives have been drawing reactions from the citizens who live in favelas, and who sometimes end up being considered criminals or even being killed.

The use of UPPs as a security policy has no real efficiency in reducing the violence numbers in the city.

List of emblematic cases of disrespect for life by the police in UPP-occupied areas<sup>56</sup>

|   |      |  |
|---|------|--|
| UPP Pavão-Pavãozinho, Copacabana, South Side      | 2011 | André de Lima Cardoso Ferreira, 19, was approached by police officers in a favela alley. He was immobilized and beaten. Then, the police let him go, but after taking a few steps, he was shot point-blank.  |
| UPP Fogueteiro Hill, Santa Teresa, Central region | 2012 | Ten BOPE (Military Police Special Ops) officers arrived at the favela, in a van, shooting. Thales Pereira Ribeiro D'Adrea, 15, was shot in the crotch and in the chest, and died on the spot.  |
| UPP Cidade de Deus, Jacarepaguá, West Side        | 2013 | Paulo Henrique dos Santos Benedito, 25, was shot in the head while he passed through the favela on his motorcycle. The shot was fired by a local UPP military police officer, but in the precinct, other policemen insisted that there had been a confrontation.   |
| UPP Manguinhos, Manguinhos, North Side            | 2013 | Mateus Oliveira Casé, 17, was hit with a taser gun (supposedly a 'non-lethal' weapon) during a police approach. The young man succumbed to the shock and died.   |
| UPP Jacarezinho, Jacaré, North Side               | 2013 | In the night of April 4th, Jacarezinho residents were protesting against the arbitrary arrest of two neighbors for 'contempt of authority' and in solidarity for a 10-year-old child hit in the face by a moral effect bomb. In the repression of the protest, the police used physical aggression and firearms, leaving three residents shot. Aliélson Nogueira, 21, who was having a hot dog in the vicinity at the time of the conflict, was shot in the head and died on the spot. |



Extra Newspaper, September 6<sup>th</sup>, 2011

[56] Cases taken from the report sent to the UN by the NGO Justiça Global (Global Justice) about police violence.



**Protest** on the day of the Confederations' Cup Final.  
(Photo: Henrique Fornazin)

#### List of emblematic cases of disrespect for life by the police in UPP-occupied areas (continuation)

|  |      |   |
|--|------|---|
| Querosene Hill, Estácio, Central Region      | 2013 | Anderson dos Santos Moura, 29, was killed on June 15th, 2013, during a shootout between the police and drug dealers   |
| UPP Rocinha, São Conrado, South Side         | 2013 | Amarildo Dias de Souza, 47, a father of six, was taken by police officers to the UPP HQ in the favela and is missing to this day. Ten PM officers were indicted by the crimes of torture and manslaughter in Amarildo's case. <sup>57</sup> |
| UPP Parque Proletário, Penha, North Side     | 2013 | Laércio Hilário da Luz Neto, 17, was found dead in a rooftop in Vila Cruzeiro. His neighbors, outraged, set fire to a bus and threw rocks at a police car.  |
| UPP Jacarezinho, Jacaré, North Side          | 2013 | Israel de Oliveira Malet, 23, was shot with a rifle while passing by four officers from the local UPP, and died in the hospital.  |
| UPP Manguinhos, Manguinhos, North Side       | 2013 | Paulo Roberto Pinho de Menezes, 18, was beaten by policemen after an approach. The young men succumbed to the injuries.   |
| UPP Pavão-Pavãozinho, Copacabana, South Side | 2013 | Thomas Rodrigues Martins, 33, died during a shootout in the favela.   |
| UPP Providência, Inner City, Central Region  | 2013 | Diogo de Oliveira Santos, 26, and Henrique Souza Rodrigues (age unknown) were shot under the accusation of leading local traffic.   |
| UPP Alemão, Penha, North Side                | 2013 | Anderson Simplício de Mendonça, 29, was murdered under the allegation that he was a drug dealer.  |
| UPP Pavão-Pavãozinho, Copacabana, South Side | 2014 | Patrick Costa dos Santos, 21, was shot during a confrontation with UPP officers.  |
| UPP São João, Engenho Novo, North Side       | 2014 | José Carlos Lopes Junior, 19, was shot in the head with an assault rifle.   |

[57] Amarildo's case had international reverberation, and became symbolic of the persistence of abusive practices by the police.

Besides, it is very clear that there are economic interests – related to the mega events – behind the “pacifying” process that raises the real estate prices in the regions under military intervention, stifles normal activities in the favelas and forces a gentrification process, causing the former residents to move out.

BBC Brazil story  
November 16th, 2011

### **‘UPP Effect’ causes rent prices to rise more in favelas than in the rest of Rio**

*“Rent prices in Rio de Janeiro favelas have gone up 6.8% higher than in other city areas since the UPPs (Pacifying Police Units) started being implemented, according to a survey made by Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) and released on this Wednesday.”*

(Complete text in: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2011/11/111116\\_favelas\\_aluguel\\_rp.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2011/11/111116_favelas_aluguel_rp.shtml))

O Globo Newspaper story  
May 19th, 2012

### **Vidigal attracts illustrious residents and wins “Favela chic” status**

UPP-made transformations have accelerated lately.

*“All gentrification roads lead to Vidigal because aside from facing one of the best landscapes of the South Side, it is quite a view on its own.*

*“Whoever sold their properties in post-occupation times has had their expectations exceeded. At Arrvãõ, where the vista appreciates anyslover (em português estava “valoriza qualquer fresta” Faz sentido, isso?!), one cannot find a one-bedroom house for less than*

*R\$ 150 thousand (approximately US\$ 67,4 thousand)’, says real estate agent José Nélio Pereira da Silva, better known as Gerônimo, owner for five years of the first real estate agency in Vidigal favela. Between 2011 and 2012, he says he’s sold approximately 40 properties in the favela to ‘people from outside’.”*

(Complete text in: Texto completo em <http://oglobo.globo.com/rio/vidigalatrai-moradores-ilustres-ganha-status-de-favela-chique-8412639#ixzz2qacydxfj>)

Poorer areas’ militarization project was exported to another World Cup host city: Salvador. During the inauguration of the new patrolling project, Bahia governor Jacques Wagner explained why he followed Rio’s example: *“The victory that Rio’s government is achieving on the last few years, where security is concerned, is a victory I, too, celebrate”*. Since 2001, 13 Community Bases have been established in Salvador.<sup>58</sup>

## **“There will be no World Cup”: protests and state repression in the World Cup’s host cities**

### **Considerations on “June Journey”**

It is still too early to explain the complex reasons that led to the first masses’ movement of the decade. The protests that took Brazilian streets on June 2013, demanding the reduction of public transportation fares, are rooted in the historic struggle of urban social movements that defend their right to the city. That means the *June Journey* did not begin in 2013. The mega events only intensified the fight for public spaces. One example is the destruction of the inflatable model of the 2014 World Cup official mascot, an armadillo called “Fuleco”. And it was not by chance that the height of the protests took place during the Confederations Cup, between the 15th and the 30th of June.

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[58] Bahia inaugurates its first Community Security Base, inspired by the UPPs. Available at <http://www.rj.gov.br/web/imprensa/exibeconteudo?article-id=437599>, access on 02/16/14.

**Photo on the opposite page:** Public Act “Maraca is ours” (Photo: Renato Cosentino)

- .....
- [59] World Cup’s mascot, the armadillo takes it during a protest in Porto Alegre. Available at <http://globoesporte.globo.com/futebol/copa-do-mundo/noticia/2012/10/mascote-dacopatu-bola-leva-pior-durante-protesto-em-porto-alegre.html>. Access on 02/16/14.
- [60] Number of arrests gathered by surveys made by Human Rights and social movements organizations, in order to build the case at OAS. See more at: SP and Rio toughen up and vandals will be treated as criminal organizations. Available at <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/cidades,sp-e-rio-endurecem-e-vandalosserao-tratados-como-organizacao-criminosa,1083518,0.htm>. Access on 02/16/14.
- [61] Couple arrested in SP is indicted under the National Security Law. Available at <http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/casal-presos-em-protesto-em-sp-enquadrado-na-lei-de-seguranca-nacional-10290793>. Access on 02/16/14.
- [62] See more in: Protests and jeers mark Confederations Cup opening. Available at <http://esportes.terra.com.br/futebol/protestos-e-vaia-marcam-abertura-da-copa-das-confederacoes,55b2e81e2424f310VgnCLD2000000ec6eb0aR.CRD.html>. Access on 02/16/14. See more in: Police use bombs, run over protestors and disperses protest at Mané Garrincha. Available at <http://copadomundo.uol.com.br/noticias/redacao/2013/06/15/policia-dispersamanifestantes-com-bombas-e-torcedores-sofrem-com-gas.htm>. Access on 02/16/14.

The first attack on the World Cup mascot, a 22.9-foot inflatable sponsored by Coca-Cola, happened in 2012’s last trimester, during a protest in the center of Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul. The protest was a “Public defense of joy”, and criticized the privatization of the capital’s public spaces.<sup>59</sup>

Protests have brought to light the ugly face of government repression. At least seven deaths, and over 1700 arrests, have occurred during the protests.<sup>60</sup> In Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, protestors were accused of crime and criminal association.

After June’s protests, federal government made laws even tougher. In September of 2013, the Criminal Organization Law (Law No. 12.850/2013) was sanctioned. This law authorizes the State to intercept phone calls, to have access to phone companies, financial institutions, internet providers and credit card companies without the need of a court order, and allows for policemen to infiltrate activities under investigation.

In October, in São Paulo, a couple was indicted under the National Security Law (Law No. 7.170/1983), after being accused of damaging a civil police car.<sup>61</sup> National Security Law is an exceptional code approved during the military coup of 1964. This law defines crimes against territorial integrity and national sovereignty; the representative and democratic regime; the Union and the Rule of Law; and the person of the Union Powers’ Chiefs.

## #The Cup of Manifestations

Jeers, protests, arrests and the Brazilian national team’s victory marked the opening of the Confederations Cup, on June 15. Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff and FIFA’s president, Joseph Blatter, were booed during the official ceremony, in Mané Garrincha National Stadium, in Brasília. But the people’s dissatisfaction went beyond the stadium walls. A protest against the use of public money in the games’ realization drew thousands of people to the streets. Police shot tear gas bombs and rubber bullets at the protestors. Twenty-nine people were arrested.<sup>62</sup>

Protests went on. With the intensification of police violence, in Belo Horizonte, MG, representatives of Minas Gerais’ Prosecutors Office, Military Police, Civil Police, Public Defender Office, Minas Gerais Human Rights Forum, Popular Counseling Office, Citizenship Hub and of social movements created the Commission for Prevention of Violence in Popular Protests. During the protests that were carried out during the Confederations Cup matches in the city – on June 22nd and 26th – there have been reports of abusive use of tear gas bombs by the Military Police; undue approaches and arrests; forced confiscation of gas masks, flasks containing milk of magnesia and/or vinegar (both used to avoid the effects of tear gas), and also of cameras and cell phones. Police was also accused of closing “exit ways”, cornering the protestors.

Since the beginning of June’s Journey, Minas Gerais’ Prosecutors Office received



**KINDER**  
CULINÁRIA • VIGORIAS • TIGER • M&M'S  
R. Conde de Bonfim, 288 Lj. 101  
3978-2555  
BARRA - 3419-8333  
IPANEMA - 2521-9777  
TAMBÉM EM SÃO PAULO, SP

**Hua Conde de Bonfim**  
R. Conde de Bonfim, 288 Lj. 101  
289 307

**ATENÇÃO**

**Mato Grosso!**

**LUTO PELO RIO**

**NADA DEVE PARECER NATURAL**

**PARIS**  
CANTINHO



Public Act “Maraca is ours”  
(Photo: Renato Cosentino)

[63] 2<sup>nd</sup> victim of fall from overpass during protests in BH dies in the hospital. Available at <http://g1.globo.com/minas-gerais/noticia/2013/07/morre-em-hospital-2-vitima-de-queda-de-viaduto-nas-manifestacoes-em-bh.html>. Access on 02/16/2014.

[64] Federal Capital Government says protests in the stadium were paid for. Available at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/folhanacopa/2013/06/1295541-governo-dodistrito-federal-diz-que-protesto-em-estadio-foi-pago.shtml>. Access on 02/16/2014

[65] Information in this summary on violence during the protests was taken from the document “Protests and state repression in Brazil: Executive Summary”, sent to OAS by the NGO Justiça Global (Global Justice).

over 1500 complaints about police abuse. Two young men have died in the state, in matches’ days, after falling from an overpass while fleeing from the police attack during the protests: Douglas Henrique de Oliveira Souza, 21, and Luiz Felipe Aniceto de Almeida, 22.<sup>63</sup>

On June 14th, 2013, in Brasília, two female coordinators of the Homeless Laborers Movement (MTST) and a truck driver who had transported tires to a protest were arrested in their homes, supposedly “caught in the act”, although the protest had ended hours before their detention. In an attempt to delegitimize the protest, the Federal Capital Civil Police director stated, during a press conference, that there might be evidences that the protest had been paid for.<sup>64</sup>

During the games – on June 19th and 23rd – in Fortaleza, CE, police attacked protestors with rubber bullets and tear gas while they were on their knees, in a space that had been closed at FIFA’s request.

Porto Alegre registered a large number of arrests in the same period. During the protests of June 13th, 17th, 20th, 24th and 27th, 208 people, both adults and adolescents, were detained. According to depositions made to the Human Rights Commission of Porto Alegre City Hall, many teenagers reported situations where the police was violent and made arbitrary arrests. According to the organ’s report, “A detained adolescent girl said she was taking part of the protest and, due to the tear-gas bombs, she started to feel very ill, with shortness of breath and dizziness. She then decided

to ask a riot policeman for help, and he told her to go beyond the police line. When she did, she was handcuffed and put in a police car”. Another arrested adolescent, a transsexual, reported many humiliations she was put through because of her gender identity. According to the reports, during the protests the police officers did not wear any kind of identification.<sup>65</sup>

The protests were not confined to the host cities. All around the country there were protests against the use of public money in the World Cup, and in denouncement of the human rights violations caused by the infrastructure building works being made because of the mega event.

In the final match, on June 15th, according to data released by SESGE, 864 thousand people took to the streets in protest. In Rio, where the big game happened, more than 300 thousand people occupied the area around Maracanã, yelling “There will be no World Cup!”. Confederations Cup ended the way it begun: amidst jeers, protests, arrests and the Brazilian national team’s victory.



## *250 thousand people evicted by Brazil World Cup*

One of the main human rights that have been consistently violated in the 12 World Cup host cities is the right to housing. The National Articulation of World Cup Popular Committees' (ANCOP)<sup>66</sup> estimate is that 250 thousand people<sup>67</sup> are currently going through evictions all around Brazil, but that number may be much higher, due to the fact that it is very difficult to have access to official data, especially in favelas. City governments usually only disclose data from expropriations in formal areas, which is a serious transparency problem. The data from the World Cup committees have been collected through newspaper news, public hearings, communities leaders' reports and cases that are followed by its members.

**Eviction** Comunidade Recreio II, West Side of Rio de Janeiro (Photo: Renato Cosentino)

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[66] Ancop congregates social movements, organizations, communities' representatives, researchers and other entities – and people – who have a critical view of the way urban transformations for the World Cup and the Olympic Games are being handled. Popular Committees are in the 12 World Cup host cities: Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Cuiabá, Curitiba, Fortaleza, Manaus, Natal, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and São Paulo. Their site is <http://portalpopulardacopa.org.br>.

[67] This information has not yet been added in the “Mega events and human rights violations in Brazil” report, available for downloading at <http://bit.ly/DossieBrasil2012>. It will be updated in the 2014 report.

Campinho community, West Side of Rio de Janeiro.  
(Photo: Felipe Werneck)



| World Cup Host City | Number of persons evicted or under threat of eviction |
|---------------------|---|
| Fortaleza           | 20.000  |
| Natal               | 4.000   |
| Rio de Janeiro      | 44.000  |
| São Paulo           | 89.200  |
| Porto Alegre        | 28.000  |
| Curitiba            | 6.000   |
| Belo Horizonte      | 14.000  |
| Cuiabá              | 3.200   |
| Manaus              | 3.600   |
| Salvador            | 12.000  |
| Recife              | 12.000  |
| Brasília            | 2.000   |
| <b>Total</b>        | <b>250.000</b>  |

Committees consider as evictions or threat of eviction the removals that happen because of construction works that are in the government's responsibilities matrix and those that are not, but that are related to the event. According

to the criteria used by the Articulation, when mayors, governors and other public agents divulge that some building must be ready until 2014, a correlation between its construction and the World Cup is made, whether or not



it is in the responsibilities matrix, not least because it has been frequently altered by the federal government.

Two things are usually questioned about the evictions: the way they are carried out and their motive. All over Brazil there is an enormous lack of information to the communities concerning the projects that will impact their lives. The amounts offered as compensation to the residents who have to leave their homes are below the market prices and there are cases in which the families did not receive any compensation.<sup>68</sup> Besides, the relocations are made to distant areas, with poor or no infrastructure – usually projects from the federal government program “My House, My Life”. Launched in the beginning of 2009 as an answer to the worldwide economy crisis, the program subsidizes private construction companies in exchange for their building of social-interest housing. Those companies seek the cheapest lands to maximize their profits, and for that reason the apartments built for the low-income population are mostly built in peripheral areas. In the World Cup host cities, the program has been diverted from its original purpose, which is to reduce the housing shortage in the country, into relocating families who already do have houses, but that are being removed from them because of the great sporting events.

“There is a huge difference between housing policy and a policy for the industrial production of houses, which is the real nature of Minha Casa, Minha Vida program, in a counter-cyclic economical perspective and in re-

sponse to the 2008–2009 economic crisis”, said UN special rapporteur Raquel Rolnik. “From a human point of view, housing is an entryway for other things like health, jobs, education and living conditions; all of which are violated the moment a person is torn from his or her house, which many times already is not in good shape, to another place where they will be subject to even worse circumstances. Then, obviously, that person will have to go back to an also precarious condition, in the same place” she added.<sup>69</sup>

The reason for the evictions is also questioned. In many cities, it is very easy to notice that the removal of families is directly related to the real estate market interests, and not to interventions that will benefit the public or that are even linked to mega events. In Fortaleza, the Ceará state governor was caught on video negotiating with entrepreneurs the removal of poor families to open way for the VLT (Light Rail Vehicle), which the governor himself called a “monkey business”. The video wound up leaking to the web and the governor justified himself saying he had been misinterpreted.<sup>70</sup>

Cid Gomes: “In at least three locations, Nunes Valente, Leonardo Mota and over at the Papicu, it can be done [high-rises]. [...] Then, let’s see if we can do some ‘monkey business’ there. It is easier for the state to expropriate, right? [...] I expropriate... We figure out an amount, I build the station, I have the money for it, but you go ahead and make a project with the verticalization included. And then this money, that the State will be using for the expropriations, you give it to me [...]”.

[68] An example is the case of Restinga community, in the Recreio dos Bandeirantes neighborhood (RJ), partially removed for the building of TransOeste in December 2010. Approximately 20 families did not receive any compensation, according to residents.

[69] Excerpt of an interview featured in the newspaper A Nova Democracia, available at <http://www.anovademocracia.com.br/no-94/4183-entrevista-raquel-rolnik-qas-remocoes-sao-fruto-da-valorizacao-imobiliariaq>, access on 02/16/2014.

[70] Available at <http://youtu.be/CuNLLuPu8WU>, access on 02/16/2014.

**Photo on the opposite page:** Largo do Tanque, Rio de Janeiro West Side.

In Porto Alegre, Santa Tereza Hill communities encompass four neighborhoods (Vila Gaúcha, Vila Ecológica, Vila Padre Cacique and Vila União-Prisma), where 1600 families have been living for over 30 years. Its proximity to Beira-Rio stadium, which will host the World Cup matches, its view of Guaíba river and the short distance from there to the city center have sparked the interest of the real estate market. In 2010, a bill (PL388) tried to privatize the 74-hectare public area, but the residents, together with the organized civil society, created a movement in defense of the regularization of the villages, and forced the government to retreat. In the first semester of 2011, governor Tarso Genro issued a decree<sup>71</sup> reinforcing the Cities' Statute and guaranteeing the right to housing of the families residing there. Nevertheless, they're currently apprehensive, since the regularization has not yet been made and the building of an event center in the area has been announced. The general fear is that the City may still evict the residents. Communities have already registered the request of Special Use Concession for Housing Purposes, and required the demarcation of their communities as a social interest special area.

In Rio de Janeiro, which will also host the Olympic Games, 65 thousand people have already been evicted since 2009, according to the City Housing Office, both because of building works related to the mega events and because the places where they lived were seen as risk areas, in data revealed in May 2013 to the Estado de São Paulo newspaper.<sup>72</sup> Nevertheless,

the evictions that took place at the Recreio dos Bandeirantes in 2010 and 2011 for the building of TransOeste (an expressway between Rio de Janeiro neighborhoods) only left behind empty lands. "The building of TransOeste resulted in the removal of approximately 500 families in three communities (Vila Harmonia, Vila Recreio II and Restinga). There was no previous notice. The compensations were too low, forcing residents to stay in informal housing, and the alternate relocation offered to them was much too distant. It is inadmissible that a mobility initiative results in the violation of these families' right to housing", said Renata Neder, from International Amnesty, which accompanied a mission organized by the Rio de Janeiro World Cup and Olympic Games Popular Committee in the area.

Recreio region, where the evictions occurred, concentrates many real estate launches. Between Grota Funda Tunnel, close to where Vila Recreio II used to be, and Recreio Mall, by the side of what was once Vila Harmonia – now occupied by the 18th Rio City Conservation Management Office – the Media Village is being built, to house journalists during 2016 Olympics. After the Games, the place will be turned into another typical condo, with units that are being sold with prices ranging from R\$ 415 thousand to R\$ 937 thousand (US\$ 186.8 thousand and US\$ 421.8 thousand, respectively).<sup>73</sup> UFRJ (Rio de Janeiro Federal University) professor and Observatório das Metrôpoles researcher Orlando dos Santos Júnior explains that the city project that is under way, associated

[71] Decree No. 48.029, from May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2011.

[72] Available at <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/esportes,dossie-denuncia-remocoes-ilegais-para-copa-e-rio2016,1031998,0.htm>. Access on 02/16/2014.

[73] Available at <http://oglobo.globo.com/economia/imoveis/prefeitura-esta-procura-de-novas-acomodacoes-para-jornalistas-que-vem-cobrir-as-olimpiadas-8067298>. Access on 02/16/2014.



to major sporting events, has the gentrification of cities at its core. “The existence of the lower classes becomes an obstacle. In order for this project to work out, it is necessary to relocate the poor within the city. That implies the building of housing projects in peripheral areas and the removal of communities, which is a requisite to attract investors”, he says.

In favelas removal processes, the City of Rio always keeps individual negotiations, that is, it does not negotiate with an association or a residents’ committee, but with each family at a time. That was the way it found to undermine the community and avoid organized, collective resistance. That way, when a resident accepts leaving his/her house, the City usually tears it down, leaving the rubble behind to structurally damage the neighboring houses and to emotionally shake the people who did not cave in. The compensations are too low, since the City

pays only for the improvements (walls, roof, windows), not recognizing the land ownership even when the area has been occupied for more than five years, as provided by the Brazilian Constitution. Raquel Rolnik explains:<sup>74</sup>

“The most paradoxical thing in all this is that people who do have legal ownership of their houses are being removed. The 1988 Constitution recognizes the ownership of people who occupied public or private spaces because they did not have access to adequate housing. When a person is removed, he or she has two options: compensation or relocation. A person can’t be left homeless, and it is not legally allowed to impose on someone a housing condition worse than the one they already have. None of these rules are being obeyed. And it is not by chance that the construction works are trampling the communities. It is in order to make it cheaper”, she says.

Another common practice of the City of Rio is to operate on festive dates. The families from Largo do Tanque were removed during the 2013 Carnival, Metro-Mangueira’s removal happened during school vacations and the houses on Vila Recreio II were demolished in 2010, on Christmas. In a meeting with the Recreio residents, the City promised to let the families spend their holidays in their homes, but did not keep that promise. “When we were least expecting, on December 23rd, machines got here and started tearing everything down. That was the City’s Christmas present to the community: destroying our homes in the holidays, without warning us”, complained Laércio Chagas, former resident of Vila Recreio II.

[74] Excerpt of an interview featured in the newspaper A Nova Democracia, available at <http://www.anovademocracia.com.br/no-94/4183-entrevista-rael-rolnik-gas-remocoes-sao-fruto-da-valorizacao-imobiliariaq>, access on 02/16/2014.

## *Right to Housing on Domestic and International Law*

### **The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)**

- Article 25.1: Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

### **International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)**

- Article 11: The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.

### **International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969)**

Article 5: In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, color, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: [...] e) Economic, social and cultural rights, in particular: [...] The right to housing.

### **Federal Constitution (1988)**

Article 6: Education, health, work, leisure, security, social security, protection of motherhood and childhood, and assistance to the destitute, are social rights, as set forth by this Constitution.

### **Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990)**

Article 16, 1: 1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honor and reputation.

### **The City Statute (2001)**

Article 2: The urban policy objective is to organize the full social function development of the city and urban property, according to the following guidelines:

I – To guarantee the right to sustainable cities, meaning right to urban land, housing, healthy environment, urban infrastructure, transport and public services, work and leisure, for the present and future generations;

II – Democratic management through the participation of the population and of representative associations from various sectors of society, in order to design, implement and follow urban planning, and other urban development programs or projects.

*Communities  
do have an  
alternative:  
Vila Autódromo,  
Rio de Janeiro*



Picture of Vila Recreio II  
Community,  
West Side of Rio de Janeiro  
(Photo: Renato Cosentino)



Community Vila Recreio II, West Side, Rio de Janeiro  
(Photo: Renato Cosentino)

Vila Autódromo Community is located in the area with the highest appreciation in the Barra da Tijuca neighborhood, where the center of 2016 Olympic Games will be. The public-private partnership (PPP) that the City of Rio signed with the building companies Norberto Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez and Carvalho Hosken includes the transfer of over one million square meters (approximately 247.1 acres) to the consortium after the Games. High-end condos and luxury hotels will be built on the grounds, as stated in the call for tender. Part of the Vila Autódromo area is in the PPP area and was supposed to be handed over to the building companies, which would entail the removal of the houses located there.

[75] Available for download at <http://bit.ly/PlanoPopularVA>. Access on 02/16/2014.

[76] Rio de Janeiro Federal University Urban and Regional Planning Studies Laboratory is dedicated to the study of territory and environments' appropriation methods, considering the diversity of actors involved in the space social production.

[77] Fluminense Federal University Center for Housing Projects and Studies.

And yet, Vila Autódromo community has an assignment of right to the use of the land since the 1990's, aside from being there for over four decades. The City argues that their removal would be necessary for the Olympics, but the official project, developed by British architectural firm AECOM, covered the community's urbanization as an Olympics legacy. Besides, there is a popular urbanization project developed by architects and city planners with the Federal Fluminense University (UFF) and the Rio de Janeiro Federal University (UFRJ) and residents, that shows the compatibility between the Games and the Vila's existence. Vila Autódromo Popular Plan<sup>75</sup> won, on November 2013, the first place in the *Urban Age Award*, an important international prize that acknowledges and celebrates creative initiatives for cities. It was the winner among 170 competitors with projects for the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area. The award is organized by the *Deutsche Bank* and by *London School of Economics*, and this win demonstrates that a diverse and democratic city is viable, and that the Olympics Project can be accomplished without removing people from their homes.

“We share this award with all the communities and with all the people who helped us and rooted for us. This boosts the residents self-esteem in a moment when we are all worried about the City's recent actions”, said Inalva Mendes Brito, who lives in the Vila since the 1980's. “Rio is going through this moment of people claiming in the streets, fighting for their rights, and this award stimulates us to keep on

doing that”, she added.

### Interview

Giselle Tanaka, architect and city planner, researcher for ETTERN – IPPUR/UFRJ<sup>76</sup>, who was in the Vila Autódromo Popular Plan coordinating team.

### Where did the idea for the Vila Autódromo Popular Plan come from?

IPPUR/UFRJ's ETTERN had been researching the urban conflicts issue in social construction, and it had a conflictual planning project. Vila Autódromo residents, on their turn, were organized for years in the fight against the City's removal plans. After a meeting between the Residents Association with mayor Eduardo Paes, in which he implied that if the community came up with an alternative project there would be a possibility that they could be allowed to remain there. In that context, the university – ETTERN IPPUR/UFRJ and NEPHU/UFF<sup>77</sup> assisted the community in the creation of their popular plan.

### How important was this experience for the resistance of threatened communities in Brazil?

The evictions in Rio de Janeiro are happening in an arbitrary and violent way. In most cases, there are no projects and no public debates about the real necessity for the construction

works that are being made to justify the removals. Our plan, to start with, demands that the public debates do happen, and contemplates the possibility of making changes in the city while at the same time respecting the rights and needs of the part of the population being affected by them. The plan is also an important tool for the strengthening of community organizations. The experience has wound up becoming a reference, by using planning as a means to fight for a more humane and democratic kind of city.

### **Is it possible to repeat that experience in other conflicted areas?**

Yes. In the current context of preparation for the World Cup, there are situations that are very similar in many Brazilian cities, concerning the utilization of construction works to remove the poor communities. In many of these cities, such as Fortaleza, Porto Alegre and São Paulo, the residents are coming together to resist and to present their own, alternative solutions. The plan is becoming a way of shaming the public power into listening to the people and of forcing a dialogue between government and population, in search for changes in the projects. Residents from the threatened areas saw in the plan a possibility of taking a stand and having a say in the decisions being made about their lives.

## *Communities do have an alternative: Comunidade da Paz, São Paulo*

Construction worker Jaílson da Silva, who lives in the vicinity of Itaquerão, is a symbol of the World Cup contradictions. While he works hard to finish the building of the stadium that will host the World Cup matches in São Paulo, Jaílson is at risk of having his home demolished, since he lives in Comunidade da Paz, which is threatened by the work. His family is one of about 300 which undergo the removal process.

'As that work goes ahead, I'm moving away from the place where I raised my children. For me it is not easy, because I know that the more I advance that work, the faster I'll be expelled from my home. But you have to do it, right? I need to work, I need to put food on table for my kids, there's no way around it, to do one thing I have to sacrifice the other'.<sup>78</sup>

But in Itaquera, residents also have their own project, the 'People's Alternative Plan for Comunidade da Paz',<sup>79</sup> inspired by the experience of Vila Autódromo, in Rio de Janeiro. São Paulo's version was coordinated by the movement Comunidades Unidas de Itaquera (Itaquera United Communities),

with technical advisory by Polis Institute and the NGO Peabiru Trabalhos Comunitários e Ambientais (Community and Environmental Works), and supported by São Paulo Cup Popular Committee. The plan proposes to keep 145 families on site and to relocate 155 families to the empty lot next to the community. The goal is to respect the minimum distance of 15 meters (approximately 45 ft.) established by the Forest Code and Companhia do Metrô, since the community is located between the subway line's overpass and a water stream. This proposal was considered ideal by the community, because it doesn't hinder the World Cup works, but ensures the families will be able to stay on site, in an adequate manner.

If Jaílson could talk to one of the 'big ones' (as he calls those who could indeed influence the decision not to remove the community where he lives) about what is going on, he would give them the following message: 'Social justice is not evicting human beings from their homes without giving them any option. We are being expelled as if we were animals, insignificant, excluded from society. Whether they like it or not, we are part of society.'

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[78] Available at <http://www.apublica.org/2013/06/quantomais-adianto-obra-mais-perto-fico-de-ser-removido-copa-do-mundo-copa-2014-direitos-humanos-itaquera-polocorinthians/>. Access on 02/16/14.

[79] Available at [http://www.portalpopulardacopa.org.br/index.php?option=com\\_k2&view=item&id=363:moradores-e-movimentos-sociais-lan%C3%A7am-plano-alternativo-a-remo%C3%A7%C3%B5es-em-itaquera-%C3%A0sv%C3%A9speras-da-visita-do-gt-de-moradia-adequada-da-presid%C3%A2ncia-da-rep%C3%BAblica](http://www.portalpopulardacopa.org.br/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=363:moradores-e-movimentos-sociais-lan%C3%A7am-plano-alternativo-a-remo%C3%A7%C3%B5es-em-itaquera-%C3%A0sv%C3%A9speras-da-visita-do-gt-de-moradia-adequada-da-presid%C3%A2ncia-da-rep%C3%BAblica). Access on 04/02/14.

*Removal at 500m  
from the finals of  
Brazil World Cup*

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Metrô-Mangueira Community,  
Maracanã, Rio de Janeiro  
(Photo: Renato Cosentino)







Since 2010 the City of Rio has been trying to remove the community of Metrô-Mangueira, each time with a different argument: to make parking spaces for the World Cup, to build a walkway access and, finally, for the construction of an automotive hub. The favela, however, is 500 meters (approximately 550 yards) from Maracanã, the stage for the World Cup 2014 final, and does not seem to fit the image that Rio wants to project abroad. Municipal officers started marking the houses without notice, making individual negotiations and bringing down the houses in August 2010. The first 107 families, from the approximately 700 that compose the community, according to the Association of Residents, were relocated to Cosmos, 50 kilometers (approximately 31 miles) away from there, although the Statute of the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro states, in Article 429, that “should relocation be necessary, it must be made to places near the relocated persons’ former place of residence or work”. The other families demanded a different treatment. Because of the residents’ resistance and the proximity to Maracanã, the case had worldwide reverberation and, in 2011, was on the pages of England’s best-known newspaper, *The Guardian*.<sup>80</sup> The families eventually won the right to be relocated to a place close by, in the ventures Mangueira I and II, and Bairro da Carioca, in the Triagem neighborhood. During this time, residents who had stayed at the Metrô-Mangueira lived amidst garbage, rats and insects that thrived in the rubble left by tractors. As negotiations became slower, the City could

not immediately demolish the houses anymore, and the site was abandoned. The practice of holding individual negotiations allowed for the houses to be reoccupied by homeless families as the former residents were relocated.

After the events of June 2013, the community received a visit from Mayor Eduardo Paes, who promised to those who occupied the empty houses that they would not be underserved. The meeting reassured the residents about their future. But on January 7th, 2014, the families were surprised by the arrival of tractors, which came to knock down some of the houses, accompanied by the Military Police and the Municipal Guard.

“It was inhumane what they did. The girl just came out from her house and the machine came and tore it down. Is our money rubbish? For we may be poor, but we do contribute to things. We apply for credit, we pay a lot of taxes, don’t we?” said Daiane Heizer, a resident of Metrô-Mangueira for three years. Through a public notice, the City informed the families that they would receive social rent benefits until the delivery of houses by the program “Minha Casa, Minha Vida”, which was exactly the same thing that had been promised by Paes at the 2013 meeting, but which only occurred after the residents’ mobilization. The benefit, however, did not include everyone and the situation remains uncertain for many of the households.

[80] Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/26/favela-ghost-town-rio-world-cup>. Access in 02/16/14.

## *Construction workers killed while building stadia for the World Cup in Brazil*

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On February 7th, 2014, Brazil World Cup claimed its sixth victim. Antônio José Pita Martins, 55, was hit in the head by a crane part during the dismantling of the machine. He was the third worker killed on the job only in the Arena Amazônia, in Manaus (AM), under the responsibility of the construction company Andrade Gutierrez. Two others had lost their lives in the Arena Corinthians (SP), by Odebrecht, and another one in the Estádio Nacional Mané Garrincha (DF), whose renovations were executed by Via Engenharia and by the same Andrade Gutierrez.

The repeated tragedies that happened in the preparations for Brazil World Cup reveal that precarious work and serious workers' rights violations are directly related to the high-end shows of the world capitalism, in constructions executed by the largest builders in the country, contrasting with the image that they try to project through big events. During the works for the 2010 World Cup, in South Africa,<sup>81</sup> two workers were killed. In Qatar, that will host the World Cup in 2022, Amnesty International accused FIFA of exploring slave labor.<sup>82</sup>

No wonder in 2014 FIFA was named the world's worst company in the Public Eye Awards,<sup>83</sup> known as the 'Nobel' of global corporate shame. The company received 54,333 votes and came in third place overall. Among Brazilians, FIFA was elected the worst corporation in the world, with 33,642 votes, demonstrating the Cup host country's dissatisfaction with human rights' violations involving the event.

Workers from eight of the 12 stadia that will hold Brazil World Cup matches had already been on strike by April 2012.<sup>84</sup> Claims that caused the workers to paralyze their activities are linked to low wages and disrespect of rights, such as failure to pay overtime and to provide health insurance, inadequate meals and the firing of workers who led the strike movement.

[81] Available at: <http://oglobo.globo.com/esportes/operario-morre-apos-acidente-de-guindaste-na-arena-amazonia-11536709>. Access on 02/16/14.

[82] Available at <http://oglobo.globo.com/esportes/copa-2014/anistia-internacional-denuncia-exploracao-de-operarios-no-qatar-10807317>, Access on 02/16/14.

[83] Further information at <http://publiceye.ch/pt-pt/>.

[84] Available at: <http://copadomundo.uol.com.br/noticias/redacao/2012/04/13/greves-em-estadios-da-copa-ja-paralisaram-obras-por-mais-de-tres-meses.htm>, Access on 02/16/14.



## *Maracanã: resistance to the FIFA model*

Maracanã Stadium, the stage of the World Cup Final in 1950 and one of the greatest symbols of Brazil, underwent several interventions to meet the requirements of FIFA to host the 2014 World Cup. Besides an extensive renovation of the stadium and attempts to demolish all public sports, educational and cultural facilities surrounding it, Maracanã's management has been privatized. Both Maracanã and part of its sports complex – a water park and an athletics stadium – had been reformed for the Pan-American Games of 2007. The argument, at that time, was that they would be ready for the World Cup if Brazil was chosen as host coun-

try. With the reopening of the stadium in 2013, after almost three years closed, the typical Brazilian fan realized that the rules had changed and Maracanã no longer belonged to them, as explained by João Borba, president of Consórcio Maracanã S.A., showing his view of how a football stadium should be.

“We have to work with the football clubs for this change of habits. Giant flags, bamboo flagpoles, shirtless fans, people watching the games standing up... I went to the Wimbledon tennis finals last weekend, and they said in my invitation that it wasn't advisable to go wearing some specific kinds of clothes... When a British person reads 'not advisable', they know they should not wear those clothes”,<sup>85</sup> he said.

What happened before the opening of New Maracanã – name given by the State Government and the Management Consortium to the

Act against the demolition of Célio de Barros Stadium, with the attendance of artists, including Long Jump Olympic Gold Medal Winner Maurren Maggi (fourth from left to right). (Divulgação/Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas)

[85] Available at <http://oglobo.globo.com/esportes/ambiente-exige-respeito-no-novo-maracana-9000186>, accessed on 16/02/14.



## World Cup: for whom and for what?

renovated stadium – was a massive mobilization of civil society through the campaign “Maraca is Ours” (“O Maraca é nosso”), organized by the Popular Committee for the World Cup and Olympics (Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas). In 2011 and 2012, protests were organized with two main objectives: to prevent the concession of the stadium to the private initiative being granted, and to guarantee that popular sectors would be available, showing respect to the Brazilians’ cheering traditions. The campaign gained momentum when the State Government published the public notice of the concession of Maracanã to the private initiative, based on the proposal of IMX, a company owned by Eike Batista, in October 2012. The project included the demolition of all facilities in the surrounding areas, such as the Indian Museum building, Julio Delamare Water Park, Célio de Barros Athletics Stadium and the Friedenreich Municipal School. The space would be necessary to build warm-up courts for the athletes, parking lots, a shopping mall and a wider area for the spectators’ exit, changing Maracanã, according to IMX and the State Government, into a profitable multi-use arena.

A public hearing was scheduled to the following month, and the affected groups started to get organized and meet periodically, since there was a previous issue to consider: if the management should continue to be public, or be privatized. The insistence of the Secretary Chief of Staff, Regis Fichtner, on holding the hearing in spite of the protest of 600 people, irritated the demonstrators, who threw eggs and

fruits at the Secretary. The hearing took place with the presence of security guards using umbrellas to protect government representatives. On the following day, the Committee issued a public notice affirming that they did not recognize the validity of the hearing.

In the end of the year, they had a partial achievement: the State and Municipal Governments made the commitment to keep the Friedenreich Municipal School in operation during the school year of 2013.

## 2013 and a turnaround the government did not expect

The year when the New Maracanã would go through its first major test, hosting the 2013 Confederations’ Cup Final, was marked by many turnarounds. In the morning of January 9th, without previous notice, Célio de Barros Athletics Stadium was locked up and there were police cars at its entrance. Users, athletes and children who participated in social projects of initiation to sports activities had no place to practice, and competitions and events were suspended. For three days, the Military Police surrounded the old Indian Museum building, trying to evict the Indians, which ended up happening in March with the use of force and violence. The story reached the newspapers’ headlines: artists and part of the public opinion took the Indians’ side, and many cultural and artistic activities were realized at the site, as a demonstration of support. On April 1st, Water

Park Julio Delamare had its gates closed. Social programs were affected and over 10 thousand people had no space to practice sports. Olympic athletes had to leave the country to keep training, such as César Castro, a diver who had to move to the United States.

“It is vital for us to fight for a public sports venue. We shouldn’t be here explaining anything. This is a situation no athlete would like to face; it is something I had never imagined would happen in an Olympic country. Things got to such a point that if they didn’t do anything, they would be actually helping us”, said César Castro on the day the water park was closed.

“I have been training daily for the last 13 years. Now, so close to the Olympic Games, which will happen in my hometown and could be my first, I’ll have to stop. They want to send us to Maria Lenk [water park], but there is no structure there for diving. But nobody is worried about it; just us. The focus for 2016 is not the medals, but money”, said Monica Lages do Amaral, another diver.

At the same time that the sports facilities around the stadium were closed down, the process of concession of Maracanã to the private initiative advanced. It was investigated by the Federal Attorney General Office, after a meeting held with social movements and affected groups in the end of 2012. This investigation happened because part of the funds for the renovation of the stadium came from the National Bank for Social and Economic Development (BNDES), which liberated R\$ 400 million for

the works. Besides that, the whole intervention would have to be authorized by the National Historic and Artistic Heritage Institute (IPHAN), since Maracanã is listed as a National Historical Heritage Site.<sup>86</sup> The stadium’s monumental marquee, which connected Maracanã to its surroundings – from the grandstands, it was possible to see the Tijuca mountain range – and it was an icon for Brazilian modernist architecture, was replaced by a new coverage structure with tensioned canvas, installed by the German company Schlaich Bergermann und Partner (SBP),<sup>87</sup> which turned Maracanã into a closed-up stadium. In spite of the approval of the reforms by IPHAN, the Consultancy Committee of the organ considered the demolition of the stadium marquee a crime.

“Destroying listed buildings is a crime, and all those who participate in it are criminally liable”, said IPHAN’s counsellor Nestor Goulart Reis.

Despite of this controversy, Maracanã was eventually privatized. The offer made by Consórcio Maracanã, formed by IMX Venues e Arena S.A. (owned by Eike Batista, with 5%), Odebrecht Participações e Investimentos S.A. (leading company, with 90%) and AEG Administração de Estádios do Brasil LTDA (also with 5%) was of R\$ 5.5 million annually, in 33 instalments, with a total sum of R\$ 181.5 million. This amount does not get even close to the costs of the stadium’s renovation, estimated in R\$ 1.23 billion.<sup>88</sup> Besides, the new management should have a profit of about R\$ 2.5 billion in 35 years.<sup>89</sup> In other words, the

**Photos on the opposite page:** Célio de Barros Athletics Stadium, Julio Delamare Water Park and the Indian Museum building (by Renato Cosentino).

[86] Available at [http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes\\_pt/Institucional/Sala\\_de\\_Imprensa/Noticias/2010/todas/20101014\\_maracana.html](http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Institucional/Sala_de_Imprensa/Noticias/2010/todas/20101014_maracana.html), accessed on 02/04/14.

[87] The same company was responsible for the report that interdicted the Engenhão Stadium. According to UOL, the interdiction of the stadium was based on a technical study conducted by the German company SBP, which detected a risk of strong winds damaging or bringing down the stadium’s arches. Two other foreign companies, Canadian RWDI 2004 (Rowan Williams Davies & Irwin Inc.) and British BRE (Building Research Establishment Ltd) contest the results of this report regarding wind effects. The interdiction of Engenhão happened exactly at the moment when the clubs negotiated with Consórcio Maracanã, pressuring them to close the deal with the new stadium manager. Information available at <http://m.esporte.uol.com.br/futebol/ultimas-noticias/2013/05/07/empresas-de-engenharia-questionam-laudo-que-fechou-do-engenhao.htm>, accessed on 16/02/14.

[88] Available at <http://copadomundo.uol.com.br/noticias/redacao/2013/07/22/maracana-tem-novo-reajuste-de-r-60-milhoes-e-ja-custa-r-125-bilhao.htm>, accessed on 16/02/14.

[89] Available at <http://globoesporte.globo.com/futebol/copas-confederacoes/noticia/2013/05/grupo-de-eike-e-habilitado-e-vence-processo-de-licitacao-do-maracana.html>, accessed on 16/02/14.



public powers will recover less than 15% of the investments in the stadium's reform at the termination of the concession contract.

### **Mobilization brought results to the affected groups: a partial victory**

The popular dissatisfaction shown during the entire process of reform and concession of Maracanã reached a new dimension during the Confederations Cup, in June 2013, when millions of people stormed the streets to protest throughout Brazil. About a month after the demonstrations, the Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro, Sergio Cabral – who had become one of the main targets of the street protests – started a back-down process regarding the Maracanã Complex plans. In late July, he announced that the demolition of Julio Delamare Water Park had been cancelled. After a week of negotiations, the same decision was made in relation to Célio de Barros Athletics Stadium, the largest property in the surrounding area and essential for the Concessionaire's project of building a shopping mall on the site. Célio de Barros was already partially destroyed, and Governor Cabral promised to rebuild it. A few more days passed and the Governor announced that the Friedenreich Municipal School would continue its operations in the Maracanã Complex, and finally he declared that the Secretariat of Culture would negotiate the use of the old Indian Museum building with the Indians. Within a week, the Governor

backed down in such a way that almost all the social movements' aims, after two years of fights, were achieved.

The only pending issue was the privatization of the stadium and there were rumours that Cabral was willing to cancel the contract with the Concessionaire. Consórcio Maracanã, however, kept its interest in the management of the stadium, going against its own original business plan, which stated that Maracanã would only be profitable and have all the comforts of a state-of-the-art stadium without the surrounding facilities. That is, it was not true that the demolitions were necessary for New Maracanã – and this was the basis for all the arguments throughout the process of privatization of the stadium. The demolitions, in fact, would only make Maracanã more profitable for the Concessionaire, affecting thousands of users of the public facilities destroyed. The State Government was always on the side of the corporations' project and defended it vehemently in public events and for the press, but after such strong popular pressure, they had to back down.

In spite of the government's retreat and many promises, there was little advancement until the beginning of the year of the World Cup in Brazil. Julio Delamare Water Park was partially reopened, but the section of its structure which had been demolished during the reform of Maracanã has not been rebuilt yet. The old Indian Museum building remains in ruins. On the other hand, the Friedenreich Municipal School, which hadn't been closed down or destroyed, is operating normally. Célio de Barros

**Photo on the opposite page:** Aldeia Maracanã (by Renato Cosentino).

Protest during the Sao Sebastião Race on January 20th, 2013 (by Renato Cosentino).



Athletics Stadium is still closed and on January 9th, 2014, the athletes organized an act to remember one year without a place to train. They call themselves the “athletics homeless” in the Olympic city. They are fighting for the rebuilding and reopening of the stadium, in conformity with international standards.

“We have been without our only official public athletics stadium for a year – and this is happening in the city which will host the

next Olympic Games, and will make History as the first in Latin America to do so. For us, athletes, the legacy came in advance: evictions, demolitions, an insane and painful fight”, said Edneida Freire, ex-technical coordinator of the Rio 2016 Project, which reunited 322 athletes between five and 50 years of age at Célio de Barros Stadium.

The reform and privatization of Maracanã are good examples of the elitization of Brazilian football. The World Cup in Brazil has triggered deep changes in the stadiums, now called multi-use arenas. But Maracanã has always been a multi-use arena, with social, cultural and sports activities and even health-related events, since Célio de Barros and Julio Delamare used to receive thousands of users, including elderly people, disabled people, and children participating in social projects and Olympic

athletes who made use of these public facilities. The aborted attempt, result of the partnership between public and private sectors, was to change Maracanã into a shopping mall, where the turnstiles would work as a “social filter”.<sup>90</sup> This was partially achieved with the privatization of the stadium and its disconfiguration after the reform. The population who used to go to matches cannot afford the tickets anymore, since their prices rose abusively and the stadium looks like a TV studio, where there are written rules for the fans – to behave as if they were in an auditorium. In spite of all that, the campaign “Maraca is Ours” and the government’s retreat regarding the demolitions showed the strength of popular mobilization to fight for their rights, and it continues to happen during the World Cup year, so that a partial victory becomes a full one.

[90] Expression used by researcher Christopher Gaffney during the debate “New Maracanã: Public Money and Private Expenses”, at the Fluminense Federal University (UFF) in Grogotá, Faculty of Economy, on October 24<sup>th</sup>, 2013. The speech is available at <http://youtu.be/v1jK3RK7IHY>. Accessed on 20/11/2013.



## *The 2014 World Cup and the increase of sexual exploitation in the Northeast*

The increase of sexual exploitation is one of the issues discussed in the cities which will host the 2014 World Cup. For organizations associated to the feminist cause, the event will contribute to an increase of sexual exploitation and trafficking of women. According to estimates of the Association of Prostitutes of Ceará (APROCE), about 3,500 women are in a situation of prostitution in Fortaleza, and major events contribute to increase sexual tourism in seaside resorts and their surroundings in the host cities.

The cities of Salvador (BA), Natal (RN) and Fortaleza (CE) have shown an intensification of prostitution, also strengthened by the presence of women traffickers coming from other municipalities and States.

According to Daniela Alencar, human rights lawyer of the National Network of Lawyers and Popular Lawyers (RENAAP) and ex-coordinator of the Secretariat of Public Policies for Women in Fortaleza, a survey conducted in 2009 by the National Federation of Sex Workers which focused on the Association of Prostitutes of Ceará points out that most prostitutes in the State started their sexual

activities during adolescence and have prostitution as their only source of income.

'In Fortaleza, the vast majority of sex professionals is between 26 and 30 years old, and declare themselves heterosexual. Most of these women started to work as prostitutes between their adolescence and early adulthood (16-20 years old); 41% earn up to one minimum wage as income. When asked if they wished to obtain qualifications in other areas, 79% answered yes. Regarding race and ethnicity, 31% said they are mixed race ('pardas'). As for schooling, 34% did not finish fundamental education; 63% of the women interviewed have prostitution as their only source of income", says Daniela.

For the lawyer, the lack of investments in public policies to assist prostitutes shows that the government is not worried with the negative impact an event such as the World Cup might cause. Working around the several seaside resorts in big cities, they are vulnerable to several forms of violation of their rights, including: coercion by pimps, bar owners and nightclub managers; submission to humiliation and violence by clients and traffickers. In most cases, one can notice the inefficiency of the assistance centers for women victims of violence, since they have structural problems that make the provision of such assistance difficult or even impossible.

All over the world, prostitution is the third most profitable activity for organized crime. It is a chain that moves US\$ 32 billion per year, according to the International Labour Organization (ILO). Without any alternatives, thousands of women are submitted to the slavery of their own bodies to survive

– 79% of this revenue (US\$ 25.3 billion) come from sexual exploitation only.

In an interview published on December 11th, 2012, on the Odara (Institute for Black Women) website, Valdecir Nascimento, an activist and former executive coordinator of the organization, affirms that the World Cup will objectify the women from Bahia and stimulate prostitution among the tourists, meeting the businessmen's interests and increasing discrimination against women.<sup>91</sup>

'I had high expectations for the World Cup in Salvador, because it is an event that mobilizes financial resources. So I had imagined that this money would benefit the populations of other parts of the city, through productive inclusion programs, but this is not our reality. What we see happening is the businessmen's interests coming first", said Valdecir.

In Brazil, prostitution and paying for sex are not crimes. However, exploiting people through sexual activities; inducing or facilitating prostitution and sexual exploitation; and preventing people from quitting these activities are serious offences according to the Criminal Code, with sentences which might vary from one to ten years in prison.

*Greice Lima collaborated.*

[91] Excerpt from the interview with Valdecir Nascimento available on the Odara Institute website: <http://institutoodara.org.br/ativistas-falam-sobre-a-copa-do-mundo-em-salvador/>.



COMITÉ POPULAR  
COPA & OLIMPÍADAS RIO

## *National Resistance to the World Cup Impacts*

For the first time during the process of preparation of a country to host the FIFA World Cup, local resistance groups have created popular committees in each host city. And they did more: they got organized at national level, through the National Articulation of Popular Committees for the World Cup (ANCOP). This happened in November 2010, from the convergence of two meetings with the intention of promoting deeper debates and analyses about the impacts of major events in Brazil.

ANCOP published its first dossier, “Mega events and Violations of Human Rights in Brazil”,<sup>92</sup> in December 2011, during a national act that took place simultaneously in all host cities. The document, divided into the sections Housing, Labour, Information, Popular Participation and Representation, Environment, Access to Public Services and Assets, Mobility and Public Safety, shows a portrait of rights violations in the 12 cities and soon became a national reference on the theme. The large media coverage put popular articulation in evidence, as the main critical voice in relation to major events.

The success of the dossier made the Popular Committee for the World Cup and Olympics of Rio de Janeiro publish a local version, keeping the same structure of the national document. In

the section Housing, the contents were based on the report of the Brazilian Platform of Human, Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights (Dhesca), resulting from a mission carried out in May 2011 in partnership with several entities, documenting a series of rights violations in different communities of the city.


The documentation work using the dossier format; the promotion of public debates and political positioning; and the occupation of streets to protest against the violations became the main activities of the committees at local level. For ANCOP, the work on the approval of federal exception laws, such as the General World Cup Bill of Law, and international denunciations at the UN were important to take the discussions about the violations happening in Brazil to the next level. In Rio de Janeiro, one of the most active committees, there were two main action focuses: fighting against the removals and for the right to dignified housing, and the privatization of public spaces such as Maracanã Stadium.

From June 2013 onwards, the massification of the protests during the Confederations Cup and the appearance of new groups, collective actions and forms of manifestation and communication showed that the World Cup committees, in a certain way, brought the debate forward for Brazilian society. Will the World Cup bring social benefits for those who need them the most? The population is finally realizing that the answer is no. The World Cup has always been seen, in Brazil, as a great opportunity

**Photo on the opposite page:** Public Act ‘Maraca is Ours’ (by Renato Cosentino).

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[92] Available for download at <http://bit.ly/1aWxMgi>, accessed on 16/02/2014.



to overcome social inequalities. With a critical, deep analysis about the overarching model for these events and the urban restructuring that Brazilian cities have been undergoing during the preparation for the games, the Committees have been able to build a more realistic view of what is actually happening: forced removals, privatization, increase of the public debt, suspension of rights and other violations, which contradict the government's discourse and publicity, highlighting potential benefits.

The campaign initiated in social networks by the President of the Republic, Dilma Rousseff, answering to the “There won't be a Cup” slogan used by street protestors with “There will be a Cup”<sup>93</sup> and “This will be the Cup of the Cups” shows the federal government's preoccupation with the population's general feeling about the event – especially considering that this is a year of State and Federal elections. Football, which has always been associated to the manipulation of the legitimate feelings of the population for their cities and country to impose large businesses that benefit only a few or to perpetuate power projects, seems to have had its importance relativized since June 2013. During the Confederation Cup Final, while the Brazilian National Team beat Spain 3-0 at Maracanã, 30 thousand people protested for their rights outside the stadium. 10 thousand policemen who were responsible for the security<sup>94</sup> repressed the protest, and the players could feel the effects of tear gas in the pitch. The population seems to be increasingly aware of their rights, systematically violated in the name of

[93] Available at <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/nacional,pt-rebate-protesto-e-cria-campanha-vai-ter-copa,1118012,0.htm>, accessed on 16/02/14.

[94] Available at <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/esportes,rio-mobiliza-10-mil-policiais-para-seguranca-na-final-no-maracana,1048157,0.htm>, accessed on 16/02/14.

**Photo above:** Protest at Praça Mauá, port area of Rio, during the opening of the Museum of Art of Rio (MAR) (by Felipe Werneck).

**Photo on the opposite page:** Community Santa Marta, South Area of Rio de Janeiro (by Renato Cosentino).



major sports events, separating them from the spectacle. In 2014, the “Cup of the Cups” also promises to be the “Cup of Manifestations”.

The people who stormed the streets in June 2013 – a movement triggered by the public transport fare rise nationwide – expressed their dissatisfaction with a clear discourse, saying that it was not for the 20 extra cents they were fighting for. The reduction of fares was the initial reason for the acts, but the people’s discontentment had much deeper roots, directly related to the type of development adopted by the country.

In spite of the clear connection between the country’s development model and the protests, they did not come as a criticism of the system as a whole, but its effects – as shown by the

demonstrations that followed the acts against the fare rise. In Rio de Janeiro, the total lack of attention to public education was the reason for major acts in September and October, when teachers of municipal and State schools went on strike, with the support of many people who, being or not students or parents of students of public institutions, realized that public education with quality is a matter of importance to all.


Besides the large demonstrations, resistance actions also oppose the development proposal of the country. The movements that fight for dignified housing make this evident by seeing houses not as a commodity to be owned by a few – who often have to go into debt for decades – but as a right to which everyone is

entitled. And the distortion that the economic model has created is even more evident when we analyse data from the National Census of 2010: the country has 6.07 million empty residences, and 5.8 million families living without a home or in inadequate places. This means that if all residences without use were given to those who need a home, there would still be 200 thousand left.

As none of the governmental spheres in Brazil seems to be willing to search for a new development model, it is possible that more protests will happen in the country over the next years. This may lead to a deeper criticism and discussion, which could eventually stop treating the effects and address the causes.

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**Photo on the opposite page:** Settlement in Cape Town (Eric Parker/CC).



# *South Africa*

Laura Burocco







## *Introduction*

### *The South Africa Case*

“South Africa isn’t showing the World what it’s doing to its people. It only shows the World Cup”

(interviewee in 2009)

In this chapter we have chosen to analyse the 2010 South African World Cup cases most commented by media and human rights organizations. After a short presentation that aims to help the reader to contextualize the conflicts in relation to the location, the reality of the place, and the actors involved, the chapter “was” divided into seven parts. The first part reports on eviction cases in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg. Among several examples, we chose the most emblematic: Blikkiesdorp in Cape Town, Umlazi D Section in Durban and Sao Jose in Johannesburg. The second part is about the disrespect of informal traders’ and construction workers’ constitutional right to work. The third part denounces police brutality, especially against street children in Durban. The fourth part deals with the public funding expenditure issue, especially concerning the over-

priced construction of the Green Side Stadium in Cape Town, as the Soccer City Stadium in Johannesburg and the infrastructural project of the Gautrain, also in Johannesburg. The fifth section is dedicated to the civil society reaction through its main organisations such as the Anti-Eviction Campaign, Abahlali baseMjondolo, War on Want, Sao Jose committee residents, South Durban Community Environment Alliance – SDCEA, StreetNet International, the Early Morning Market committee, The Building & Wood Workers International – BWI Africa & Middle East. The last section is dedicated to the legacy of the 2010 South African World Cup analysed from the social and economical perspectives, and a conclusion section. A review of videos and documentaries produced on the 2010 SA World Cup close the chapter.

## Localizing the conflicts

### Cape Town, (Western Cape Province)

is the second-most populated city in South Africa, the provincial capital of the Western Cape, the seat of the National Parliament and the legislative capital of the country. It is the economic hub of the Western Cape Province, South Africa's second main economic centre and Africa's third main economic hub city. The central business district, CBD, is under an extensive urban renewal programme, with numerous new buildings and renovations taking place under the guidance of the Cape Town Partnership, a PPP formed by the City of Cape Town, the South African Property Owners Association (SAPOA) and the Cape Town Regional Chamber of Commerce and Industry. CTP is registered as an independent non-profit organisation with the aim of addressing issues of urban degeneration, disinvestment and the social problems in the inner city of Cape Town. In the pursuit of this goal CTP has been particularly active in attempting to ensuring the realization of the SA 2010 World Cup, as well as the continuity of its legacy.

### Durban, KwaZulu (Natal Province),

referred to, in Zulu, as eThekweni, is the largest city in the South African province of KwaZulu-Natal. It is the second most important manufacturing hub in South Africa after Johannesburg, and the busiest port in South Africa and Africa. Together with Cape Town it is one of the major centres of tourism. The municipality, which includes neighbouring towns, has a population of almost 3.5 million, making the combined municipality the biggest city on the East Coast of the African continent. The Durban Metropolitan Area (DMA) has a large and diversified economy with strong manufacturing, tourism, transportation, finance and government sectors. It is the third richest city in South Africa. The government has endured sustained controversy for their eviction of shack dwellers, who belong to one of the biggest South African housing movements, and for reports of police brutality against informal traders, homeless and representatives of social movements.

### South African Province map

#### Johannesburg. (Gauteng province)

is South Africa largest city, by population and the provincial capital of Gauteng. Gauteng is the wealthiest province in South Africa, having the largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the 2007 Community Survey, the population of Johannesburg was 4,434,827 and the population of the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area was 7,151,447. The city is one of the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the world. Johannesburg is one of the world's leading financial centres, and it is the economic and financial hub of South Africa. In a 2008 survey conducted by MasterCard, Johannesburg ranked 47 out of the 50 top cities in the world as a worldwide centre of commerce the only one located in Africa. In 2002 the City launched the "Joburg 2030 Strategy" (followed now by the 2040 strategy) aimed at promoting an outward-oriented economy to achieve the vision of Johannesburg as a "World Class African City".



## *Actors involved by area*

### **Municipalities and governments**

City of Cape Town: <http://www.capetown.gov.za/>  
 eThekweni Municipality (Durban): <http://www.durban.gov.za/>  
 Gauteng Province: <http://www.gautengonline.gov.za/>  
 City of Johannesburg: <http://www.joburg.org.za/>

### **Organizations**

Anti Eviction Campaign: <http://antieviction.org.za/>  
 Abhalali Base Mondjolo: <http://abahlali.org/>  
 South Durban Community Environment Alliance (SDCEA): <http://www.sdcea.co.za/>  
 War on Want: <http://www.waronwant.org/>  
 Building and Wood Worker's International (BWI): <http://www.bwint.org/>  
 StreetNetInternational :<http://www.streetnet.org.za/>

### **Private initiatives**

Cape Town Partnership: <http://www.capetownpartnership.co.za/>  
 Gautrain: <http://www.gautrain.co.za/>

### **Stadiums**

Cape Town, Green Point Stadium:  
<http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/FIFA2010/Pages/CapeTownStadium.aspx>  
 Durban, Moses Mabhida: <http://www.mmstadium.com/>  
 Johannesburg, Soccer City: <http://www.stadiummanagement.co.za/>

## Evictions

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) is a South African socio-economic policy framework implemented by the African National Congress (ANC) government in 1994 to address the immense socio-economic problems brought about by the consequences of the the Apartheid regime which preceded the advent of democracy in 1994. RDP Housing also represents the most popular social housing program implemented by the South African Government. Between 1994 and the beginning of 2001 over 1.1 million cheap houses eligible for government subsidies had been built, accommodating 5 million of the estimated 12.5 million South Africans without proper housing. Unfortunately this does not represent an efficient and sustainable solution since the houses were located in land with no access to services, work and transport. RDP housing allocation led to violent conflicts within communities. Most of the people interviewed for this research are people on waiting lists for RDP houses (some of them waiting for as long as fifteen years) and people organized in urban housing movements. The common reaction of people concerning the World Cup was, and still is, about the willingness of the government to make the poverty that exists in South Africa invisible through their removal from the view of tourists coming to South Africa to attend the games. Even so, the way the government was acting, forcefully removing and relocating

people to supposed temporary relocation areas, TRA, that became permanent; the violation of human rights; the lack of provision of basic services - all these elements, formed part of the ordinary living conditions for most of the South African poor and was not a complaint specific to the World Cup. One of the most visible negative consequences of the lack of an efficient housing policy in South Africa is the fact that cases of forced evictions are rather frequent, both for the illegal occupation of land and for the illegal occupation of buildings in the inner city of the main South African cities.

Maybe for this reason the results of a data research regarding the effects of the 2010 South African World Cup in terms of evictions have been quite frustrating. A few months after the games were over, people who were interviewed seemed to relate to the event as something that had happened a long time ago and had a debatable impact.<sup>1</sup>

The 2010 World Cup seems to have had the effect of accelerating some processes which are nevertheless present in some people's lives, more than creating a situation of new abuses.

This is different from the Brazilian case, whose nomination as hosting country for the World Cup allowed for the resurgence of ancient removal policies that had been considered unacceptable since the sixties.

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[1] The data research on which this chapter is based was conducted by the author in two periods: the first between February and April 2011 and the second between November and January 2013.

## Blikkiesdorp, Cape Town

Symphony Way Temporary Relocation Area (TRA) in Delft, Cape Town, is better known as Blikkiesdorp. It is a relocation camp made up of iron shacks, built by the City of Cape Town in 2008 for an estimated R32m (€2.9m) to provide “emergency housing” for about 650 people who had been illegally occupying buildings. While the mayor of Cape Town describes it as a “temporary relocation area” (TRA), which for definition had to be a provisional emergency accommodation, its residents prefer to use the more significant name “concentration camp”, which in 2013 seems to have been transformed into the definitive place for these people to live.

Many residents interviewed during the preparation for the World Cup, and again after the event happened, by local and international newspapers, say they were forcibly evicted from their former homes and moved there against their will. And for that they blame one thing: the football 2010 South African World Cup, and they have no doubts about the reasons. The shacks of these people were on the route that connects Cape Town airport to the centre of the city, and were relocated in order to create an illusory image of South African cities for incoming soccer fans who arrived from around the globe to attend the World Cup games. Africa’s first World Cup had become a tool to impress wealthy foreigners at the expense of its own impoverished people – as evidenced by the city’s decision to relocate these people.

In 2013, after three years, the temporary area is still home to those relocated, who say “it is worse than the townships created by the government before the end of racial apartheid in 1994”. In some cases families of six or seven people are crammed into living spaces of three by six metres. They complain that the iron walls swelter in summer temperatures of 40°C and offer little protection from the cold in winter. Tuberculosis and HIV are rife and babies who have been born at Blikkiesdorp officially do not exist because they have not been registered in any census. The shacks are laid out in strict lines with little room for individual home improvement, though some residents have tried to build extensions, gardens and informal stores (spaza shops). Lighting and power cables take electricity to residents, but between the shacks there is no paving, only sand that swirls in the wind. There are no shower facilities and the taps do not have bowls, so water tends to leak into the ground and under people’s homes. Toilets are found inside small, grim concrete cubicles. Many of them have broken, leaking roofs, despite repeated promises from the government to fix them.

While the World Cup continues to be associated with promises of infrastructure improvements and a higher standard of living by the South African government and private investors Blikkiesdorp represents a sad example of the regression in South Africa housing conditions for low-income people. The World Cup and FIFA’s responsibility for the worsening of living conditions for many South Africans is





clear to them, and people are still suffering its effects four years after the big party ended. In an interview with David Smith of *The Guardian* in 2010, residents of Blikkierdorp declared: “When rich people come to the World Cup they must come to Blikkiesdorp first to see for themselves how people are living. It’s worse than apartheid.” This is even more serious considering the country has such a recent and brutal history of forced removals based on racial segregation. What the World Cup has done, apparently, was contributing to the deepening

of an already remarkable economic and spatial inequality.

The city of Cape Town denies the accusation that it has dumped people in Blikkiesdorp because of the World Cup, and continues to reinforce the fact that TRAs have been constructed for emergency accommodation purposes and are provided by the city. But, in 2014, people are still living in the same inhuman conditions. According to an interview conducted in December 2013 with Matilda Groepe, a member of the Blikkiesdorp Concerned Resi-

**Photo above** Private security guard  
(Laura Burocco, December 2013)

**Opposite page photo** Blikkiesdorp field  
(Eric Parker/CC)



**Photo above and Opposite page**

Blikkiesdorp, relocation field in Cape Town  
(Laura Burocco/December, 2013)

dents Group, in the last three years the City has continued to build new shacks to accommodate people – confirming the dubious nature of the supposed emergency interim measures. She also expressed deep concern and worries about the increase of crime by gangs who have started to control the territory, selling drugs and committing robberies. The security issues becomes even worse considering the high number of single women with children who live in Blikkiesdorp and who are often the target of these criminals. For two years, residents have asked the police to control the area and guarantee their basic safety but it was only recently, because of the increase of violence, that the city provided private security guards.<sup>2</sup>

Residents complain that private security is mainly there to ensure that residents do not steal the shacks (or building material) and perhaps erect them in a better place, rather than to ensure their safety.

Another aspect of serious concern are the sanitary conditions of those places, since every time it rains, the inefficiency of the sewerage system means that there is flooding and sewage leaks in the streets where kids play and people circulate.

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[2] The use of private security companies is very common in South Africa, and represents an important economic sector. These services are not used exclusively by private persons, but are also used by municipalities. Private security companies such as “Bad Boys” or “Red Ant”, are responsible for most of the eviction orders executions in central Johannesburg.







**Fotos** Blikkiesdorp, relocation field in Cape Town  
(Laura Burocco/December, 2013)



## Umlazi D Section Housing eviction – Durban

In 2009, approximately 100 residents of Umlazi D Section in Durban were evicted, and had their houses demolished, to make space for the expansion of the Umlazi Stadium for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. According to the South Durban Community Environment Alliance, SDCEA (<http://www.sdcea.co.za/>), the government had promised the families alternative accommodation in 6 months, but since 2009 they have been living in “temporary” shacks on a toxic landfill site used by several chemical companies and refineries as a deposit for their chemical and medical waste. Residents, mainly women and children, have been breathing polluted air since 2009.

Southern Durban is the biggest African

chemical hub and many international and local companies, with the complicity of the government, are responsible for environmental and health disasters in the area. Among these companies are: Anglo American, Mondi Paper Mill, Petronas ENGEN Refinery, Shell &BP Refinery The Dutch chemical company, VOPAK and the British chemical company Island View Storage. The landfill has been managed by ENVIROSERVE until 2007, when the landfill was officially closed. After not being used for two years the landfill became the home of many people that, similar to the Blikkiesdorp residents, are living in desperate conditions, with no toilets, no lights, no facilities, far away from hospitals and clinics, schools and any possible source of income – formal or informal – in markets of on the streets as traders. Women and children are exposed to all kinds of violence



**Lateral photo** Umlazi Landfill (South Durban Community Environment Alliance - Sdcea)

**Photo above** Girl plays with an old toxic product container in Umlazi Settlement, in Cape Town (Manuel Ebert/CC)



San Jose Building (Lauren Royston/CC)

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- [3] These are buildings taken over by illegal gangs who impose the payment of rent, cut off water and electricity, and leave the building to deteriorate while they continue to pocket the rentals from residents.
- [4] The City of Johannesburg's (CoJ's) Inner City Regeneration Strategy was set up in 2000 to raise and sustain private investments in the city. The components of the strategy are: a) Intensive urban management; b) Upgrading and maintenance of infrastructure to create an environment attractive to both residents and businesses; c) Support for those economic sectors that have the potential to thrive in the inner city, and encourage growth in those sectors; d) Discouraging properties that are abandoned, overcrowded or poorly maintained, and which in turn "pull down" the value of entire city blocks by inhibiting investments; e) Encouraging "ripple effect" investments that can lift an entire area.
- [5] "Johannesburg, a World Class African City" is the official slogan of the city of Johannesburg that appears in the city logo. The "Joburg 2030 Strategy", the city long-term development plan drawn by the Municipality, is clearly a move to promote an outward-oriented economy, seeking to make real the vision of Johannesburg as a "World Class African City" and reinforcing a logic of competitiveness at the expense of inclusive and equity policies addressed to support an integrated and more equal use of the city.

and danger and they live in constant fear due to criminal elements, and haunted by their violent eviction by the government.

### Sao Jose Building – Johannesburg

Sao Jose is a so-called "condemned or bad building" in Hillbrow, a high-density district of the inner city of Johannesburg. It could be used as an example of what the City of Johannesburg (Municipality) defines as "bad buildings" – buildings that have been abandoned and neglected by their owners – leading to illegal occupation by poor people. Around 400 people were living in Sao Jose until the moment of their relocation by the City of Johannesburg. The city considers there are around 25.000 people living in 235 bad buildings in the city centre of Johannesburg. Many of Sao Jose's residents are unsure about who owns the flats in which they live. Some say they simply walked in off the street, found an abandoned flat and fixed it up. According to the article "Joburg's urban poor: why the City wishes they didn't exist" featured on the Daily Maverick on April 13<sup>th</sup>, 2010 by Kevin Bloom, "for years they had been living resourcefully in the abandoned block of flats, overcoming the lack of electricity and water by bringing in paraffin lamps and five-litre drums, getting up at 4 a.m. every Sunday to scrub and clean the corridors and public spaces as procedure required in lieu of rent payments by the informal committee that managed

the building. Thanks to the civic pride of the residents, and to the attitude of the informal committee members, Sao Jose was never a hijacked building.<sup>3</sup>

The relocation of the residents of Sao Jose by the City Council is part of the city strategy of rejuvenation and renewal of the inner city.<sup>4</sup> This is one of the pillars of the "Joburg 2030 Strategy" clearly attempting to promote an outward-oriented economy and to bring to reality the vision of Johannesburg as a "World Class African City"<sup>5</sup> reinforcing a logic of competitiveness at the expense of inclusive and equity policies addressed to support an integrated and more equal use of the city. The 2010 South African World Cup played a considerable role in the marketing strategy of the national government, reflecting in municipal plans.

## *Working condition*

### a) Informal Traders

Despite the undeniable importance of the informal economy in the economical system of developing countries and of the recognition of the right to work in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of South Africa, informal traders' working conditions around South Africa are more and more complicated, and several traders have been evicted from their usual place of trading as result of the legislation imposed by FIFA before and during the World Cup (the FIFA By-law<sup>6</sup>). According to Lawyers for Human Rights, "Informal traders are especially vulnerable to these bylaws. Street vendors usually live hand to mouth and depend on their revenue from selling their goods by the side of the road to buy food, pay school fees and uniforms for their children, and to provide a roof over their heads. They are certainly not in competition with international corporations such as Coca-Cola or Budweiser. Many traders complained of police harassment and of the indifferent attitude of municipal officials". The violations became even more serious because most of these informal traders are women, who are often the main breadwinners for their families.

Tens of thousands of informal traders lost income because of FIFA-imposed "exclusion zones" around stadiums, which permit only approved businesses. Regina Twala, who has been selling cooked meals and snacks for 35 years in

Johannesburg, told South Africa's Sunday Independent newspaper that she and many fellow traders had been ordered to vacate the premises outside Ellis Park stadium during the 2010 World Cup.

After the World Cup ended, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign declared:

"The lives of small businesses and informal traders in South Africa were not benefited by this World Cup in any way. If we are not allowed to trade near stadiums, fan parks and other tourist areas, how can we benefit from tourism?"

In Cape Town informal traders have been prohibited to trade in the best-known market in the city centre, the Parade Market, and have had their trading space limited in Green Market Square; both markets have been declared off limits during the FIFA Games because the two squares are part of the cordoned security area. This means that for the duration of the Games they were not able to earn a living at the markets, which are also popular tourism spots.

According to interviews made with random traders in the Green Market Square, opinions are contradictory. The Market gathers approximately 200 traders, and around 50 of them have been evicted to create a parking space for the buses of tourists arriving at the inner city. Obviously the traders who had the right to stay have registered a positive effect on their sales, different from the ones who have been evicted without being offered any alternative solutions.

The situation was different for the Parade

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[6] For more info about the 2010 FIFA World and Confederations Cup: South Africa Bylaw see the Box



Market, whose area has been used by FIFA to create the Fan Park, with food courts and entertainment quarters administered by FIFA. The usual traders have been confined in another area, and have been prohibited from selling food and local products. The only goods they could sell were flags (which were not hand made by them as they were, previously) and T-shirts with the brands of FIFA and of its main supporters. The traders complained about the bad quality of the products for sale and it is common knowledge that the supposedly “typical” South African “vuvuzelas” were made in China.

**The Green Market Square**

(Laura Burocco, December 2013)



### The Top Dek Free Market

(Laura Burocco,  
December 2013)



Niezaar Toffar, a trader from the Top Dek Free Market (in existence since the seventies), declares they were not allowed to trade for six months, from January to June 2010, when they were finally allowed to go back to work. He said the renovation of the market was planned long before the World Cup, but the City Council (through private funds) decided to realize it in an impressive time of about one day, shortly before the World Cup.

The situation for informal traders remains critical in the main South African cities. In Cape Town a clearance policy is acting in all the central streets of the city, limiting the possibility

of trade and even pan-handling. The pedestrian use of the beachfront is also highly regulated. The city of Johannesburg started the 'Mayoral Clean Sweep' initiative in September 2013. The aim is to address illegal trading, illegal dumping and littering, land and building invasions and other by-law contraventions, electricity theft, and to promote civic pride. Mayor Parks Tau has led the initiative, which includes the Johannesburg Roads Agency, City Power, Pikitup, Jo'burg Water, Environment, Health, the Metro Trading Company (MTC) and Department of Home Affairs. The result was the eviction of hundreds of vendors from the streets of the city

centre. Thanks to the resistance of the trader organizations and to the support of Universities and several individuals, the Socioeconomic Rights Institute of South Africa (SERI) took the city to the Constitutional Court and won the return of the vendors to the streets.





The Early Morning Market, familiarly described as “The Mother Market”, is a centenary Durban market which, for the 2010 World Cup, the eThekweni Municipality (Durban) wanted to replace with a shopping mall. The plan affected approximately 4000 jobs—including market traders, informal vendors, barrow operators who transport produce around the area and traditional medicine gatherers – did not provide for any type of consultation by the Municipality regarding planning or the provision of alternative locations.

The Early Morning Market is in the Warwick Triangle transport nexus, which, accord-

ing to police figures, sees more than 400,000 commuters travelling through it every day. The opening of a mall could affect the pedestrian and consumer patterns in the area and, consequently, the traders’ income. According to Richard Dobson (interview published in the article “Trading markets for malls”, M&G April 2009) “the mall appears to be part of the city’s efforts to ‘sterilise’ the area in time for the 2010 World Cup. Essentially, the mall is about prescribing what the city should look like. It’s less about allowing it to develop through the participation of its citizens, who impart their own flavour and history to it.”

In April, 2009, traders at the Warwick Junction Early Morning Market put the city of Durban on notice that a shopping mall would not displace their century-old institution. Between June and July 2009, the Early Morning Market protests grew more intense and ended with the victory by Warwick Early Morning Market activists.

### Construction Workers

Despite the support and the positive expectation by the government of job creation in the construction sector because of the World Cup, temporary, low-skilled and poorly paid jobs did not constitute a solution to South Africa’s 40%-plus unemployment rate, which, post-2010, has experienced a zero-sum increase. The new stadiums heralded a construction boom, but many of the workers who built them have already been laid off and are now without work.

While the final cost of Cape Town’s Green Point stadium was R. 4.4 billion (\$599 million), more than 2,100 workers were earning an average wage of 14 Rands per hour, about 2,500 Rands per month (\$340), well below the subsistence wage of R4000 (\$545). Among these predominantly male workers, between 70% and 80 % claim the limited duration of their contracts left them ineligible for benefits.

The Labour Research Service (LRS) and the Building and Wood Workers International (BWI) Union have produced a report on directors’ fees in the construction sector. According to the report, “the average annual salary of a CEO, an executive director or a non-executive director was R6.9-million, R4.3-million and R261,000 respectively. The average annual minimum wage for ordinary workers was R28,006. It would take a worker 245 years to earn the same as a CEO, 153 years to earn the same as an executive and nine years to equal a year’s worth salary of a non-executive director”.

On January 2009 a worker died in Cape Town – the second worker to die on a World Cup site, confirming the dangerous nature of the job and insufficient safety measures applied by the construction firms.

## Police brutality

In anticipation of the socially and economically driven movements and protests, heavy police presence in the streets was correctly anticipated, violently repressing any kind of protest. The FIFA by-law denied the South African constitutional right recognized by Chapter 2, “You have the right to peacefully assemble, demonstrate and protest”. The city of Durban registered the worst cases of brutality.

### Durban:

In Durban, demonstrations against forced evictions happened months before the 2010 World Cup, and several reports denounced street children being forcibly removed from the city centre to “safe areas” far from the inner city. The safer cities department of eThekweni municipality (Durban) used to deal with street children, prostitutes and homeless people, but in preparation for the 2010 World Cup an intense “street-cleaning” exercise was implemented by eThekweni metro police.

Street children accused the police of using violence during their relocation to “safe houses”. The Metropolitan Police in Durban violently held street children in prisons for adults, such as Westville prison, in order to be controlled and stashed away from the eyes of tourists arriving for the 2010 World Cup. These prisons, far away from the centre of Durban, are also used for homeless adults, thus exposing the

children to abuse and violence while ignoring any obligation to social measures.

Round-ups used to be commonly applied in Durban before major international conferences or sports events (Durban often hosts international events), but in preparation for the World Cup the Metro Police’s actions worsened. Several NGOs denounced the incapacity of the metro police to deal with the situation and the traumatic experiences suffered by South Africa’s most vulnerable children which emerged from subsequent reports during their therapeutic rehabilitations. According to interviews made with street children, police drop them out of town forcing them to walk back to the centre of the city, where they try to find places to live and to get some help through charity. According to Niren Tolsi’s article featured in the Mail&Guardian in January 2010, “Rounded up and shipped out” girls denounced being blackmailed by cops who wanted sex in exchange for the chance of remaining in the streets.

In 2009, the city of Durban was under sustained controversy for their eviction of shack dwellers in the Cato Crest area, as well as for the violent attack on the Kennedy Road shack settlement which left two people dead. The attack was denounced by members of Abahlali baseMjondolo, a shackdweller movement, for being carefully planned and sanctioned by the local police.

In 2012, about a thousand people occupied a piece of land in Cato Crest<sup>7</sup>, that they called Marikana. The occupation has resulted in an

[7] More info about Cato Crest available in: <<http://www.iol.co.za/news/cato-crest-s-deadly-housing-war-1.1588256>>, <[http://abahlali.org/taxonomy/term/cato\\_crest/cato\\_crest/](http://abahlali.org/taxonomy/term/cato_crest/cato_crest/)>. Accessed in mar. 2014. About the eviction of Kennedy Road) : <<http://sds.ukzn.ac.za/default.php?3,6,684,4,0>>; <<http://sds.ukzn.ac.za/files/RR%2083%20Chance.pdf>>, <http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-SAfrica&month=0912&week=b&msg=W/SUmqooLIQQ7RyZ8XEs2Q>. Accessed in mar. 2014. United States dollar (USD) and South African rand (ZAR) Year 2004 Exchange Rate

escalation of violence. Leaders and activists of Abahlali baseMjondolo were arrested and murdered. Nqobile Nzuzi, 17, also connected to the organization, was killed by two shots from behind by police during a protest. The municipality continued evicting occupants, despite contrary court orders. The police violently attacked residents, using rubber bullets and often live ammunition. The occupation was destroyed by the city of Durban for the ninth time on December 23, 2013.

### **Nelspruit:**

During the protest against the demolition of the Mataffin school in Nelspruit, to make space for the Mbombela Stadium, a single mother of two was shot in her leg by the police. She was protesting against children having to be taught in an unventilated prefabricated school. She was in a hospital for nearly six months and lost her job as a result.

These are just some of the several examples of police violence. Police abuse is commonplace in South Africa, but in the preparation and duration of the World Cup it got even more out of control. The government, highly pressured by the need to guarantee tourists' security, on one hand strengthened police presence in the city centre, providing greater security, while on the other hand committing continued violations against informal settlement dwellers all around the country.

## ***Public funds expenditure***

One of the main issues of SAWC has been the costs the South African Government had to bear, as a commitment with FIFA, and the real national needs, as well as the post-World Cup legacy in terms of effective benefit, use and maintenance of the infrastructure provided. According to a series of articles featured in the South African and international media, as well as in the publication "South Africa's World Cup: A Legacy for Whom?" and the study "Conflicting interests and the 2010 FIFA World Cup" in 2004 the estimated cost for South Africa World Cup was approximately R2.3 billion (\$328-million). That pre-vision was drastically raised to R15-billion (\$2 billion), achieving a final cost of estimated R40 billion (\$5 billion), more than 10 times what was originally planned.<sup>8</sup>

Before the World Cup, while the government was engaged in huge public funds expenditure to meet FIFA's requirements, president Jacob Zuma's government was insisting that the sport's biggest showpiece was already benefiting the whole nation: creating jobs, improving infrastructure and transforming its image abroad. But this idea was not shared by informal settlements dwellers, the majority of South Africa's population, one of whom declared in an interview featured in *The Guardian*:

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[8] For a better understanding of the slogan "World Class African City" see note 5

“I think they must cancel the World Cup because people are starving. They are renovating buildings in Cape Town for half a billion rand; why can't they spend that money here? It breaks my heart”.

According to the 2009 Human Development Report, South Africa has a population of nearly 50 million, of which only 5 million are taxpayers, and 13 million receive some sort of social grant. 42.9% of South Africans lived on less than \$2 a day, and the discrepancy between South Africa's GDP and HDI makes it, as its Gini coefficient score also reveals, the most unequal country on the planet. Such inhuman conditions means South Africa is recognised as “the capital of protests” against the absence of any public service for the majority of citizens. Against these realities, the spending of close to 33 billion rand (about £3 billion pounds) on a football tournament is a testament to there being no concern for the national welfare among its politicians.

The most commented infrastructural projects in terms of public spending are: the Green Point Cape Town's Stadium, whose final cost was of R4.5 billion (around US\$ 414,25 million), followed by the Soccer City Stadium, with a cost that was initially estimated at R246,48 million in 2003 but escalated to R3,3 billion (around US\$ 303,79 million) when construction was completed. The same happened with the budget for the Bus Rapid Transit -- BRT ReaVaya, where costs escalated from R500 million to R1.5 billion - and another infrastructural transport project: the Gautrain, which

was first estimated at just over R20 billion, but ended up costing a total of R34 billion.

Linking private enterprise and government in a project designed to become the central hub of a future integrated transport project for South Africa's commercial heart, the Gautrain is the largest Public/Private Partnership (PPP) ever launched in South Africa. With a projected cost of about R20 billion, the Gautrain project, led by the Gauteng Provincial Government (GPG), has been structured to ensure that the government and the concessionaire, the Bombela International Consortium, operate within a strict set of financial and time parameters. The financial parameters are designed to take into account the risk associated with South Africa's fluctuating macro-economic parameters.

The concern is not only about the final cost of the stadiums, but even more serious are the costs of maintenance. The Soccer City stadium built for the Soccer World Cup finals costs between R25-million and R30-million per year to maintain. The Green Side Stadium has total operating costs, since 2009/10, of about R436 millions, while their total income is R92 million. Taxpayers have had to make up for the R344m shortfall to keep the stadium going.

**Settlement, in Cape Town**  
Precarious life conditions mobilized social organizations and residents to fight for their rights  
(Susan Secretariat/CC)



## *Civil society reaction*

### **Housing:**

In Blikkiesdorp (Cape Town) NGOs, international human rights organisations and the Anti-Eviction Campaign have publicly criticised the living conditions and the use of forced removals of poor families to make way

for the 2010 World Cup. British anti-poverty charity War on Want created a virtual model of the area, featuring videos of residents talking about the living conditions in the settlement (see the area reserved for video production).

The residents of Umlazi D section in Durban, together with others organizations from Durban, challenge the government in defence of their living conditions rights. South Durban Community Environment Alliance, SDCEA,

supports their struggle through the help of an academic group of researchers, and a legal board that provides legal assistance to people forced out from their homes. The legal team is taking the local government to court, and in December 2013 they opened a case in the Human Rights Commission that is still underway.

In the case of San Jose a “condemned” building in Hillbrow, Johannesburg, the residents went through two lower courts before the Constitutional Court finally defined an alternative accommodation for them. According to the Prevention of Illegal Eviction – PIE Act (1998) – which represents the legal base for the obligation by the municipality to not arbitrarily evict people from homes – no one can be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without a court order issued after considering all the relevant circumstances, especially when the eviction of informal dwellers may result in homelessness. The alternative has been provided in a refurbished building managed by the city, a dozen blocks to the south of San Jose. According to the interview of a resident featured in the Daily Maverick by Kevin

Bloom, some years after the relocation, the living conditions of the people of San Jose in the new building are even worse. Sanitary and safety conditions are very poor, and the private security guards contracted by the City are corrupt and do not provide the level of security that residents used to provide themselves in San Jose. The City, uncritically committed to the promotion of the “World Class African City”<sup>9</sup>, treats residents as criminals, and demonstrates its inability to manage the inner city’s housing emergency.

### Informal Traders:

StreetNet International organized the resistance to informal traders’ evictions and working rights violations in several cities. They demanded the recognition of African street culture, music, indigenous food and informal traders as an integral part of a visitor’s experience of South Africa. The organization approached the municipalities of the host cities, the minister of Local Government and the South African Local Government Association – SALGA and promoted the international World Class City for All – WCCA Campaign (<http://www.streetnet.org.za/>). Even though the results have not been very positive, since most of the Local Governments didn’t engage with the Campaign, some Municipalities made some effort in order to avoid arbitrary removals or at least to provide alternative accommodations to the removed traders.



[9] The City of Cape Town has injected R575.8 million into the development of a 10.5 hectare park, The Green Point Common, to transform what was previously a dysfunctional public open space into a living, vibrant, busy and safe park.



**Informal business** around the construction works of Green Point stadium, Cape Town (Warrenski/CC)



**Street vendors**  
(Eva Uppsala/CC)

The goals of the WCCA campaign are:

1. Challenging the traditional approach to World Class Cities and creating a new, more inclusive concept of World Class Cities for ALL, with the participation of street vendors and other groups of the (mainly urban) poor.
2. Providing an effective, people-centered strategy with a focus on women and other vulnerable street vendors, who are the first to lose their livelihoods and the most overlooked in the official plans for World Class Cities.
3. Building a proactive alternative to the defensive strategy to which StreetNet and its affiliates were finding themselves resorting, time after time.

The Western Cape Informal Traders Coalition and Western Cape Civil Actions Campaign called for a moratorium on all evictions of informal traders by the City of Cape Town before and during the World Cup, and demanded the negotiation of alternative trading spaces, but the city never responded – even when the traders asked the city to address their demands as a matter of urgency.

Public resistance and a legal action by traders made it possible for the shopping mall on the market site plans to be put aside. The development, at first just delayed because of the legal action taken by the Early Morning Market traders, was eventually abandoned. The multi-million project was due to start in June 2009,

but could not proceed as planned after the traders refused to move from the market and took the dispute to the Durban High Court in October. The lawyers for the municipality and the developer, the Isolenu Group, did not show up in court. Even the city's offer to accommodate the displaced traders within the new development was rejected by traders, some of whom had been working at the market for decades.

### **Construction workers:**

Between July 8<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup>, 2009, South African construction workers came together in an unprecedented national strike. The uniqueness of the strike lies in the fact that it was the first national strike happening in a World Cup site, and in the unity displayed by workers and unions of different sectors. Another important element was the support demonstrated by the South African media and public. The first strike happened in 2007, in Cape Town, igniting a wave of strikes across the country. Workers demanded improved working conditions and an increase in safety and salaries. The Building & Wood Workers International – BWI Africa & Middle East, and its affiliates in the construction sector, Building Construction and Allied Workers Union – BCAWU, National Union of Mineworkers – NUM and South African Building Workers Organisation – SABAWO, promoted the Campaign for Decent Work Towards & Beyond 2010. This campaign saw all unions increasing their membership, and gaining a stronger voice to represent all workers





in the construction sector at different levels, including FIFA level. The assessment of the achievements and results of the Campaign are available in the report “Evaluation of the Building & Wood Workers International Campaign for Decent Work Towards and Beyond 2010”.

The idea of the national strike, its strategy and demands were elaborated well before the negotiations with South African Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors – SAFCEC and the strike in July, 2009. On the 8<sup>th</sup> of July 2009, 70,000 workers from both the civil engineering and building sectors embarked on a national day of action, with a 100% rate of participation, in 35 construction sites across South Africa. This was the biggest strike since the new ANC government, under Zuma as president, was inaugurated and the first since the World Cup preparations had began. The strikes ended with a negotiation between unions’ representatives, the Labour Minister and the representative of the FIFA Local Organising Committee, based on a package that included a 13% increase of

the minimum wage, annual bonuses, maternity leave with pay and a reduction in the working hours without the loss of pay. The negotiation also undermined the demands and ended up demobilising the national strike. Pressured by patriotism and the meaning that being World Cup hosts would have for South Africa, the position of the leaders of the trade unions was weakened at the expense of national workers’ militancy. A sticking point of the negotiation was the definition of the “peace clause”, which imposed the illegality of strikes until August 31<sup>st</sup>, 2010, two months after the World Cup was ended. This was just one of the legal actions imposed by FIFA. In 2006, the South African Parliament passed a special law (the 2010 FIFA World Cup Special Measures Acts 11 and 12 of 2006) that set a potentially dangerous precedent. These laws meant that for the duration of the tournament, South Africa surrendered its national sovereignty and suspended constitutional rights, such as the rights to work, to freedom of movement, to strike and to gather,



**Interrupted construction works** Workers on strike at different stages of the building of stadia that hosted the World Cup  
(Larger photo: Warrenski/CC; photo above: Shine/CC)



**World Cup construction workers**  
(Douglas Whitfield/CC)

and even the basic freedom of expression, in order to protect FIFA's cash cow.

### Police Brutality:

Many protests against police brutality have been organised by several South African social movements and organizations. At the same time, legal actions have been promoted by legal board of organizations engaged in the support of social movements. South African academics and their counterparts around the world denounced police violence against social movements and the "social cleaning operation", promoted by the Government and implemented by the police to meet FIFA requirements. At international level, many organisations, like the members of War on Want, who joined the London Coalition Against Poverty in their visit to the South African High Commission to deliver a message in solidarity to Abahlali baseMjondolo, showed their support.

### Public Funds Spending:

All the five new stadiums that were built especially for the World Cup have become an issue for the national fiscus. Most of them struggle to be profitable, or even to just afford their maintenance costs.

The new Cape Town stadium (cost: 4.5 billion Rand) struggles to host enough events to pay for its colossal maintenance; for that rea-

son, some people are calling for it to be demolished, while others propose turning it into low-income housing. This second option is not feasible, not only for the difficulty (and cost) of adapting the stadium for housing use, but also due to the fact that the stadium is located in Green Point, one of Cape Town's most noble areas, in which a rich residents' association is firmly opposed to any further building of infrastructure.

In June 2013, the city council published advertisements saying the Cape Town Stadium "is open for business", in an attempt to attract enough clients to help foot the huge costs of running the stadium. The stadium has been unable to attract enough business top break even. Its total operating costs since 2009/10 is R436 million, while the total income is R92 million. The City cites "extremely restrictive zoning laws" on Green Point Common<sup>10</sup> as one of the major reasons why the stadium is running at a loss. The Green Point Ratepayers' and Residents Association has stated that it is not opposed to commercialisation next to the stadium, as this land has already been "alienated". Yet nothing has been developed around the stadium which, four years later, has resulted in a no-use land between the beachfront and an expensive residential neighbourhood.

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[10] Xenophobic attacks have a long history in South Africa. "Prior to 1994, immigrants from elsewhere in Africa faced discrimination and even violence in South Africa, though much of that risk stemmed from the institutionalised racism of the time, due to apartheid. After the democratisation, in 1994, the incidence of xenophobia increased, contrary to expectations. Between 2000 and March 2008 at least 67 people died in what were identified as xenophobic attacks. In May 2008 a series of riots left 62 people dead; although 21 of those killed were South African citizens, the attacks were apparently motivated by xenophobia ( source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xenophobia\\_in\\_South\\_Africa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xenophobia_in_South_Africa) accessed February 2014). 2010 registered a wave of xenophobic violence happening in various townships around South Africa. A thousand foreigners, mostly Zimbabweans, were forced out of their townships. People have been horribly murdered or mutilated, and refugee camps have been erected, especially in Cape Town, to provide a secure shelter to foreigners living in townships around South Africa.

## Legacy

### a) Social

Despite all the controversy, most South Africans agree that the World Cup did reinforce social cohesion in a country marked by deep racial discrimination, and contributed to a shift away from Afro-pessimism, especially in the immediate linking of South Africa with racism, inequality and violence. The 2010 World Cup's sounds (the vuvuzelas), sights, and aesthetics have been explored, along with questions of patriotism, nationalism, and spectatorship in Africa and around the world, and suggested a substantial (if questionable) increase in social cohesion and national pride amongst all South Africans.

The World Cup discourse about pan-African solidarity represented a double-edged sword in a year (2010) sadly marked by xenophobic attacks against African migrants<sup>11</sup> all around South African townships. Even if the xenophobia had nothing to do with the 2010 World Cup, and was caused by the lack of basic services to the poorest and most disenfranchised communities, the anger towards foreigners who compete for minimum resources may have been fed by the reinforcement of nationalist sentiment.

The pride of being the first African country to host the World Cup has a special meaning, since South Africa was the first non-European country to join FIFA, in 1910. As a vocal advo-

cate for South Africa's World Cup, FIFA president Joseph Blatter fulfilled a promise made to African FIFA delegates in the late 1990s: bringing the World Cup to Africa for the first time. For that reason, some South African fans cultivated a perception of Blatter as a "friend of Africa", an element that, among other things, can be used to deflect attention from FIFA's bribery and corruption scandals.

Despite the positive outlook from some sources, others didn't share this perspective. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Prince Mashele, the South African executive director for the Centre for Politics and Research affirmed, "All the problems that bedevil this country will resurface. Also, the national pride of showing that "Africa can do world class" has been, and continues to be, mainly a middle class feeling".

In his book, "Africa's World Cup", Marc Fletcher describes the World Cup's effect through a very elitist perception: "travelling on the bus from white suburbs to predominantly black townships was symbolically significant: it challenged the city's *de facto* segregation." He also mentions

"One of the major quirks of the tournament was the amount of people walking around at night in previously-considered dangerous parts of cities. However, beneath much of the public joy were major economic and social concerns".

These types of brotherhood and community feelings were very short-lived and very

[11] The 2010 FIFA World Cup Legacy Trust was established in the wake of the 2010 FIFA World Cup to promote and extend the development of football in South Africa and support initiatives using football as a tool for social development. The first 973 beneficiaries were approved in January 2013 and the next phase of application is expected for the period between March 2014 and February 2015. In the area of social development, the Legacy Trust is supporting a number of Football for Hope Centres across Africa, an initiative which has already brought education and health services to over 70,000 young people in disadvantaged communities in 16 countries across Africa. Moreover, a total of 800 legacy bags that consist of football equipment with the value of ZAR 7500 were distributed to clubs and schools across the country. The Legacy Trust also funded a number of key football grass-roots activities implemented by the South African Football Association and its regional and local affiliates, including a Women's High Performance Programme and Women's Regional Leagues, as well as U-13, U-15, Beach Soccer and Futsal competitions. Source: <http://www.safa.net/index.php?page=articles&id=1883>

restricted to the usual social classes, eventually connecting wealthy South Africans to international visitors of the same class, rather than with citizens of their own “rainbow nation”.

What it actually seems to be is the manipulation by the government of the patriotic spirit, in order to distract public opinion from the absurd expenditure of public funds. The government argued that the event would generate jobs and investments, but the cost of hosting the event shifted from R17 billion to nearly R40 billion, and it became apparent that the money that could have been spent to finance housing, hospitals and education would be used to finance the World Cup. When the media started to raise doubts and criticism, the result was that every critical voice about the benefits of the World Cup was drowned by the national pride.

The South African World Cup raises also serious issues about the meanings of democracy and equality in the new South Africa. The games have been watched in the stadiums by an audience formed largely of white spectators (South African or foreign), while the almost exclusively black supporters crowded the fan parks. “To pretend that this division doesn’t exist is to align oneself with the elite minority who continues to occupy the bars and cafés of Cape Town and Sandton, as they did before 1994” said Leonard Gentle.

## b) Economic

In 2010, the Wall Street Journal published an article that claimed “The South African government has used the World Cup as a catalyst for development, and to address social ills of crime and race tensions. It has claimed success on all fronts” (Wonacott and Stewart, 2010). The economic legacy is seen as the potential increase of investments consequent to the change of perception of the country by outside investors which, after the World Cup, should feel safer and more comfortable with the idea of investing money in a country with what was considered to be an “abnormal and violent society”. South Africa hosted a ‘successful’ FIFA 2010 World Cup, which hopefully will stimulate further interest in the country as a tourism and foreign direct investment destination, but as reported by Bond and Cottle, “According to Western Cape Finance, Economic Development and Tourism MEC Alan Winde,

‘...despite the Western Cape’s reputation as a tourist destination, the short-term economic impact of the World Cup has been muted. The tourism figures are far lower than expected, and accommodation occupancy rates in the CBD, at just 55%, were well below expectation. According to the KwaZulu Natal office of the Federated Hospitality Association of South Africa, Durban experienced similar problems, where occupancy hovered at about 30 to 40% during non-match days, with the Gooderson Hotel Group condemning FIFA for raising expectations through massive bookings, only to suffer extremely low oc-



**Restricted improvements** Transportation systems were an important legacy, although they only work well in the capital and in a few of the cities that hosted the Cup  
(George Lamson/CC)

capacity rates thereafter.”

The Western Cape Province report said:

“the legacy and long-term impact of the tournament are related with a changed perception of the host economy and its potential for tourism, trade and investment in the longer run; the economy stands with an internationally enhanced image following very extensive media coverage, as well as the impression made on thousands of visiting fans”.

According to the declarations of several public officials, “The World Cup offered South African cities the chance to be reimagined. Budgets were considerable, governments were mobilised and opportunities to engage communities were at their peak. In order to make the World Cup succeed, private and public sectors worked together. New partnerships and ways of operating were established”. The big issue is the incapacity of the government to apply this new practice, so efficiently applied for the World Cup, to all the other necessary mega projects, like housing, education and unemployment.

In economic terms, the reality is that FIFA earned more than \$3 billion in tax-free revenue, largely through the sale of television rights and corporate sponsorships, while South Africa spent more than twice that amount in public funds and made at most \$100 million from ticket sales. In terms of privatised profits, South African shopping mall retailers, construction giants, and food and hospitality companies did

well, but the overall impact on GDP in South Africa amounted to between 0.3 and 0.5 percent – roughly one-tenth of the original estimate.

In terms of infrastructure, new airports and expanded terminals have opened in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. Bus rapid transit systems (BRTS) have been planned and partially opened in cities across the country. One of the most successful projects, the Rea Vaya BRT in Johannesburg, is still not working completely in 2014. The Gautrain regional rail system in the Johannesburg area is working, but there are no comments or plans for the extension of its system in a regional scale. Major road projects have been undertaken in every host city, updating access and circulation. New train stations have also opened in many host cities. The National Treasury has invested more than \$2.1 billion on transportation and infrastructure projects, in addition to local funding sources. According to the South African Department of Transport, transportation has been the main legacy of the World Cup. And it is probably true, even with all the shortcomings of the working system.

By creating more construction jobs for the World Cup, the government hoped to increase the taxpayer base and to finally generate some much-needed revenue. This strategy was actually counterproductive; the construction jobs only provided temporary employment, and created a false sense of national economic improvement. According to Grant Thornton, the number of annual sustained jobs was estimated to be 695,000 in total for both the pre and



**Profit** Construction industry was one of the most benefited (Jim Sher/CC)

post-World Cup periods. Of those, 280,000 annual jobs would be sustained in 2010. But as Bond and Cottle denounce in their paper, “on July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2010, in the immediate aftermath of the World Cup being held in South Africa, the official government statistics bureau, Statistics South Africa, released its Labour Force Survey, Quarter 2 (April-June) and stated that, “there was an annual decrease of 4,7 percent (627 000) in employment” in the overall economy and “the loss of jobs in the formal sector was driven by construction, where employment contracted

by 7,1 percent, or 54 000 jobs”. On a year to year basis 111,000 jobs were shed in the construction industry. With all major construction projects completed for the World Cup, these jobs have all but disappeared”.

Some of the most important critiques have to do with the nature and impact of financial and legal arrangements between FIFA and South Africa, as well as the development of public spaces and infrastructure in host cities for the benefit of foreign tourists and the local consumer class. The 2010 FIFA World Cup

Legacy Trust was established in the wake of the 2010 FIFA World Cup to promote and extend the development of football in South Africa and to support initiatives using football as a tool for social development.

The official legacy runs to just the construction of a number of Football for Hope Centres in South Africa in addition to the existing 20 artificial football pitches distributed across 16 African countries, and some profits shared by African football authorities, while grass-roots expectations have been left unmet.

Moreover, a total of 800 legacy bags, that consist of football equipment to the value of ZAR 7500 were distributed to clubs and schools across the country.

FIFA Vice-Secretary General Mr. Jerome Valcke declared in an interview in 2009 that “Our commitment when we set up this Trust was to ensure that the FIFA World Cup leaves a lasting legacy in its host country, by supporting long-term football development in South Africa and social development organisations”.

According to an interview with Tinashe Njanji, a Zimbabwean social justice activist who lives in Khayelitsha since 2008,

“ After winning the bid to host 2010 World Cup, every African, particularly South Africans, were filled with jubilation. No one expected Africa to host the world’s biggest and most popular event. I remember the night of FIFA draw in December 2009. Every Capetonian was in Cape Town to witness what most thought was the beginning of dreams shaping into reality. But we were not even allowed anywhere near the venue, the Cape Town International Convention Centre. It took few years to spend billions of Rands to build or renovate stadiums and infrastructures like roads, airports and train stations. But no houses were built. World Cup match tickets were priced so high, the poor couldn’t afford them. The world’s most famous tournament came and went and it never changed our lives. We had hopes of getting jobs, running businesses etc., but none of those dreams came true. The World Cup left us in the same poverty-stricken conditions; only a few soccer projects, like “Football for Hope Movement” in Harare Khayelit-

sha and in Alexandra in Johannesburg. Coca-Cola, Kia, Hyundai and Sony sponsored these projects, but the projects’ infrastructures are deteriorating. I doubt the 2010 sponsors are still on board. World Cup is biased on the elite side. We are left nothing in South Africa, except for big white elephants that we will struggle to maintain”.



A look upon the legacy of the World Cups in Brazil, South Africa and Germany



## Conclusion

While President Jacob Zuma referred to the 2010 World Cup as “the greatest marketing opportunity of our time”, the Provincial Government of the Western Cape as “the most remarkable and significant event since the birth of our democracy in 1994”, and the 2010 Organising Committee CEO, Danny Jordaan, compared the event to a “second liberation”, informal traders – a significant part of the working poor – were subjected to an “exclusion zone”, away from the bonanza in the fan parks, fan walks and stadiums, and those who were struggling for a meaningful notion of citizenship continued their public protests.

The central issue is how a country with such a high public budget deficit for the provision of basic services like housing, infrastructure, health, education and transport, would invest such huge amounts in a month-long sports event with no apparently tangible and meaningful legacy. In an interview with *The Guardian*, in 2010, Caroline Elliot, international programmes officer for the anti-poverty group *War on Want*, said: “Behind the spectacle, the World Cup has exacerbated the struggle of poor South Africans who are facing evictions, lack of public services and unemployment. The South African government needs to tackle these problems as an urgent priority.”

South Africa’s World Cup did have some positive significance. South Africans were quite pleased with the ways in which FIFA and global

media congratulated their country for staging a world-class event. There was just about universal praise for South Africa’s warm hospitality, high modernist stadiums, tight security, sound event management, adequate accommodation, good transportation, and functional telecommunication networks. The World Cup added lustre to “Brand South Africa” and this element, although debatable, is undeniable.

But on the other hand, the manipulation of the representation of national pride has been so strong during the South African World Cup that even the powerful national workers’ strike has been affected and weakened by the discourse, used by the negotiators to reinforce the need to come together and ensure the “unconditional success of the World Cup”. The same expression of dissatisfaction by the workers has been transformed, in the words of the representative of the FIFA Local Organising Committee – LOC, into an emblematic representation of the high level of democracy achieved by the nation of Nelson Mandela, and how important it was for the eyes of the world to see that progress.

But a country with such a brutal history of forced removals has, in order to create the brand it attributes to itself, evicted the urban poor and rounded up and hid the homeless. Dumped into so-called “temporary relocating areas” and “transit camps”, these disowned South Africans seem to make a mockery of the struggle against apartheid.

Another glaring negative aspect has been the inequitable nature of FIFA’s hosting ar-



rangement. That most stadiums built or renovated for the World Cup now stand empty was an entirely predictable legacy. According to Jacobs (2013), even Local Organizing Committee CEO Danny Jordaan recognizes in a recent interview that: “Many of the expectations among South Africans were too high”.

The central achievements highlighted in all the reports almost exclusively make reference to the opportunity for the country to become more competitive in the international trade, investment and tourism markets. They also laud the ability of all three spheres of government to work together, along with civil society and the private sector. On the other hand, there is no reference to people living in concentration camps, the unaffordability of the games, the fact that the police, as a routine, repressed any kind of protest as they shot at protestors with buckshot, rubber bullets and teargas.

Nelson Mandela made a claim that “the World Cup [would] help unify people and if there is one thing in this planet that has the power to bind people, it’s soccer.” However, the use of football to forge a national identity had to overcome the deeply ingrained divisions in post-apartheid South Africa. Unfortunately, the World Cup did not change the racial divisions in South African society. Ticket prices accounted for about 10% of a working-class man’s monthly earnings, the instructions were in English only, and they required credit cards to be purchased online. As a result, fewer working-class fans than anticipated were in attendance at matches. The fact that FIFA strictly

controlled the market for merchandise also sterilised the African experience; local vendors selling soft drinks, barbeque chicken and roasted meat were “absent or obscured at World Cup venues” (Fletcher; Alegi). A few weeks after the World Cup’s conclusion, even this fake feeling of union faded away, and the gentrification of the “people’s game” made just evident that while some racial mixing is taking place in contemporary South Africa, it is happening mainly in privatised and closely policed bourgeois spaces.

Now we know how much the World Cup finally cost – but we don’t know what exactly did it leave behind. And at a price tag of over 40 billion rands – that’s about 4 billion pounds – was it really worth it?

For many South Africans The World Cup was supposed to bring a higher standard of living. But looking at the experience now, it is clear that in reality the living conditions of many people worsened during the event and that some people are still victims of that deterioration. For these people it would be better if the games had happened on another continent. Andile Mngxitama, a political commentator and columnist, in a controversial paper wrote in 2010: “The World Cup is not about football or so-called tourism. It’s about politicians hoping it keeps us busy for a month and making enormous amounts of money for themselves and their friends.”

## Videos and documentaries



Tin Town  
(video frame)



Fahrenheit 2010  
(video frame)

### Tin Town

A documentary film by Nora Connor, Clementine Wallace & Colton Margus

With housing having been promised by South African government, over a hundred families from Cape Town founded a community through their struggle as squatters on land by the side of a sand road known as Symphony Way. Due to a court order, they have recently moved to an as-yet-undetermined relocation area called Tin Town, in Afrikaaner. Community members think about this road, their past and the path ahead of them.

Avaiable in: <http://vimeo.com/9214594>  
Access: April 12, 2013

### Fahrenheit 2010

A documentary film by Craig Tanner

This investigative documentary film's aim is to know what the World Cup will actually mean to South Africans. Who will really benefit from the millions of invested dollars?

And what will be left behind for South Africa, after the trophy is raised and the applause dies? '2010 World Cup will be in South Africa!', the announcement was received with deafening applause. Promises were made that 'the people will [would] reap the benefits'. And the advertising wheels were turning. 'FIFA expects to collect US\$ 25 billion with transmission rights only'. Advertising spaces were sold to corporations such as Visa, Budweiser, Telkom and many others... and stadia, like giant white elephants, sprouted all over South Africa.

'A world filled with greed, selfishness and self-promotion" had begun.

Avaiable in: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ibAthe-\\_5fl](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ibAthe-_5fl) Access: April 12, 2013

## The Battle for Johannesburgo

by Rehad Desai & Darryl Els

The dark side of 2010 World Cup: Africa's wealthiest city is going through a big 'cleansing', marked by speculation and social paradox. The Battle for Johannesburg captures the changing face of a city getting ready to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup. It is the story of real estate agents that fight for ruined parts of the city with renewed enthusiasm; of a City Council determined to create a 'World Class City'; and, finally, of how that affects the lives of hundreds of thousands of people who made their homes in the city slums. There is money to be spent, a lot to be done and conflicting interests at stake.

How entire areas around the stadia were renovated and how the middle classes, both black and white, began moving back into those regions. Beyond the struggle for properties and space, there is a human survival story.

Avaiable in: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CuwS9FUiEul> Access in: April 12, 2013

## Welcome to Blikkiesdorp

The organization War on Want created a virtual model of the community, with videos that show residents talking about the relocation site's living conditions. It is possible to:

Click and drag on the scenery, in any direction, to explore the field;

Click on people and listen to their life stories

To zoom in and out on the images' details, by pressing ctrl+shift

Avaiable in: <http://www.waronwant.org/overseas-work/south-africa-and-the-2010-world-cup/watch/watch/16899-welcome-to-blikkiesdorp>

- Watch the video of the residents' walk to Blikkiesdorp Avaiable in: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=apKHUXyZ\\_kE](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=apKHUXyZ_kE) EWN Online - Residents' walk to Blikkiesdorp.>
- Images of Blikkiesdorp. Avaiable in <http://libcom.org/gallery/blikkiesdorp>
- **Video** Our words are our weapons: Symphony Way residents protest against the action of Cape Town's Anti-Squatting Unit.
- Avaiable in: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5qprLWofxpo&feature=player\\_embedded](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5qprLWofxpo&feature=player_embedded)



The Battle for Johannesburgo  
(video frame)



Welcome to Blikkiesdorp  
(video frame)

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## Public expenditure

Overall estimates of capital expenditure changed dramatically over time, with the amount of R22 billion for stadiums and related infrastructure.

### Stadiums' Cost:

| City          | Stadium                   | R             |
|---------------|---------------------------|---------------|
| Cape Town     | Green Point Stadium       | R4.5 billion  |
| Durban        | The Moses Mabhida Stadium | R3.1 billion  |
| Johannesburgo | The Soccer City Stadium   | R1.96 billion |
| Nelspruit     | Mbombela Stadium          | R875 million  |
| Polokwane     | Peter Mokaba Stadium      | R870 million  |
| Pretória      | Loftus Versfeld           | R99 million   |

Source: Amandla Issue n.15, 2010. Available on <<http://www.amandla.org.za/amandla-magazine/back-issues?download=62%3Aamandla-issue-15>>.

### Total Direct Spend Estimates - 2010 World Cup (in billions of rand)

|                                    | 2010 Update        | 2008 Update        | 2007 Update        | Bid Book           |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Category of spend                  | Total Direct Spend | Total Direct Spend | Total Direct Spend | Total Direct Spend |
| Number of foreign visitors         | 373.609            | 483.000            | 483.000            | 251.453            |
| Currency                           | R                  | R                  | R                  | R                  |
| Organising spend                   | 6,805              | 6,888              | 5,509              | 5,492              |
| Foreign and domestic tourism spend | 9,273              | 8,780              | 7,446              | 4,917              |
| Infrastructure and stadiums spend  | 39,229             | 17,400             | 17,400             | 2,304              |
| Total Direct Spend                 | 55,306             | 33,068             | 30,356             | 12,713             |
| GDP contribution                   | 92,992             | 55,714             | 51,144             | 21,419             |
| Employment generated               | 694.758            | 415.400            | 381.327            | 159.697            |

Source: South Africa's World Cup: A Legacy for Whom?, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, chapter 2, Economic Promises and Pitfalls of South Africa's World Cup, Patrick Bond & Eddie Cottle.




A look upon the legacy of the World Cups in Brazil, South Africa and Germany

### Infrastructure's Cost:

| City         | Structure  | Cost                            |
|--------------|--|---------------------------------|
| Cape Town    | BRT System   | More than \$600 million dollars |
| Johannesburg | Gautrain - High-speed-trains railway (system connects Johannesburg and Pretoria to O.R. Tambo Airport) | 25 billion rand                 |
| Durban       | King Shaka International Airport   | 8 billion rand                  |

### FIFA WORLD CUP - Stadium Spend – in US\$



Fonte: South Africa's World Cup: A Legacy for Whom?



**Moses Mabhida Stadium** building cost US\$ 180 million (Clive Reid/CC)

## Legislation

The 2010 FIFA WORLD AND CONFEDERATIONS CUP: SOUTH AFRICA BY-LAW has been passed in all the host cities where soccer matches will take place. From May 7<sup>th</sup>, 2010 until August 15<sup>th</sup>, 2010 the Municipality of each host city has in effect become the enforcement arm of a private company – FIFA – to protect that private company's image and profits. In terms of these by-laws, 'authorised officials' will be empowered to enforce the provisions relating to advertising, controlled access sites, public open spaces and city beautification, public roads and traffic guidance, as well as street trading. The by-laws make clear that 'any notices, directives, instructions, regulations, policies or procedures issued by FIFA or the Local Organising Committee (LOC) will be administered and enforced by the Municipality'.

The purpose of the By-law is to provide the Host Cities with legislative measures in order to comply with their obligations as Host City under the Host City Agreement between and with the 2010 FIFA World Cup Organising Committee South Africa ('LOC'), and the Fédération Internationale De Football Association ('FIFA'), for the hosting of the FIFA Confederations Cup and the 2010 FIFA World Cup to be held on South Africa during 2009 and 2010 respectively. Any host city assumed certain obligations with regard to the competition and, in particular, has agreed to ensure that a by-law be passed to enable the efficient running of the competition, requiring to ensure the appropriate respect of the following issues: a) Advertising b) Controlled-access sites c) Public open spaces and city beautification d) Public roads and traffic guidance e) Street trading.

All around South Africa, abuse of these by-laws by municipal officials and, in particular, by police and metro police has been very common, and these by-laws are being used to 'clean the streets' of street traders and homeless people during and before the World Cup. Also, the prohibition applicable to any person from distributing any pamphlets near or in stadiums or fan parks without the prior written approval of the Municipality seems to impose quite a drastic limit on the freedom of expression of everyone in South Africa.

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
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Access: March, 2014.

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**Opposite page photo** Berlin Olympic Stadium  
(Stacey Cavanagh/CC)





# *Germany*

Christian Russau





**Munich Stadium** in a 2006 World Cup match (Photo: Werner Kunz/CC)

## *2006 World Cup in Germany: a fairytale summer?*

Berlin, June and July 2006: the sun shines brightly on the city for an entire month. This summer is hot, with out-of-the-ordinary temperatures. Germans celebrate in parks and public gardens, street cafes and taverns. They celebrate the World Cup that happens in the country. They celebrate cheerfully, with people from every corner of the world, and even after Germany's defeat to Italy, in the semifinal, they go on celebrating the cheerful atmosphere, the good humor, the summer and the *joie de vivre*. The most heard expression on that month was "Germany, a fairytale summer". It became the title of a documentary film made about the German national team and its coach, Jürgen Klinsmann, throughout the tournament. The film was a box-office success. Although they had not conquered

the coveted cup, even though they were playing at home, the Germans kept celebrating their new, less tense relationship with themselves, for several months afterwards. International radio, TV and newspapers correspondents wondered: "What happened to the German? What happened to those disciplined, workaholic people, who complain about everything? Where are those humorless and a little bit boring Germans? What happened?"

### **"The world among Friends"**

The Germans did not go on vacation to escape from the World Cup mega event in their own country; neither did they get locked at home in front of the TV.



**Official motto** The world among friends (Jens Matheuszik/CC)

In spite of the defeat to Italy, they did not go back to work as their usual protestant ethic would have them do. No, the Germans filled the streets and the places where football fans usually gathered. They seemed more euphoric than the Italians, who celebrated winning the cup; merrier than the Brazilian hordes who had traveled

for that World Cup; made more jokes than the English, who were surprised about that German hot summer. In short, they gleefully celebrated with guests from around the world.

“World among Friends” (Die Welt zu Gast bei Freunden, in German): this was the official motto that foreshadowed the World Cup 2006 realization. But how could the German committee for the World Cup organization know that the Germans would suddenly become such wonderful hosts, surprising even the sharpest critics in their own country? There was more: after having been known for decades for their resistance to national symbols, they started to publicly wave their national flag. Pennants fluttered in millions of cars and bikes, and young people showed off the national colors painted on their faces all through what seemed like a never-ending summer, dancing in their flip-flops, beer in hand.

Did it really happen that way? Was that the whole story, the one which is usually told about the football summer of 2006?

As a matter of fact, that was only part of the story.

Before the tournament, the German government issued a “cultural program” to accompany the sporting event. The government final report about 2006 World Cup states: “Between 2003 and 2006, the Ministry of Interior (BMI) provided a total amount of € 29 million for arts and culture programs during the World Cup of 2006.

With this sum, 50 excellence projects were supported in the following categories: art shows; dance and theater; music and radio play; film, TV and video; literature and events/festivals”. Among the projects that received the most funding was Streetfootballworld, whose goal was to bring junior teams from many different countries to take part in the World Street Football Cup championship, in Germany.

That was the idea.

Coach Jürgen Klinsmann and former Interior Minister Otto Schily launched the project in the district of Kreuzberg, Berlin. But not all teams were allowed to go to Germany. Visa applications for the Ghana and Nigeria teams were denied. According to some news pieces from that time, the Minister responsible for the subject stated that the risk of some young people taking advantage of their stay to seek political asylum in Germany was too high. According to the minister, “the authorities responsible for granting the visas interviewed young people, who spoke about their dreams of a professional career abroad”. What boy, from any country, who plays street football, does not dream of a professional career?

Should these young people lie and say: “I do not want to become a professional football player?”<sup>1</sup>

[1] Available at [http://www.epo.de/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1714:gruene-abgeordneteforderung-einreisevisa-fuer-afrikanische-straenfußballer&catid=82&Itemid=35](http://www.epo.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1714:gruene-abgeordneteforderung-einreisevisa-fuer-afrikanische-straenfußballer&catid=82&Itemid=35). Access on 10/10/2013.



## *Germany open, yes. But not for everyone*



### **Official motto in a German Stadium**

(Marc Oliver John/CC)

The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs set a 'general rule for granting visas during the 2006 World Cup.' A procedure was promised for granting visas for visitors from abroad in a way that would be 'fast and focused on services.' The ministry also announced, simultaneously, that the principle would not apply for every country.

'Under the 2006 World Cup motto 'The World Among Friends', the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomatic representations abroad will make possible a swift visa procedure, focused on services, for visitors from around the world who need to enter the country. However, experience from several major events showed that people without roots in their original countries frequently take the opportunity to remain in the host country, instead of returning to their own. In some countries, the numbers of this abusive practice are high.

A considerable share of their documents proved to be false, i.e., bought. The objective of the Federal Republic of Germany is to be a good and open host during the 2006 World Cup, while also ensuring that the Cup is not used as an excuse to abuse the visa. This is in the best interest of all. [...]

The visa can only be granted without prejudice to the security interests of Germany and of the other Schengen-Agreement countries. In this context, besides investigating the purpose of the trip and ensuring the traveler has enough money for his/her stay, we must have a positive prognosis about the tourist's availability to return. Only those who fulfill all these conditions will receive the visa. Showing evidence of having purchased a ticket for a Cup match can be considered a means to justify the credibility of the trip's objective, but does not justify any right to a visa."<sup>2</sup>

[2] Italics on the original document WM 2006: Abschlussbericht der Bundesregierung (2006 World Cup, final report from German Federal Republic Government). Available at <http://wm2006.deutschland.de/DE/Content/SharedDocs/Publikationen/abschlussbericht-bundesregierungwm2006,property=publicationFile.pdf>. Access on 10/10/2013.



**Postcard** Brandenburg Gate in Berlin during the 2006 World Cup (Russel C/CC)

[3] Idem, 21p.

[4] Idem.

[5] Available at: <http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/sport/fussball-wm-2006/73592/ein-land-sieht-rund-essay>. Access on 02/14/2014.

[6] Brenke, Karl; Wagner, Gert G. Zum volkswirtschaftlichen Wert der Fussball-Weltmeisterschaft 2006 in Deutschland“ [About the Germany 2006 World Cup macroeconomic effect]. DIW, Berlin, 2007. Available at <http://www.diw.de/documents/%20publikationen/73%20/56559/rn19.pdf>. Access on 09/14/2013.

[7] Müllender, Bernd. Ein Land sieht rund – Essay, In: Aus Politik und Feijões-chicote, 19/2006. Available at: <http://www.bpb.de/apuz/29761/ein-land-sieht-rund-essay>. Access on 11/10/2013.

### The World Cup, an economic boom factor?

Besides the good reputation, the German Government<sup>3</sup> also attributed macroeconomic successes to the 2006 Cup. According to it, electronic equipments’ sales grew 5.2% (or € 227 million) – an increase credited, for the most part, to the new flat-screen TV sets, which broke all previous sales’ records. Since there were 10% more tourists than expected, the hotel industry around the whole country allegedly had an extra revenue of € 220 million. In all, hotels and restaurants were said to have registered additional revenues of €300 million. However, according to the official statistics, meals sales grew only 0.3 %, while liquor sales rose 4.7%.

### Increased consumption in the Cup: “No relevant cyclical momentum”

Companies, on their turn, claim to have profited with the World Cup in Germany. According to a survey carried out by the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce with 19,000 stores all over the country, “11 % of companies reported that the Cup had positive consequences for business. In the regions that hosted the games, this figure holds true for 14 % of the companies.”<sup>4</sup> No matter how optimistic these government data may seem, they are miles away from the forecasts of € 10 million

consumption increase during the World Cup, representing 0.5 % of GDR.<sup>5</sup> Economists, on the other hand, seem much more realistic. Karl Brenke and Gert G. Wagner, researchers in the German Institute for Economic Sciences (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, DIW), have another interpretation for the 2006 World Cup supposedly measurable economic effects. In 2007, a year after the mega event, they analyzed the economic data of the “World Cup effect” and reached less optimistic results. According to them, the World Cup has not generated “Any relevant cyclical momentum.” The economic effects “had no noticeable dimension in the economy.” The researchers concluded that “There was no increase in private consumption during the Cup”.<sup>6</sup>

But had the Cup created new jobs? In 2004, the Federal Agency for Labor and Employment (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) predicted there would be “100 thousand new jobs”, noted Bernd Müllender in 2006.<sup>7</sup> In January of 2006, two years later, the same agency had already changed its forecast to about only 50 thousand jobs: “These jobs will be mostly in catering sales industry, in bars or in security – i.e., short term”. Where would then be the legacy of the 2006 World Cup in Germany?

### The 2006 World Cup in Germany - an international "love-in"?

It is an indisputable fact that Germany gained a new image before the world due to the 2006 Cup. The British channel BBC, among others, noted that the traditional image of the Germans abroad was not the same anymore. "We all like the Germans!" stated Laura Smith-Spark on her *blog* about the World Cup at BBC, asking immediately afterwards: "Isn't it funny how ten days of football can change so many people's ideas about other nations? I had never expected to hear so many voices around the globe saying how fantastic the Germans are. Neither did I expect the World Cup to become an international 'love-in'."<sup>8</sup>

Was Germany, in the summer of 2006, a party? Absolutely. People danced until dawn in the warm summer nights, socializing with fans from all around the world, breaking all their traditional prejudices. "With the Brazilians it was very striking: many of them came to Germany to attend the World Cup matches with that 'correct German' image in their heads", says Christian Tänzler, spokesman for the travel agency Visit Berlin, a partnership between the State of Berlin, some hotels, the city investment banks and others. "Then they arrived in a country where the sun shone for four weeks, and everyone celebrated nonstop". Especially in the capital, Berlin, this showed the Brazilian visitors a completely new im-

age: that of a Germany that was open to the world and willing to have fun. "During the four weeks of the 2006 World Cup, Berlin alone received 15 million tourists," said Tänzler. Every day, 450,000 new visitors arrived at the city. "And since the Cup, the city has been experiencing a boom, especially with tourists from Brazil. The 2006 World Cup brought a priceless gain for the city image, something that no marketing campaign could have achieved", complements Tänzler.

### A new image of Germany abroad

With this, the country did profit, in terms of image. In that respect, the Foreign Affairs Minister hit the nail on the head in his analysis at the time: "In countries with a traditionally critical approach, 2006 World Cup generated a questioning of the old stereotypes. It confirmed that Germany and its residents have a new tranquility, kindness and emotionality. To those 'typically German' known virtues, like order, perfectionism, punctuality and anxiety for security, were added attributes such as friendliness, openness, hospitality, joie de vivre and sense of justice. Old prejudices, such as stubbornness, lack of humor, xenophobia and emotional coldness were abandoned. The successful efforts to show that Germans are good hosts, the sweeping game of the German national team, the



Party Team supporters in Munich, Bavaria, Germany (Fabian Mohr/CC)

[8] Available at: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/worldcup/2006/06/we\\_all\\_love\\_the\\_germans.html](http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/worldcup/2006/06/we_all_love_the_germans.html). Access on 10/10/2013.



**Dortmund Stadium**  
(Cristian Cruz/CC)

enthusiasm of so many – generally young – spectators at the local concentrations and the ‘relaxed’ patriotism gave Germany a good name worldwide.”<sup>9</sup>

Even the German police, who are not exactly known for their sunny disposition, demonstrated a good sense of humor in their actions during that summer. “Cars Damaged: Police arrested Beckham, Rooney and Owen”, the

Dresden Police said in a statement to the press on June 21st, 2006. On the previous night, three New Zealand fans had been arrested, wearing the shirts with the numbers and names of their British idols, Beckham, Rooney and Owen.<sup>10</sup> Road patrolmen of the highway A2, from Hamm to Uentrop, were not as amused when they stopped the real Diego Maradona, who raced to the game of Argentina against Serbia and Montenegro at 120 km/h in a 80 km/h-limit zone. The football star had to pay a € 200 bail before being allowed to move on.<sup>11</sup> In general, however, Germany did convey the image of a partying country, on that summer of 2006.

## *FIFA invades the country...*

The German could have exercised their criticism and organized some protests. They had no shortage of reasons, since before approving the holding of a World Cup, FIFA always imposes some obligations on the hosting country.

### **Public expenditure for the 2006 World Cup in Germany**

Seven years before the ball started to roll in Germany’s World Cup, on the 6th of July, 1999, the Green/Democrat coalition delivered a long list of governmental warranties to FIFA, announcing measures and assuring wide-ranging privileges to the football association, their sponsors and partners, as well as to other countries’ players and their staff: tax exemptions, adaptations in custom tariffs and law amendments to assure FIFA’s privileges. “Business with a not very social partner”, was how *taz*<sup>12</sup> newspaper referred to the German Government’s submissive attitude to FIFA. On top of that, FIFA also demanded a vendors-free radius of about 1 km around the host stadia, as well as a series of warranties regarding the modernization of those stadia. The government obliged, and a total of € 530.7 million in public money was made available from federal, regional and municipal funds to pay for the



**Symbol** The bear, symbol of Berlin, stylized for the World Cup. (Photo: Christian Russau)

[9] Available at <http://wm2006.deutschland.de/DE/Content/SharedDocs/Publikationen/abschlussberichtbundesregierung-wm2006.property=publicationFile.pdf>. Access on 10/10/2013.

[10] Available at: <http://www.mopo.de/news/fussball-wmsprueche-vom-21--juni,5066732,5764656.html> Access on 09/12/2013

[11] Available at: <http://verkehrsunfall.beeplog.de/blog.pl?blogid=49286&from=14>. Access on 10/09/2013

[12] Available at: <http://www.taz.de/!118372/>. Access on 10/09/2013.

### German flag graces a window

(Joachim Niemeier/CC)



[13] See WM 2006: Abschlussbericht der Bundesregierung (2006 Cup, German Government final report). Available at <http://wm2006.deutschland.de/DE/Content/SharedDocs/Publikationen/abschlussbericht-bundesregierungwm2006,property=publicationFile.pdf>. Access on 10/10/2013.

[14] See WM 2006: Abschlussbericht der Bundesregierung (2006 Cup, German Government final report). Available at <http://wm2006.deutschland.de/DE/Content/SharedDocs/Publikationen/abschlussbericht-bundesregierungwm2006,property=publicationFile.pdf>. Access on 10/10/2013.

[15] Weinreich, Jens: "Die Kosten der WM – insgesamt wurde der Steuerzahler im Zusammenhang mit der Weltmeisterschaft mit mehreren Milliarden Euro belastet Die Kunst des Rechnens", in: Berliner Zeitung, 10/6/2006. Available at: <http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/die-kosten-der-wm--insgesamt-wurde-dersteuerzahler-im-zusammenhang-mit-der-weltmeisterschaftmit-mehreren-milliarden-euro-belastet-die-kunst-des-rechnens,10810590,10393614.html>. Access on 09/30/2013.

very expensive buildings or renovations of twelve stadia, totaling € 1.4 billion.

Another € 3.7 billion were invested on expanding highways all over the country, as registered by the government's final 2006 World Cup report. However, not even the government itself included these expenditures in the World Cup general budget. The public expenditure destined directly to the cup, according to government data, added up to only € 294 million.<sup>13</sup> The other costs, as high as billions of Euros, weren't attributed to the Cup in the union budget, and neither were the expenses from the federation, states and municipalities regarding security (the police etc.), because, according to the German government, "they couldn't be safely accounted for".<sup>14</sup>

What is behind that? Were not then the costs of the German Cup in fact as high as its critics feared? No. What is behind is a simple trick: "In football, as in the Olympic Games, the 'art' consists in putting a minimum of costs in the budget and indicating

the maximum possible costs as having been foreseen as investments not directly linked to The Olympics or to The World Cup, thereby arriving, in the end, at a pretty surplus within the respective budgets".<sup>15</sup>

It is true that it's hard to allocate infrastructure projects financed by public resources exclusively to the German World Cup, since East Germany is still receiving public funds through the solidarity tax included within the tax bill and also because Berlin is still amidst a property boom after the fall of the wall, the reunification, the changing of the capital city and the raise of its attractiveness to people looking to earn more money. Nonetheless, economists made calculations in 2009 and found out that the public expenditure for all of the Germany World Cup host cities, including costs with infrastructure, totaled about 7 billion Euros. But it is still quite hard to envisage a clear limit between investments made for the World Cup and others.

**Costs and funding for Germany 2006 World Cup stadia\***

| Stadium                | Construction Operations   | Total costs    | Responsible for funding  |
|------------------------|---------------------------|----------------|--|
| Berlin Olympic Stadium | Renovation                | € 242 million  | Federal Government: € 196 million<br>City-State of Berlin: € 46 million loan   |
| Dortmund               | Renovation                | € 45.5 million | Funding by Westfalenstadion Dortmund GmbH (private company)  |
| Frankfurt am Main      | Building of a new stadium | € 126 million  | Hessen State: € 20.5 million<br>City of Frankfurt: € 64 million<br>Banks: € 41.5 million loans   |
| Gelsenkirchen          | Building of a new stadium | € 191 million  | City of Gelsenkirchen: €10 million<br>Banks: € 122.5 million loans<br>Owner's equity : € 40 million<br>General Contractor: € 6.4 million loan<br>Leasing: € 5.3 million<br>Fans: € 5.1 million<br>Private company: € 1.7 million |
| Hamburg                | Renovation                | € 97 million   | City of Hamburg: € 11 million<br>Third-party funding: € 70 million<br>Private company: € 16 million  |

[\*] Source: WM 2006: Abschlussbericht der Bundesregierung“ (Germany Final Report on the 2006 World Cup). Available in: <http://wm2006.deutschland.de/DE/Content/SharedDocs/Publikationen/abschlussbericht-bundesregierungwm2006,property=publicationFile.pdf>. Access on 10/11/2014.

## Costs and funding for Germany 2006 World Cup stadia (continuation)

| Stadium              | Construction Operations   | Total costs    | Responsible for funding  |
|----------------------|---------------------------|----------------|--|
| Hannover             | Remodeling                | € 64 million   | City of Hannover, Federal State of Niedersachsen: € 24 million<br>KFW (Federal government development bank) € 20 million loan (secured by the City of Hannover)<br>Banks: € 20 million loans |
| Kaiserslautern       | Expansion                 | € 48.3 million | State of Rheinland-Pfalz: € 21.7 million<br>City of Kaiserslautern: € 7.7 million<br>FC Kaiserslautern Football Club: € 18.9 million   |
| Köln (Cologne)       | Remodeling                | € 119 million  | City of Köln: € 25.7 million<br>Kölner Sportstätten GmbH (Private Company): € 93.3 million   |
| Leipzig              | Building of a new stadium | € 90.6 million | Federal government: € 51.1 million<br>City of Leipzig: € 12.1 million<br>EMKA GmbH (Private company) € 27.4 million  |
| München (Munich)     | Building of a new stadium | € 280 million  | FC Bayern München Football Club: € 140 million (approximately)<br>TSV 1860 München Football Club: € 140 million (approximately)  |
| Nürnberg (Nuremberg) | Renovation                | € 56 million   | Freistaat Bayern State: € 28 million<br>City of Nürnberg: € 28 million   |
| Stuttgart            | Modernization             | € 51.5 million | Baden-Württemberg State: € 15 million (approximately)<br>VfB Stuttgart Football Club: co-funding of one of the stadium's grandstands.  |

**Opposing page picture** Munich Allianz Arena Stadium  
(Pikadilly C/C)



A photograph of the Allianz @ Arena stadium at night. The stadium's facade is illuminated with a vibrant blue light, creating a textured, diamond-patterned effect. The name "Allianz @ Arena" is prominently displayed in white on the right side of the building. A single street lamp with a glowing white bulb stands in the foreground on the left, casting a soft light. The background is dark, emphasizing the illuminated structure.

**Allianz @ Arena**

And FIFA? What did it get out of this?

FIFA is a public interest entity, based in Switzerland, and makes financial statements of each World Cup, in four-year periods. These periods usually start on the 1st of January after the most recent World Cup completion, and end on December 31st of the year preceding the next World Cup. The result: “In the period between January 1st, 2003 and December 31st, 2006, FIFA had a 3,238 million Swiss francs (CHF) revenue, against a total expenditure of CHF 2.422 million. This results in a net profit of CHF 816 million in those four years. FIFA closed the 2003–2006 period with a record positive result of 816 million. Their equity on December 31st, 2006 was CHF 752 million, the largest amount in the 103 years of FIFA’s history.”<sup>17</sup>

### FIFA was the host: the World Cup and the rights over sponsors’ trademarks

Besides, the rights over trademarks were adapted to FIFA’s needs. The football stadia became territories licensed by FIFA, and around them there could only be advertising and products from FIFA’s partners.

In 2006, FIFA’s World Cup featured 16 international sponsors, each one paying FIFA 40 million Euros for the exclusive advertising rights during the World Cup promos and matches’ transmissions around the globe: Adidas, Avaya, Budweiser (Anheuser - Busch), Canon, Coca-Cola, Continental, Deutsche Telekom, Emirates, Fujifilm, Gillette, Hyundai, Mastercard, McDonald’s, Philips, Toshiba and Yahoo! There were also six German local sponsors, with the right

**Dortmund Signal Iduna Park Stadium** Sponsors banners on the main entrance  
(Tom Langston /CC)



[17] FIFA-FINANZBERICHT 2006. Available at: [http://de.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/51/52/65/2006\\_fifa\\_ar\\_de\\_1768.pdf](http://de.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/51/52/65/2006_fifa_ar_de_1768.pdf). Access on 09/20/2013.

to advertise only in Germany – but also exclusively – paying FIFA € 13 million for the privilege.

During the 2006 World Cup, the exclusive area for the Cup official sponsors was not limited to the stadia and their vicinity, but everywhere in the whole country where there could be fans celebrations and events related to World Cup. FIFA's Cup became a cash register, transforming the advertising areas for their sponsors.<sup>18</sup>

And what did the fans think about that? “Instead of their favorite brand, they were forced to drink Budweiser, a brand nobody here likes – and that in a country famous for its beer”, said Caroline, a student who helped selling beers at the Dortmund stadium. Those who worked selling drinks were told to always pronounce the brand name correctly.” If someone asked for a Coke, we had to ask, while already correcting them: ‘Would you like a Coca-Cola?’” Caroline says. “And if they asked for a beer, we had to confirm: one Anheuser-Bud? Of course!”

Near the Dortmund stadium, in a place named Westfalenhalle, there has been, for many years, a giant “U” on the top of a building, as an advertisement for a local beer brand. This “U” is a popular symbol in the city. To protect its sponsor beer for the World Cup, FIFA wanted the “U” to be removed. The city of Dortmund refused, for historical heritage reasons.

In Cologne, FIFA demanded that the

name of a bus stop across the stadium, which bears the name of a factory, were renamed for four weeks to “Cup Stadium Stop”. To do that, all the brochures containing bus routes in the city would have to be reprinted.<sup>19</sup> But the mayor did not yield to the pressure from FIFA. And FIFA's negative image before the public kept increasing, with the news in the press about the absurd demands of the organization. The mayor of Munich, Christian Ude, came to publicly criticize the “leonine agreements” proposed by FIFA. The dislike for FIFA spread nationwide.

### Special courts in stadiums

Several politicians took advantage of that mood, managing to pass measures during those four weeks that would never have been approved under normal circumstances. The government sped the trials of offenses related to the World Cup. That was how the controversial – and highly criticized – special courts, for example, came to be installed in the stadia, in order to rush the progress of such actions. In the completely new Leipzig Central Stadium, blocks of cells were built for these courts and for the detention of suspects. Before the Cup, judges', lawyers' and fans' associations made many harsh complaints about the special courts. According to newspapers pieces and official statements, they

were hardly ever used. The alleged reason was that, thanks to the tickets pre-ordering system (which included police checking of the buyers' backgrounds), potential suspects were not even allowed to attend the games, being kept away from the stadia. In that respect, the organizers', politicians' and police plans worked out.



Many brands in the 2006 World Cup (Mitsurinho/CC)

- [18] EICK, Volker. 'Secure our profit!' The FIFATM in Germany 2006. In: Colin Bennett and Kevin Haggerty (eds.), *Security Games: Surveillance and Control at Mega-Events*. New York: Routledge: 87–102 p. Available at: [http://www.policing-crowds.org/uploads/media/Eick-Secure\\_Our\\_Profits\\_2011\\_.pdf](http://www.policing-crowds.org/uploads/media/Eick-Secure_Our_Profits_2011_.pdf). Access on 10/10/2013.
- [19] Müllender, Bernd. Ein Land sieht rund – Essay. In: Aus Politik und Feijões-chicote, 19/2006. Available at: <http://www.bpb.de/apuz/29761/ein-land-sieht-rund-essay>. Access on 11/10/2013.

## *Legal exceptions and the measures taken before and during the 2006 World Cup*

- Subsidies for renovations, reconstructions or building of new stadia: € 530.7 million<sup>20</sup> came from federal, state and municipal funds, for a total expenditure of € 1.4 billion spent on stadiums.
  - Warranty statement for stadia infrastructure. According to the final report by the Federal Government of Germany on the 2006 World Cup: € 3.7 billion costs (not included in FIFA's expenditure report).
  - FIFA was exempted from income and corporate taxes, but kept the commitment to pay the VAT. However, FIFA was given the right to tax the sponsors' income and the broadcasting rights in Switzerland, taking advantage of the reduced rates prevailing in that country. It was quite impossible to collect reliable data on the total amount of taxes that were not paid in Germany.
  - Participants of the 2006 World Cup (football associations from other countries, their advisors, their coaches and athletes) were also exempted from paying income corporation taxes. In those cases, there are also only estimates, since incentives payments, as well as individual advertising contracts, were not all made public.
  - Exceptions to taxation of costs with VIP boxes at sporting venues. This has not been reliably audited and published yet.
  - Warranty Statement to FIFA of exemp-

tion from customs or import taxes for goods taken into Germany.

- Explicit guarantee of inapplicability of capital traffic control.
  - By request of FIFA, a security policy tailored for the 2006 World Cup ('Nationales Sicherheitskonzept FIFA WM 2006') was elaborated, against 'hooliganism' and any comparable violence phenomenon arising from groups, politically motivated crime, terrorism, general and organized crimes linked to events.
  - Expansion of information measures, supervision and control at land and maritime borders, railway stations and airports, by the Border Protection Service (Bundesgrenzschutz).
  - Installation of the Central Cup Intelligence Agency (Zentrale Informationsstelle WM 2006) with the Criminal Police of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia, with the goal of gathering information and providing an international overview of 'hooliganism' in the 2006 World Cup.
  - Development of an analysis of dangerous situations in terms of terrorism or criminal actions for political reasons by the Civil Police (Bundeskriminalamt), in federal and state levels, by the Federal Service for Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) and the Federal Secret Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst).

[20] Data added to the German government final report on the Cup: "WM 2006: Abschlussbericht der Bundesregierung", see footnote 13.

- Creation of a 'National Aerospace Security Center, expanding the surveillance in the German airspace.
  - Expansion (up to 500 officers) of authorization for foreign police units to support the fans and to identify known 'problematic fans'.
  - Development of a 'Disasters Fighting Model Plan' for fire brigades and other rescue services, at federal and state levels.
  - Creation of a 'National Center for Information and Cooperation ' and scheduling of a daily ' Cup Overview', led by the Ministry of Interior, with the participation of other federal ministries and state departments, as well as the Organizing Committee of the World Cup, ZIS, Interpol, Europol and Eurojust.
  - NATO Awac (Airborne Early Warning and Control System) aircrafts, in attendance at the Geilenkirchen Air Base, to oversee German airspace. In its final report, German Federal Government explicitly emphasizes that this expense was paid through a NATO budget, with no costs to the Government.
  - Exceptions to the noise abatement laws (sometimes the games went beyond 22 p.m., causing the changing of the noise-related portions of the Federal Immissions Control Act in all the German states, since this is a matter regulated at state, and not at federal level).
  - Exceptions to the regulations of stores opening and closing times (also a state issue).

- Changes in rights of brands protection and conformation to agreements between FIFA and its sponsors and partners.
  - Exceptions made in labor laws.
  - Exceptions made in the visa granting system.
  - Speeding of legal proceedings against criminals as part of the World Cup, as well as the installation of special courts inside the stadiums.
  - Increase of control over tourists coming from countries 'notorious for their emigrants'.
  - Immediately after the last 2006 World Cup match in Germany, the Minister of Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble, asked the Army to continue securing the order in the German territory.



**Police reinforcements** One of FIFA's demands for the 2006 World Cup (Nicholas Babaian/CC)

**Police reinforcements** One of FIFA's demands for the 2006 World Cup (Qabluna/CC)



and measures taken before and during 2006 World Cup” box).

On top of that, after the World Cup ended, the German Minister of Interior proposed to perpetuate the use of the army in internal security operations all over the country. Not even the police union could hide its indignation: “It’s almost grotesque that the Minister of Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble, should consider using Army forces to carry out police duties within the country, as soon as the last game of this wonderful and peaceful Cup had barely ended. These plans need to be shelved. The latent threat to Germany by Islamic terrorism [...] is not reason enough to overthrow the constitutional – and repeatedly proven right – separation between external and internal security”, the police union said in a statement to the press, in which it also demanded “that the Army be definitively relieved of the responsibility of ensuring order inside the country.”<sup>21</sup>

What did the 2006 World Cup achieve in terms of “security and control”? The largest security mobilization since World War II. Seven thousand German Army (Bundeswehr) soldiers in readiness, 250,000 police officers and 20,000 private security guards. Reconnaissance AWAC aircrafts supervising airspace. Over 700 foreign police officers.<sup>22</sup> Besides all of this, there were also 12 thousand volunteers who took security jobs in public spaces temporarily privatized by FIFA for fans’ parties.<sup>23</sup> Video

### Massive expansion of security and controls

Security was one of the first items in the priority list made by the World Cup organizers, and one that FIFA clearly required before the tournament started. Many politicians tend to be sensitive to it. Thus, there was an expansion of surveillance on citizens by the police, the security forces and the secret services. Even NATO’s Awac aircrafts, which normally only fly over the airspace of conflicted regions, surveyed the German airspace during the 2006 World Cup (see details in the “Legal exceptions

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- [21] Available at: <http://www.gdp.de/gdp/gdp.nsf/id/p60702?open&l=DE&ccm=3000208>. Access on 11/28/2013.
- [22] Bach, Stefanie: “Die Zusammenarbeit von privaten Sicherheitsunternehmen, Polizei und Ordnungsbehörden im Rahmen einer neuen Sicherheitsarchitektur” Holzkirchen: 2008, S.152f
- [23] In 2002, during Japan/South Korea World Cup, many people went out to watch the games in public places, with no control from any entity or marketing structures links. Inspired by that experience, FIFA created for 2006 World Cup the Fan Fest™, spaces with gigantic screens with high-quality image and free access to watch the matches. FIFA Fan Fest™ is a whole-day event, with entertainment and sales of food and drinks exclusively from the Cup sponsors’ brands. The event was repeated also during the South Africa World Cup, even in other cities around the world.
- [24] EICK, Volker. ‘Secure our profit!’ The FIFA TM in Germany 2006. In: Colin Bennett and Kevin Haggerty(eds.), Security Games: Surveillance and Control at Mega-Events. New York: Routledge: 87–102 p. Available at: [http://www.policing-crowds.org/uploads/media/Eick-Secure\\_Our\\_Profits\\_\\_2011\\_.pdf](http://www.policing-crowds.org/uploads/media/Eick-Secure_Our_Profits__2011_.pdf). Access on 10/10/2013.

surveillance of public spaces in Germany was practically made “official” during the World Cup: if, before the event, there was video surveillance in only half a dozen cities, that number leaped to 30 during the World Cup.<sup>24</sup>

## ***Ball rolling, beer aplenty - and politicians take advantage of that to approve controversial bills***

The new measures and changes to laws made before the World Cup were not enough. The measures and laws that the German government had approved during<sup>25</sup> the tournament were as significant and full of consequences as those.

### **The largest raise in corporate taxes in German history**

Amidst all the euphoria, the largest raise in sales taxes of German history – from 16% to 19% – almost went by unnoticed. Approved on June 16th, 2006, this 3-per-

centage-points raise represented a heavier monthly burden that hit especially hard the poorer sections of German society. The on-line-petition campaigns organizer *Campact* (similar to the American MoveOn) tried – in vain – to fight against this raise, seen as “extremely unfair in social terms”.<sup>26</sup> The German income tax with its two reduced rates – 7% for daily-needs products,<sup>27</sup> 19% for superfluous ones<sup>28</sup> – caused the 7% rate to be applied to such items as cat and dog foods and delicacies like quail eggs, frog and turtle meats.

### **Generous allocation of emission rights for the industry**

German parliament (Bundestag) members marched on as vigorously as their national football team at that time of the tournament, stunning the opponents with their attacks. On June 28th, 2006, the federal government presented its carbon emissions trading plan on the National Allocation Plan for the second phase, 2008–2012 (NAP II) –, conceding large advantages to highly energy-consuming and pollution-producing industries.<sup>29</sup> In spite of massive protests by environmentalists, the first plan (NAP I) had already conceded 499 million tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> per year in emissions credits to 1,849 German companies. For the second phase (from 2008 to 2012), the government decided to keep giving

the same companies 456 million tonnes in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions credits per year, and for free.<sup>30</sup> Environmentalist associations deemed this 8% reduction insufficient, but the protestors’ voices were drowned by the World Cup fever pitch, because the entire country was mesmerized by the quarter-finals game of their national team against Argentina on the Friday of June the 30th. That way, the “energy conglomerates made extraordinary profits of millions of Euros at the expense of the German people, because the emissions credits were given for free”, according to NGOs.<sup>31</sup>

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- [25] See also at <http://www.giga.de/extra/software-themen/news/passives-abseits-politische-entscheidungen-waehrendder-wm/>. Access on 11/18/2013
- [26] Available at <https://www.campact.de/mwst/home/>. Access on 09/20/2013
- [27] Available at [http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ustg\\_1980/anlage\\_2\\_83.html](http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ustg_1980/anlage_2_83.html). Access on 10/20/2014
- [28] Available at [http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ustg\\_1980/anlage\\_1\\_82.html](http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ustg_1980/anlage_1_82.html). Access on 10/20/2014
- [29] According to many NGOs for climate policy, this plan is “a fallacy”. Available at <http://germanwatch.org/klima/et-zug06.htm>. Access on 10/14/2013
- [30] Mussel, Gerhard; Pätzold, Jürgen. *Grundfragen der Wirtschaftspolitik (Fundamentos da economia)*, Stuttgart 2011.
- [31] Available at <http://germanwatch.org/klima/et-zug06.htm>. Access on 11/30/2013.

## Tax changes and federalism reform: 25 Constitution articles changed before the beginning of the match.

The day before the classic match between Germany and Argentina, the German government passed a series of laws to change taxes (see “Laws passed in Germany during 2006 World Cup” box). Those laws, under normal conditions, would have entailed fierce debates in the press and among the public. But Germany was taken by the football frenzy. To make things even tenser, on the very day of the quarterfinals match against Argentina the German parliament decided to vote nothing less than the largest reform on the Federal Republic of Germany’s history since 1949. Every article of the Constitution that dealt on the relationship between central government and states of the federation, as well as their respective attributions, was changed. This means that financial questions, financial compensations between states, the country’s internal security and police, building and traffic, justice, environment, agriculture, education, research, universities, media and culture were all affected. In all, 25 articles of the German Constitution were modified in a single Bundestag session, something hitherto unheard of in Germany. That evening, the national team won the match 4–2 in the penalty shootout, in a packed Berlin Olympic Stadium. The decisive session at the Bundestag ended in time for the parliament members to go watch the game.

## Laws passed in Germany during 2006 World Cup

- 06/16/2006. Raise of sales’ tax rate from 16% to 19%, approved by the Bundestag.<sup>32</sup>

- 06/28/2006. Law on emissions trade: the German government presents the National Allocations Plan for the second period 2008 – 2012 (NAP II), to meet the commitments made in the first phase of Kyoto Protocol. To comply with its precepts of ‘climatic protection’, ‘investments and innovations stimulation’, ‘transparency’ and ‘competitiveness of energy intensive industry’, the Bundestag decides to adopt generous conditions to German industries, where CO2 emissions and certificates are concerned.<sup>33</sup> For this 2008 – 2012 second period, the German government decided to give 1,849 German industrial plants emission credits of 456 million tonnes of CO2 per year: 90% of them given for free and the remaining 10% acquired by the companies through biddings.<sup>34</sup> In the following years, the prices of CO2 certificates dropped significantly.

- 06/29/2006. Tax and contribution changes package: changes in the legislation regarding several taxes, contributions and levies (income tax, corporations and syndicates taxes, tax on miners payments, law on benefits for civil servants and military pay, contributions and the law on taxes’ statistics and law on external services.<sup>35</sup>

- 06/30/2006 and 07/07/2006. Federalism reform: one of the largest constitutional changes of all times, approved by the Congress in 06/06/2006 and by the Senate in 07/07/2006.<sup>36</sup>

[32] Article 10 of June 26th, 2013 Constitution (BGBI.I.S. 1809, 2013 II 1120)

[33] NAP 2008–2012 of 06/28/2006

[34] Gerhard Mussel, Jürgen Pätzold: Grundfragen der Wirtschaftspolitik (Economic Fundamentals), Stuttgart 2011

[35] Steueränderungsgesetz 2007 (StändF 2007, Law on Tax Modifications)

[36] Congress Decree “Law for the modification of the Constitution - Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Articles 22, 23, 33, 52, 72, 73, 74, 74a, 75, 84, 85, 87c, 91a, 91b, 93, 98, 104a, 104b, 105, 107, 109, 125a, 125b, 125c, 143c)”. Print 180/06 “Entschließung des Bundesrates zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (articles 22, 23, 33, 52, 72, 73, 74, 74a, 75, 84, 85, 87c, 91a, 91b, 93, 98, 104a, 104b, 105, 107, 109, 125a, 125b, 125 c, 143c) ”.



## Prostitution and World Cup

One of the biggest headlines before the World Cup of 2006 in Germany reported that the mega event would encourage sexual exploitation and that 40,000 prostitutes would be taken to Germany especially for the occasion. This kind of headline dominated the media for months. There were campaigns urging the boycott of the World Cup in Germany, claiming the country, with its liberal laws (in comparison to other European countries), would encourage not only prostitution but also sexual exploitation.<sup>37</sup>

Before the 2006 Cup there were 21 campaigns against human trafficking and sexual exploitation in Germany,<sup>38</sup> promoted by ministries, human rights organizations, churches and the Police Union. At first, the German Football Confederation (Deutscher Fußball-bund) refused to engage with these campaigns “to avoid showing the Cup in a bad light”, but joined them in 2006, states the Evangelical Church of Germany in its final report about the cup.<sup>39</sup> But even during these campaigns, the majority of institutions taking part explained that “the sexual exploitation numbers on the Cup’s sphere were exaggerated by ecclesiastic institutions and individuals”, or maybe even falsified. Initial estimates indicate that the prostitution rates during

the cup dropped instead of raising, a fact reinforced by the early leaving of foreign prostitutes from the country. According to the Civil Police Federal Agency (BKA), even the numbers for sexual exploitation decreased.<sup>40</sup> That was also verified by the German government in its 2006 World Cup Final Report. Investigations made by the security authorities in both regional and federal levels did not register any case of human trafficking or forced prostitution during the World Cup. The alleged 40,000 prostitutes that would have been taken to Germany for the World Cup, as denounced by the local and international press, were not confirmed. Even before the World Cup, experts from the Civil Police and various NGOs had declared that this data was made up.<sup>41</sup>

How did people arrive at that number of 40,000 prostitutes brought into Germany for the duration of the Cup? The number was based on an estimate according to which 10% of the women working in prostitution are sexually exploited.<sup>42</sup> This 40,000 figure, already disputed, derived from the number (also estimated) of 400,000 sex workers in Germany. As it happens, there are no such reliable numbers regarding Germany, because this kind of data is not surveyed by the country’s authorities.

With a government coalition made of greens and socialists, Germany changed its legislation on prostitution in 2002.<sup>43</sup> Since

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- [37] Cit. cf. A Swiss Department of Justice and Police EJPD / Bundesamt für Polizei fedpol/Stab Koordinationsstelle gegen Menschenhandel und Menschenmuggel: Zwangsprostitution und Menschenhandel anlässlich der WM 2006 und Empfehlungen für öffentliche Präventionskampagnen vor und während der UEFA EURO 2008 TM in der Schweiz, January 2007
- [38] Martina Schuster, Almut Sülzle: Zwangsprostitution, Sexarbeit, Menschenhandel und die WM 2006. Gutachten zu Kampagnen zu Prostitution und Menschenhandel in Deutschland im Umfeld der Fußballweltmeisterschaft der Männer 2006 (Forced Prostitution, Sex Work, Human Trafficking and the 2006 World Cup, Vienna, December de 2006. p. 3.
- [39] Hans-Georg Ulrichs: Ein starkes Stück Leben – Ein hartes Stück Arbeit. Bericht des WM-Beauftragten der Evangelischen Kirche Deutschlands (German Evangelical Church’s Report about the World Cup)
- [40] Idem.
- [41] Cit. cf. WM 2006: Abschlussbericht der Bundesregierung, p.99
- [42] See interview with Stephanie Klee and Friederike Strack in this text.
- [43] According to Veronika Munk, the law of 2002 on prostitution is made of three fundamental points:  
1. Sex workers have the support of the law to charge for services delivered but not paid for;  
2. They can choose to work as employees or self-employed, on both cases with obligations and rights to social benefits as any other work activity;  
3. The law that considered it “prostitution promotion” when brothels offered good working conditions or condoms to the clients was abolished. Available at: <http://br.boell.org/>

then, there has been a constant battle for the achievements and setbacks caused by it. Those in favor point to the advances in the legal status given to prostitutes, now protected by more working rights and for the first time allowed to claim those rights. According to those defending the law of 2002, that is important because, in the end, looks to improve the lives of the very people affected by prostitution. Those against the law point to the rise in prostitution in Germany since the law was passed, a rise stimulated by sexual tourism from neighboring countries with harsher laws on prostitution. Sweden, for instance, has forbidden buying services of sexual nature since 1999, with sentences of up to two years imprisonment for the offenders. Was this law a success, as the Swedish government believes, or was it a setback? To this day, no sexual services client has been sent to prison, because proving the offense is much harder than the legislators thought. According to the press, the police spies on people with infra-red light and X-ray cameras to gather evidence of commercial sexual acts. But it still has not been proven in legal terms.<sup>44</sup>

One of the most popular arguments for the “Swedish Way”<sup>45</sup> is the allegation that prostitution vanished from the streets. Still without answer are the questions of whether the approach to the prostitutes has migrated to the internet or other forms of communication or the Swedish costumers

(as the critics of the “German Way” believe) begun to travel to more liberal Germany, buying sexual services from brothels for affordable prices.

The defenders of the German law of 2002 on prostitution claim there is not enough data to prove the raise of prostitution in the country because there isn’t a database and because the grey area is still too vast. They also allege the new law has managed to reduce precisely this grey area, since the women have more rights than before, and that it was for their benefit that the law was changed. The critics, in their turn, point to the reduced number in legally registered prostitutes within the social services, despite having these rights by law. The defenders counter that by saying prostitutes would rather register as *personal trainers*, in order to avoid social stigma, while the critics – using various types of arguments, like the one that states there can be nothing right in what is fundamentally wrong – defend the complete removal of prostitution. But the defenders of the current legislation insist in saying that prostitution is a reality, that law should serve to protect the women and that any changes in the law, designed to deter prostitution, would only push the women to illegality, worsening their misery.

The prostitution and sexual exploitation debate took shape before the 2006 World Cup and continues today, having been recently rekindled. If in France the question

[44] Available in: <http://www.linksnet.de/de/artikel/30222>. Accessed on 20 October, 2013.

[45] Since then, Finland, Norway and Iceland also chose the “Swedish Way”. France is still debating the question. Canada is going the other way since the Supreme Court judged the anti-prostitution laws unconstitutional. – Available at: /accessed on 19 October, 2013.

is being debated on the senate, and the prohibition looks to reach the costumers through punishments, following the Swedish model, in German media the argument revolves around the successes and failures of the prostitution law of 2002. The most recent proposition on this legal soap-opera also envisions punishments for clients caught with women in sexual exploitation situations. But the Swedish model demonstrates how very hard it is to collect legally sustainable evidence.

What generally does not go into debate is the rights of foreigners in Germany, which only very rarely allows immigration for work reasons, and its fatal consequences. The women victims of human trafficking are considered by the German state as criminals, and are deported back to their countries of origin, since, according to the law, they entered the country illegally. That way, the German legislation in force turns victims into criminals.

### “The World Cup was used to turn a light onto human trafficking”

Interview with Stephanie Klee, sex worker from Berlin, and Friederike Strack, defender of the sex workers' rights, about The World Cup and prostitution. Interview made in October of 2013.



**The interviewed**  
(photo by Isaumir Nascimento)

### What was your experience during the 2006 World Cup in Germany?

**Stephanie Klee:** When I learnt the World Cup was to happen in Germany, I found it inspiring, although I know nothing of football. I thought of the economic dimensions and began to imagine: loads of fans will come to Germany and they will all go to the red light district, so we symbolize our international dimension! Football is joy and life energy, and this goes well with prostitution. Because of that I believed we could contribute and benefit. But I have negative memories, for I soon noticed the Cup was going to be used to shed a light on the human trafficking subject. Mistaken information was launched into the media stating that 40.000 prostitutes would be taken into Germany during the Cup. The police carried operations to find those prostitutes, but they were not found. The press addressed the prostitution subject in a

negative way, which caused the campaigns to make our lives harder. And the Cup didn't even mean good business for us.

### You say the media and the politics mixed prostitution with human trafficking.

**Friederike Strack:** The underlying strategy is that discussing people trafficking is commonly used to force more stringent policies in relation to foreigners. That became very clear when Franco Frattini, then the European Commissioner of Justice, Liberty and Security, suggested not even letting in women coming from countries suspected of human trafficking. This proposal caused such a commotion that it didn't even go ahead. But it shows the way of thinking: “Let's close the borders, let's build higher walls”. According to this logic, nothing could happen since the potential victims didn't even get in. It turns out this num-



**Strict policing**  
(Spinnerin/CC)

ber of 40,000 forced prostitutes wasn't even proven right.

This data reappeared on other events and mega events, both in South Africa and in the Olympic Games in London. In the case of the Olympic Games in Brazil, this number hasn't yet been mentioned, but it is only a question of time: it will still arise. We criticized the "forced prostitution" tag because we consider prostitution to be a line of work. Of course there is forced work, but in this instance we need to sort

things out. The word choice is significant: if everybody only talks about forced prostitution, it looks like all the sex workers are forced into prostitution.

**Did you go to the stadiums with your "Freier-Sein" campaign? How did it go?**

**Stephanie Klee:** In every city hosting matches, a group was created, consisting of consultants, prostitutes, pro-Family groups and gay and lesbian organizations, and that group decided, locally, how to carry out the actions. Many went straight to stadia and fan-gathering spots, sometimes even to train stations. If memory serves, the atmosphere was happy. There were kiosks selling beer and other stuff, people arrived two to three hours early, the weather was wonderful, there were various groups wanting to know each other. People talked to us and there was nothing negative, no turmoil, no foolish touching, no drunkenness, everybody was fine. And I think it was also because the atmosphere in the country was so good.

**There was a change in the law here in Germany on 2002. Did it have good results?**

**Stephanie Klee:** In the first place, the law gave us whores the right to remuneration.

In Germany, prostitution has been legal for a long time, but it has been punished and discriminated against by different laws with rules regarding our behavior. Since the law on prostitution, I, as a whore, have the right to be paid if I have worked or spent some time with a client. Brothels are accepted as workplaces and a brothel owner can decide, together with the prostitute, whether she wants to work under a dependent work regime with rights to social assistance or whether she prefers to work on an independent basis.

**Friederike Strack:** I would like to emphasize once more that the laws fighting human trafficking are, on many occasions, damaging to the sex workers, who are often criminalized. According to these laws there are only victims and criminals. One is criminalized and the other is an innocent victim. Those who are criminalized get a stamp on their passport and are extradited. It is necessary to adopt a new policy of rights for immigrant women, so they too can work here.

## Mega event and fan culture

In Germany as in other countries, football lives, to a large extent, from its fan base. The first division is one of the most successful. The German Football Confederation congregates 25 thousand clubs with 6,8 million members. Within its 13 divisions (from the first to the lowest) there are 170 thousand active players. The first division alone counted 12,5 million visitors to the stadia on the 2005/2006 season, which means an average of 40 thousand fans per match.<sup>46</sup>

At every new season, politicians, the police and the communication channels declare that violence and excess remain “on a high degree”. That is what the Central Agency for Sport Activities Information (ZIS-Zentrale Informationsstelle Sparteinsätze)’s annual report claims. This agency gathers all information about fans considered relevant by the police. In addition to filing, it also analyzes the data. Likewise, ZIS also collects all fan information from abroad that interests the police, in a central archive called “Sports Criminals”. This archive receives data from all the police authorities in Germany, which on their turn can access the data.<sup>48</sup> In this archive, there were registered, until March 2012, a total of 13,032 people.<sup>49</sup>

The police authorities estimate the existence of potential violence among fans



within the different German leagues from around “10,500 people”. Since 1991, German police divides football fans into three categories: category A for peaceful fans; category B for fans inclined to use violence and category C for fans that look for violence.<sup>50</sup>

ZIS focuses especially on the so called “Ultras”. Categories A, B and C, in which the only criteria of differentiation are their different degrees of inclination towards violence, can also be applied to the “Ultras”, as it says a little later: “part of the so called “Ultra” groups (...) can be classified, without restriction, within the B and C categories”.<sup>51</sup>

The “ultras” themselves see it in a different way and criticize the generalization of their fan culture, seen as “ready to exert violence” or “looking for violence”. The critics say that, sometimes, it is enough “to

### Fifa Fan Fest 2006 - Dortmund (Malcolm Surgenor/CC)

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- [46] Available in: <http://www.dfb.de/?id=11015>. Accessed on 12/12/2013.
- [47] Available in: <http://www.weltfussball.de/zuschauer/bundesliga-2005-2006/1/>. Accessed on 09/12/2013.
- [48] Available in: [http://www.polizei-nrw.de/artikel\\_\\_4596.html](http://www.polizei-nrw.de/artikel__4596.html). Accessed on 12/12/2013.
- [49] German government: publication 17/9003. Available in: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/090/1709003.pdf>. Accessed on 12/07/2013.
- [50] Complete data available on: [http://www.polizei-nrw.de/media/Dokumente/05-06\\_Jahresbericht.pdf](http://www.polizei-nrw.de/media/Dokumente/05-06_Jahresbericht.pdf). Accessed on 12/19/2013.
- [51] Report about football, 2005/06 season. Landeskriminalamt NRW. Dezernat 43 (ZIS), p.6. Available in: [http://www.polizei-nrw.de/media/Dokumente/05-06\\_Jahresbericht.pdf](http://www.polizei-nrw.de/media/Dokumente/05-06_Jahresbericht.pdf). Accessed on 11/06/2013.



**No Police** (Photo: Christian Russau)

be in the wrong place at the wrong time”, for a regular fan to be recorded within the Sports Criminals Archive. On the following interview, an “Ultra” speaks from his perspective.

**“Repression of fan culture has grown since long before the Cup”. Interview given by an “Ultra”, on October, 2013.**

An interview with Bernd (an alias) about repression and control inside and around stadia, the ‘Ultras’ fan culture and the consequences of the 2006 World Cup in Germany.

**What were your experiences in the 2006 Cup?**

**Bernd:** I didn’t go to any match. You had to buy tickets one year in advance. I enjoyed the fans on the streets, here in Berlin. It was nice because it was something new and special, suddenly watching a million people celebrating together.

**It was the first time ever the fans met on the streets...**

**Bernd:** Yeah. Before that, I always went to a bar. For the true fan (a fan that follows his team at every single match), the German National Team isn’t as important. I know many people who don’t care for the

National Team to the point of wanting it to win at any cost. After all, there are players from all the teams and not only from the team I support. And it has all become a mega event, especially before the 2006 World Cup. Like the distribution of artifacts made of cardboard sheets, for clapping.

**What is that?**

**Bernd:** It is some sort of A4 cardboard, folded to make noise. To the fans it is completely silly. You already have a flag and you have your own hands to clap, and your voice. In many stadia what happens is they hand out these cardboards and soon everything becomes a kind of sound soup. It isn’t like that beautiful fan sing-along in the stadium anymore, but a hellish noise. It doesn’t match the idea a good fan has of supporting his team.

**Many team fan clubs have very creative choreographies. Does it happen on the National Team’s games too?**

**Bernd:** It is different. The choreographies made in the clubs are almost 100% made and financed by the fans. The fans make the flags themselves, and they distribute leaflets before the games, just because of their love for the club. It is nice to have your little five minutes before a match and have your choreography and make it all look beautiful, knowing that you may have helped giving a little push to your team. As for

the National Team, there once was a group taking care of this stuff. At certain point, someone said: “I’m going to turn this into a business”. Because of that, the National Team’s choreographies are now all paid for by the official fan club. It is all very artificial; you can find the Coca-Cola logo in there. There is nobody really taking care of it. It is something official, from the German Football Confederation.

**How are your choreographies made?**

**Bernd:** We only make them for certain games, not for any match. We go from simply handing out leaflets to those gigantic banners covering the entire grandstand.

**And do they let those flags in?**

**Bernd:** Everything is authorized. We announce what we are planning to do, what sort of banners we are taking, and for years we have been taking special care not to use any flammable material and stuff like that... I mean: you can’t just use any old paper, it has to be of a certain kind, which of course raises the costs. But in general, the club and the club’s security know all in advance. Sometimes we smuggle inside things that are forbidden, like banners, that can’t be fixed to the stadium fences. If we manage to take them inside, excellent. If not, tough luck.

### You said that everything changed shortly before the Cup in Germany.

**Bernd:** Yes. Before the cup, around 2004/2005, everything became harder. And from then on there has always been a big fuss in the media just because someone lit a flare in front of the stadium. BILD (the biggest German tabloid) turned this into a major violence scene, headlining: “What to do with all those vandals?!” Of course the media and the politicians jumped into it. And the Police Union has always been quite active, outdoing themselves every week with populist statements: “All anarchists!” And so everything became harder.

Overall, the repression of fan culture increased long before the Cup, because the subject was under the limelight and the politicians realized they could use it to show off. That was when the police established the central archive called “Violent Sport”, where the suspects’ files are kept. It is a similar archive to the “Left Wing Criminals” or the “Right Wing Criminals”. The problem is that during a simple police raid you can be filed without knowing. It is enough to be in the wrong place with the wrong group. Or when someone beside you breaks a bottle and everybody around gets filed as suspects. There were cases when people tried to go on holiday and couldn’t get out of the country simply because a match would be happening at the country of destination and that could mean a risk. And all of that only because you happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. These cases have happened a lot. And cases

when we throw some punches to expel Neo Nazis from our section at the grandstand and the police come and we are the ones who end up being banned from the stadium because of the brawl.

### Let’s talk about sitting areas versus standing. How do you see that?

**Bernd:** Well, if I’m talking about clubs like Berlin, it makes no difference, because before there were only seats. And we simply stood on top of the benches. Now there are seats that can be folded, so you can seat or stand. And it is like that all over the stadium. In our fan club everybody stands, there is nobody sitting. On the grandstands it is different, the seats are more expensive. Here in Germany, on the division games, there is no obligation to remain sitting, like in England, for instance.

### You briefly mentioned the difference between “Ultras” and “Hooligans”. Could you clarify?

**Bernd:** The hooligans think exclusively of assaulting their adversaries. They travel just to battle their enemies. They might even like the club, but first comes their motto: “Let’s go to the massacre”. As they are heavily persecuted these days (there are cameras everywhere in the stadia), those battles have been pushed to the periphery. So, regardless of games, the hooligans often meet on fields or in the forest and battle each other, 50 against 50, and then go back

home happy. Those are the hooligans.

Being an Ultra is an extreme form of being a fan. You look to be there at any match, at home or abroad, at trainings, friendly games, anything. It is for pleasure, it’s a life perspective. You try to be always present, to show support in any shape, singing along, you try to be some sort of fandom engine. Flags, buntings, banners, choreographies, throwing confetti, pyrotechnics, it’s all part of it, even when it is forbidden. Everything. This is what being an Ultra is. It is like being an exaggerated fan. It isn’t like being a better fan, it isn’t the same.

### Last year there were big fan demonstrations in the stadia of the German championship...

**Bernd:** That was an action on all of the national territory. The trigger was the government’s decision to apply a security policy. All those controls inside the stadia, the chicaneries when you want to travel to watch a match abroad. And that “operation 12:12” (the politicians and the German Football Confederation approved this policy on 12/12/2012). And the fans figured the following: we are going to be silent during the first 12 minutes of every match. In every stadium. Until we have made it clear to the German Football Confederation and the politicians that this is no way to create a good atmosphere on the stadia. You could hear a pin dropping. That was a very extreme protest.





## *Of flags and flip-flops: the return of national symbols since the 2006 World Cup*

On Friday, the 9th of June of 2006, the World Cup began with Germany playing against Costa Rica. Suddenly, as if by miracle, streets and squares, alleys and boulevards were filled with little German flags, as it had not happened since before 1945.

For many Germans and foreign observers that was a surprise; for some it even came as a shock. Since the end of the World War II and the liberation of Germany from fascism, any hint of nationalism, patriotism or display of national pride from the Germans was seen as shameful, especially for the first and second generation of descendants of the criminals responsible for the fascism and the holocaust, to whom any gesture leaning that way was seen as suspicious. At schools, the National Anthem was part of the program, but was almost never sung. Until the 1990s, not even the national team's players sang the National Anthem

**Flags** Decorated building during the preliminaries of the 2006 Cup (Photo: Christian Russau)



**Party atmosphere** Fifa Fan Fest in Munich  
(Stewart/CC)

- [52] Julia Behr: "Was meint die Jugend? - Auswertung und Daten der Befragung „Fußball und Nation“ zur WM 2006". Available in: <http://www.bpb.de/lernen/unterrichten/grafstat/131000/was-meint-die-jugend>. Accessed on 09/12/2013.
- [53] Available on: <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wissen/fahnenmeere-zur-em-party-patriotismus-istnationalismus-1.1394854>. Accessed on 09/12/2013.
- [54] Saskia Brauer und Gernot Brauer: Was ist bloß los mit den Deutschen? Die Fußball-WM 2006 und das Deutschlandbild in der Welt. [What happened to the Germans? The World Cup 2006 and Germany's image abroad] Available on: [http://de.fifa.com/mm/document/afmarketing/marketing/sport3\\_57408.pdf](http://de.fifa.com/mm/document/afmarketing/marketing/sport3_57408.pdf). Accessed on 09/12/2013.
- [55] Saskia Brauer und Gernot Brauer: Was ist bloß los mit den Deutschen? Die Fußball-WM 2006 und das Deutschlandbild in der Welt. [What happened to the Germans? The World Cup 2006 and Germany's image abroad] Available on: [http://de.fifa.com/mm/document/afmarketing/marketing/sport3\\_57408.pdf](http://de.fifa.com/mm/document/afmarketing/marketing/sport3_57408.pdf). Accessed on 09/12/2013.

before a match. Sparse German flags could be seen here and there in the stadia, during the national team's matches, but were very rarely seen on the streets. German patriotism had practically vanished from the country after the end of the World War II.

In the 2006 World Cup, it suddenly became seemingly normal to have a "less tense" relationship with Germany. A research<sup>52</sup> made among students on the year of the cup (2006) revealed that, because of the games, "it became normal for the majority of the young people to wear the national colors".

On the summer of 2006, all of those things that, for 60 years, nobody seemed to have missed, came back: little national flags on top of cars and trucks, balconies and windows, mugs, flip-flops and even bed linen on the national colors, even if only on the "creative gifts" category. The "party patriotism" (*party patriotism*) was a concept coined during that World Cup.<sup>53</sup>

The international media was unanimous. "Germany showing off flags was the event that dominated this Cup", stated *The New York Times*. Another research showed that the "national colors" theme took half of the international news coverage of the Cup.<sup>54</sup>

For the duration of the "fairy tale summer", the national press also highlighted accounts of thousands of The National Team's fans shouting "Almanya!" in the streets – in Turkish. The Turkish team had

failed to classify for the World Cup of 2006, so the Turkish who had been living for generations in the country supported the German team, wearing the official shirt, waving German flags and celebrating the football party together with supporters from all over the world. On facing the images of Turkish youngsters wearing Germany's national kit, the French magazine *L'Express* declared: "The Cup is football's Woodstock". From France, the French-German Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Member of the European Parliament for the Green Party wrote: "For many French the World Cup looks like a cultural shock. They did not expect this happy and colorful mix of peoples in the Cup host cities".<sup>55</sup> In this instance the German government assessment is correct: "Since the fall of the Berlin Wall no other event happened that had such a positive and intense influence on Germany's image abroad", says the final report.

Even though Germany was the country of football, peace and happiness for the duration of those four weeks in June and July of 2006, there are two issues that need to be mentioned.

First: Since the cup of 1974, left wing groups had been demanding that the German Football Federation (Deutscher Fußball-Bund, DFB) at last investigate its historical links with fascism and Nazism. But in 1974, the socio-political debate was not yet sufficiently mature to grasp the urgency of that demand. When, at the end of

the 1980s, German companies saw themselves increasingly forced by the public opinion pressure to investigate their entanglement with the National Socialism, the pressure over DFB rose. Only in 2005, one year before Germany's World Cup, a historian, upon request from DFB, presented an analysis<sup>56</sup> about its role and structural changes over the Nazi era and the links between their personnel and party leaders – a bit too late, like many onlookers concluded.

In second place, it is necessary to remember the victims of the German far right's violent acts; people who were murdered and killed since the reunification of Germany in the 1990s. According to official data from February of 2012, 58 people were killed in Germany by far right criminals. But even before that, as early as the year 2000, the *Berliner Tagesspiegel* and *Frankfurter Rundschau* newspapers had published different numbers, later updated by the *Mut gegen rechte Gewalt (Courage Against Far Right Violence)* group: 184 victims of far right violence in Germany from 1990 to 2013.<sup>57</sup>

However, these numbers still are not in keeping with reality, as it was recently verified. Due to the NSU (The National Socialist Underground) scandal, the German authorities, pressured by public opinion, resumed the investigations of all unsolved murder and attempted murder cases, from 1990 to 2011. The outcome is frighten-



ing: “In 746 cases there are indications of possible right-wing motivations” said the German Ministry of Interior in December of 2013. Therefore, German far right extremists could have victimized many more people. The Interior Ministry, the National Civil Police and the Regional Police, when investigating a total of 3,300 murder and attempted murder cases, found evidence of right wing motivation for 746 cases.<sup>58</sup>

In 2006, still before the World Cup, the Council of Africa released a statement to the press titled “At home with enemies” in allusion to the World Cup motto “The world among friends”. The council warned black people about areas of Germany to be avoided. For many days the “no-go areas” topic dominated the news.

**Motto** Despite of the motto, scandal over racism and right wing killings took over the news (Jenz Matheuszik/CC)

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- [56] Nils Havemann: Fußball unterm Hakenkreuz. Der DFB zwischen Sport, Politik und Kommerz [Football and the swastika. The German Football Confederation between sport, politics and commerce]. Campus, Frankfurt a. M., 2005.
- [57] Available on: <http://www.mut-gegen-rechte-gewalt.de/news/chronik-der-gewalt/todesopfer-rechtsextremere-und-rassistischer-gewalt-seit-1990/>. Accessed on 12/12/2013. Available at/accessed on the 12th of October 2013.
- [58] Available in: <http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article122531604/Rechtsextreme-Motive-bei-746-Toetungsdelikten.html>. Accessed on 12/12/2013.



Photo: Christian Russau

## **“At Home with Enemies?” – The World Cup and the no-go-areas in Germany.**

Interview with Moctar Kamara, from the Berlin-Brandenburg region Council of Africa, about racial violence against black people in Germany and the effects of the “no-go-areas” campaign before the World Cup in Germany. Interview made in October of 2013.

**Even before the 2006 World Cup you talked about “no-go-areas” in Germany. What is that, exactly?**

**Moctar Kamara:**

*No-go-areas* are certain places where we, as black people, don't feel safe, because we can be attacked by loitering neo Nazis, always ready to use violence.

**And you made this warning even before the World Cup...**

**Moctar Kamara:** A few months before the

World Cup, in March of 2006, an Ethiopian, Ermyas M., was attacked at a bus stop in Potsdam with such brutality that he went into a coma. That was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. Aggressions against black people happen regularly here. When the attack against Ermyas happened, we wanted to mark our position, so we released a statement to the press. At the time the Cup was yet to start and all over Germany there were signs with the slogan “At home with friends”. In our statement to the press we used the following, provoking title: “At home with enemies?” Using this headline we spread the statement through the Council of Africa (Afrika-Rat Berlin-Brandenburg).

**Could you explain what this Council does?**

**Moctar Kamara:** The Council of Africa was created in May of 2005 to bring together African associations and initiatives from the Berlin and Brandenburg regions. We were pioneers in this and that was the reason why we spoke, at the time, for all the Africans in Germany: because we were the only organization of the kind in the country.

**What was the reaction to the statement?**

**Moctar Kamara:** The interesting aspect was that only one or two journalists went to the statement release. In spite of that, after the first article, a never-before-seen excitement started at the *Spiegel* magazine (*Spiegel Online*). The

**World Cup: for whom and for what?**

general outcry was: the Council of Africa wants to draw a map, an atlas of forbidden territories for black people in Germany. No texto em português está “na África”, o que não faz o menor sentido. Sugerimos revisar antes de imprimir. We didn't even say that in the statement, but they wrote it like that. And everybody jumped in that boat.

**Did you ever intend to draw such a map?**

**Moctar Kamara:** In fact, not in a map form. We thought of a list of cautionary measures, as we said in the statement. I mean, if a black person arrives in Germany from Africa or America, this person needs to know what to pay attention to, how to behave on the underground, for instance, what places to visit or to avoid etc.

**Did the authorities react?**

**Moctar Kamara:** Yes. And it was interesting to notice that they reacted far too late. And badly. It was unbelievable. Because of the media fuss, that was all everybody talked about, but of course the authorities contested. They accused us of spreading panic, but when the international press started to talk about the subject, the likes of BBC, the Korean TV, the entire world, authorities began to take care of the subject. Mathias Platzeck, the governor of Brandenburg, invited us for a meeting. We talked to him and also met all the state police chiefs. In Berlin, at first, there wasn't even any reaction. Only after the opposition challenged the Senate to contact

the Africans and find a solution to the no-go-areas problem did the Interior Minister meet us. But the talk was very constructive. We managed to make ourselves heard with the intention of discussing racism against black people, which was our main goal.

### What does it mean to be black in Germany?

**Moctar Kamara:** Being black in Germany means being submitted to control by racist police officers, to be subject to something called *racial profiling*, in other words: having your documents checked seemingly without any reason, only due to the fact of being black. This is only part of the problem, and in different instances you notice you are being discriminated against. Like in the job market, where there is also discrimination against black people. This is hard. It is hard to find your own space as a black person, but there is also the structural racism. Germany still hasn't processed its colonial history and the books always picture blacks as bad people. The kids grow up prejudiced against black people. There are books in Germany using discriminatory language and there is even a popular child's game called "Who is Afraid of the Black Man?"<sup>59</sup>

### In your opinion, has anything changed since 2006?

**Moctar Karama:** Very little. I wouldn't be fair if I said nothing has happened, little steps have

been taken, tiny steps. Meanwhile different associations were created in different states and there are some confederations like the Central Council of the African Community in Germany. Some things have shifted. There is some contact with the politicians. In a way, the politics have moved on, but racism still exists.

## Retrospect: Mega events and protests

The 2006 World Cup in Germany was seen as a party. That is a unanimous opinion. But even so, there were many things that could have given reasons to criticism and protests. Why then there was so little protest?

Compared to France, where the unions bet heavily on street protests, Germany is perceived as "lazy" in this aspect. Even so, German authorities registered a number of between 2,000 and 3,000 manifestations during the 2000s,<sup>60</sup> i.e., in average, up to 8 manifestations in Germany, daily.<sup>61</sup> Why then nobody took to the streets to protest, instead of for drinking? To understand the reasons, it might be useful to look back

to the 1971 World Cup in Germany and the country's failed bids for the Olympic Games from 1991 to 1993.

### Football and human rights: A retrospective of the 1974 World Cup in Germany

Nine men are forming a wall. Six of them wear dark blue and three wear yellow. There is a kick, two men in yellow dive to the ground and within the blue wall, a gap appears. Through it a ball flies, like an arrow, until it hits the net. Rivelino, the striker, scores a goal for Brazil, winning the match against the Federal Republic of Germany at the world cup of 1974. In Germany! After winning the World Cup of 1970 in Mexico, Brazil already was the current champion. And who would not want to watch their team's magic touch? Especially the Brazilians who had travelled from so far away just to see the games. But not all of them could make it.

[59] In the original: "Wer hat Angst vor dem schwarzen Mann?"

[60] Swen Hutter, Simon Teune: Politik auf der Straße: Deutschlands Protestprofil im Wandel [Policy taken on the streets, change in the profile of the demonstrations in Germany], 11/6/2012. Available on: <http://www.bpb.de/apuz/138276/deutschlands-protestprofil-im-wandel?p=all>. Accessed on 12/07/2013.

[61] More recent data are much higher. Only in 2013 the capital, Berlin, recorded 4.200 events. See Berliner Morgenpost, edição de 12/26/2013.

### Chicanery instead of football joy

The Brazilian team played in Frankfurt, Hannover, Gelsenkirchen and Dortmund. Bochum is located between Gelsenkirchen and Dortmund, in a sort of conurbation. In July of 1974, a group of Brazilians of both sexes, supported by the Lutheran Church of Germany (EKD) were living in Bochum, attending German classes. They had arrived in Cologne on February of 1974, after an odyssey that had taken the group from Brazil to Chile in 1971, from Chile to Mexico after the 11th of September of 1973 and at the end of that year to Cologne, travelling through Belgium. Brazil was ruled by a military dictatorship since 1964.

Around the end of 1968 the repression worsened, with torture, killings and kidnappings sanctioned and managed by the state. To apply for asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany was the last hope for many refugees from different countries. The Cologne section of Amnesty International helped the Brazilians from Bochum. The asylum applications dragged for many months. But even so, the police authorities acted vigorously.

“On July of 1974, I was called to report to the immigration police with two other comrades. We were informed that we had to go three times a day to the nearest police station, for control, over the 21 days

of the duration of the World Cup, that was happening in Germany at the time. Whoever refused to comply would be banned from German territory. We tried to find out the source of such an order, but didn't receive any explanation. We legally argued this order, and the legal costs were met by the church. We lost. This order hurt us a lot in our studies, since we were forced to go to the police three times a day during the exams period. Furthermore, we didn't manage to watch a single match, and had to walk three hours a day to report to the police, once in the morning and twice in the afternoon” declared Maria Auxiliadora Barcellos Lara in an account that survived the dust of history at the FDCL (Forschungs-u. Dokumentationszentrum Chile-Lateinamerika) in Berlin. The military dictatorship celebrated ten years of power in Brazil while the World Cup was happening in Germany.

### Exiled – with no right to any rights

The German authority for foreigners kept to their chicaneries against the exiled. In October of 1974, Dora, as she was called, tried to enroll at the Free University of Berlin, but the authority informed her that she had entered the country illegally and there would be a legal process against her. From May of 1975 Dora was forbidden to leave West Berlin. Her last passport, issued

in Chile, expired in July of 1975, and the German authorities refused to issue a new one, so Dora became stateless, like many Brazilians at the time.

Hannah Arendt, the philosopher, defined citizenship as “the right to have rights”. Being stateless, therefore, means having no rights. According to accounts from friends from her West Berlin time, Dora was scarred by torture endured in Brazil. Depression and other psychological problems made her seek treatment. She died on the 1st of July of 1976 in a Charlottenburg station. To the police, Dora's death was an obvious case of suicide. “In fact, Maria Auxiliadora was killed by those who, seven years before, brutally tortured her inside the Brazilian prisons”, wrote Heinz F. Dressel, who knew her from Bochum. “The psychological illness was no doubt a consequence of the physical and psychological suffering endured by Dora, than 25 years old, during her prison years”. Her family wanted to bury Dora in Brazil. The Brazilian military government refused, at first, to authorize the body transfer to Brazil, since Dora had been banned years before by a decree from General Medici. But, with help from foreign interventions, pressure and negotiation, it was possible to make the Ministry of Foreign Affairs change its opinion.

## Solidarity – and the battle for public opinion

The mainsprings of the humanitarian work with Brazil and for the Brazilians exiled in Germany were solidarity and humanitarianism. This included help facing the authorities as well as helping to tell everybody about the atrocities committed by the military in Brazil. But it was also important to name those responsible, thereby, the torture and the disappearing of political adversaries in Brazil were the subject of information dissemination campaigns in Germany at the time. But solidarity to Chile was also strong.


### “Chile sí! Junta no!”

14 June 1974 – Berlin Olympic Stadium. The German squad is about to face the Chileans on the first match of group 1. At 16:45pm, just before the end of the first half, the placard shows German 1x0 Chile since the first 18 minutes, thanks to a goal scored by Paul Breitner. All of a sudden some people start leaving from different parts of the grandstand, running to the Perspex wall that separates the stand from the pitch, breaking through it and getting to the centre of the pitch to unfold a gigantic flag with the written slogan: “Chile sí! Junta no! Despite being followed by security. The TV studio directors needed a few seconds to change the cameras. Too late. The

images of the protest against the Chilean military dictatorship that had overthrown the democratically elected president Salvador Allende travelled the world. Even in Chile, the spectators saw the action, for the censors didn't cut the transmission in time to avoid the unpredictable disturbance to the match.

They had planned, discussed and trained for that action along weeks and months. Rehearsing the “jump of the barricade” in a little garden on the suburbs. “We wanted to achieve many goals: To make it clear that our protest wasn't against Chile but against the military junta and the message to reach Chile and the whole of Latin America. We wanted to send a public sign of solidarity against the dictatorship. Later we learned that it worked”, recalls one activist. It was a “moment that had nothing to do with football. In the midst of the worse darkness in Chilean history, a little minute of international solidarity to the country”, declared lawyer Petra Schlegenhaut in an article about solidarity actions during the World Cup of 1974 in Germany.<sup>62</sup>

The protests linking football and torture topics happened again four years later during the World Cup in Argentina. In Germany, a wide ranging coalition of human right defence groups had been formed to lead a campaign against torturers from the Argentinian military dictatorship and call public attention to the human rights violations in that country.<sup>63</sup>



[62] Petra Schlegenhaut: “Chile Sí, Junta No! Spektakuläre Solidaritätsbekundung während der Fußball WM 1974“. In: Lateinamerika Nachrichten 382, April, 2006.

[63] Available on <http://fdcl-berlin.de/de/publikationen/fdcl-veroeffentlichungen/fdcl-1978-fussball-und-folterereine-dokumentation-zur-argentinischen-realtiet-vor-demhintergrund-der-wm-78/>. Accessed on 10 out. 2013.

## The 1991-1993 campaign against the Olympics in Berlin: "Berlin 2000 NOlympic City"

In the beginning of the 1990s, Berlin made a bid to host the Summer Olympic Games of 2000. One year before, in 1989, the idea was born that both West and East Berlin could hold the Olympics. After the fall of The Wall this idea developed and led to the campaign with the International Olympic Committee (IOC). But not everybody in the city liked the idea.

Was it possible that after the 1936 Olympic Games on fascist Germany, Berlin could again host this sports event?

**"We always followed them wherever they went, signalling via the press: there is resistance here!"**

Interview with Hauke, an activist for the campaign against the Olympics in Berlin from 1991 to 1993. In this interview, he talks about the protests behind-the-scenes, the protests, the actions, the political reaction, the IOC and the success of the movement.

**From 1991 to 1993, there were wide ranging protests in Berlin against the city's bid to host the Summer Olympic Games of 2000. What could you tell us of the movement's behind-the-scenes?**

**Hauke:** After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the reunion of both Federal and Democratic Republics of Germany happened in 1990. We were against moving the capital from Bonn to Berlin. We feared that soon we would have a housing deficit and property speculation and that everything would be more expensive. This war we lost.

Immediately after came the city bid to host the Olympic Games of 2000. Many people in the left, the greens and the Socialist Party feared a new real property boom and the redevelopment of entire neighbourhoods evicting people, especially in the City Centre. And of course the increase in rental prices.

**But weren't many new buildings constructed for the World Cup of 2006?**

**Hauke:** No, because there were already stadiums. In Berlin there were. Few stadiums were specially built for the Cup. The Olympics case is different because of the many different sport modalities.

When we found out Berlin had the intention to bid, in 1991, we were inspired by the successful campaign of Amsterdam, a city that had failed in their bid to be a host city for the Olympic Games a few years earlier because of the house occupying movement. They used the same strategy as us: soiling the image.

In Amsterdam the demonstrators had two goals: They tried to discredit the city to the public opinion and to discredit the IOC. We adopted the same strategy. We were a very small

group. In 1991 the first IOC delegation visited Berlin and more than 1.500 people came out to the streets to support the "Berlin NOlympic City" movement. And the press reported. Obviously, the IOC big bosses understood there was resistance. We kept pushing it little by little. We managed to unmask, on the one side, corruption on municipal government level and within a company called Olympia Ltd., responsible for preparing the bid.

We are against the Olympic Games, not against sport per se. We are in favour of promoting sport to large segments of the population. Many people, especially the young, jumped to this wave and started to disseminate their stance against the Olympics through sport activities. When the Olympic Committee president came to his residence on the Kleiner Wannsee Lake we were already in the water with dozens of little boats and banners with the "Berlin NOlympic City" message. The police came shortly after! We always followed them wherever they went, signalling via the press: there is resistance here!

We tried to be present in the city, in the neighbourhoods. And succeeded. At the time, the IOC was under the presidency of Juan Antonio Samaranch, who had been the last Sports Minister under Franco (the Spanish dictator), a fascist. We went twice to the IOC headquarters in Lausanne. The second time, we managed to get there ahead of the delivery of the bid official video, taking a fake video with us. When the Mayor of Berlin arrived we were already inside, formally dressed and delivered the "of-



ficial” video in the name of Berlin, obviously attacking the IOC and the City.

That caused great confusion because the IOC believed we were really from the City Hall. They only started to find out later on and we even had the audacity to try to throw eggs at Samaranch during the official reception. Sadly, we were arrested...

The Olympics in Rio have already been decided but I think the IOC still gets very annoyed to notice that they are not welcome. And you can still annoy them today. The Olympic Games will only happen in three years' time. You can still show that not everybody agree with what the IOC is doing, not least because the money invested doesn't get to the city but goes instead to the TV channels and the IOC. Billions were invested in almost all Olympic host cities and still today they are suffering to pay the interest. It will happen to Rio too. If we direct the focus to it, we can at least ruin their dinner.

**Why do you think there were so many protests against the Olympics while there were almost no demonstrations against the 2006 World Cup in Germany?**

**Hauke:** On one side, the World Cup was decentralized. On the other, there was little investment on new stadiums because the majority of the cities already had theirs. There wasn't the threat of eviction or urban restructuring. And even despite Fifa's image being far from immaculate and Fifa being corrupt to the bone,

we called the IOC, under the presidency of Samaranch, the “International Association of Corrupt Mobsters”. When bidding, the City recalled the Olympic Games of 1936 during the Nazi era, since they would use the same places (Like the Olympic Stadium and The Maifeld). And these places still hold all the statues from that time in a sort of cult to the fascist architecture and to racism. They referred to it in a positive way but still many people didn't like the idea.

They had a bad conscience but referred to history. But you can't erase what happened 60 years before: the staging of a farce directed by the Propaganda Minister, Goebbels himself. They made their own lives harder and soiled the image of a “modern and clean city” by pointing to the Nazi past, albeit in an oblique way.

**What are your conclusions about the 1991-1993 protest movement in Berlin?**

**Hauke:** That it was the only successful campaign won by the radical left in the city in the 1990s. It is true that we faced an easy opponent, clumsy like the Berlin Bear. And we managed to interlink the many different topics: The scandal of the Olympic Games Nazi past and it being pushed under the carpet by the city administrators, the threats of urban redevelopment, property speculation and the foolishness of erecting pharaonic buildings for the Olympics.



**NOlympic** popular demonstration (from the book: ‘Volksport statt Olympia’, published by the Berlin NOlympic movement, Berlin-1993.)

## *A retrospective of the campaign against the Olympic Games in Berlin, the “Berlin 2000 Nolympic City”: A brief chronology.*<sup>64</sup>

- **7 March 1991:** Berlin bids with the IOC to host the Olympic Summer Games of 2000.
- **16 – 18 September 1991:** Protected by 1.500 police officers, the IOC executive committee meets in Berlin. The committee against the Olympics calls demonstrations that result in injuries and 41 arrests. 600 cyclists protest through the city centre using the ‘Nolympic City!’ slogan.
- **13 April 1992:** The Mayor of Berlin delivers the city official bid to Juan Antonio Samaranch, the IOC president, in Lausanne.
- **July 1992:** Olympic flags with the mascot image are hanged all over Berlin. The opponents steal the flags in night raids.
- **27 June 1992:** the committee against the Olympics sends a letter to IOC members: *‘Dear IOC ladies and gentlemen, You must be tired of your unilateral correspondence with corrupt politicians, sports personnel and the building business mobsters. Through this letter another Berlin shows the face. The Berlin of protest and resistance against the 2000 Olympics in the capital of the Reich: the chaotic, criminals, punks, gays and lesbians, stone throwers, long suffering workers, the poor, the drunk and the mad.’*
- **From October 1992:** Attacks against banks, companies and conglomerates supporting the bid by Berlin, committed by unknown groups.
- **27 January 1993:** Berlin delivers a candidacy video to the IOC in Lausanne, Switzerland. Or almost. The delegation, elegantly turned up, already had a video under the arm and the hand

on the door knob of the meeting room of the IOC Executive Committee. But the delegation was fake and the video an ‘Olympic anti-candidacy’ declaring the withdrawing of Berlin. Ending the video, a punk, holding a stone, warns of the consequences of the IOC favouring Berlin, with the words: ‘we will wait for you’. Only at this point the real delegation arrived with the official video and the IOC bosses understood the ‘misunderstanding’. Both video versions stayed in the IOC building. The press doesn’t tell the IOC reaction to the ‘punk’ video.

- **March 1993:** The police creates a Special Investigation Group to deal with frequent intentional fire attacks against department stores in Berlin.

- **18 April 1993:** Ten thousand people demonstrate in Berlin against the plans to host the 2000 Summer Olympics in the city. IOC members visit the city for three days.

- **18 – 20 April 1993:** Demonstrators follow the IOC members on their visit, by walk and by bike, stopping the traffic in the city centre. During the three day protest there were people injured and arrests. The great ‘Nolympia’ march moves past the Grand Hotel on Friedrichstrasse, where the IOC meets, chanting loudly and clearly anti-Olympic slogans. The Berliner Morgenpost newspaper reported: ‘frightened, the IOC members looked through the Grand Hotel windows and saw the protesters wearing black and leather. ‘It’s going to be beautiful’, said one. ‘I have never seen anything like it’, said another.”<sup>65</sup>

- **15 September 1993:** The opponents

[64] Based on [http://autox.nadir.org/archiv/chrono/olymp\\_chro.html](http://autox.nadir.org/archiv/chrono/olymp_chro.html), <http://www.morgenpost.de/printarchiv/berlin/article184224/Wie-dem-Berliner-Olympia-Baerchen-das-Grinsen-verging.html>, <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/gelb-geergert/8826084.html>, <http://www.taz.de/!21215/>. accessed on 8 October 2013.

send a 42 page brochure in shiny paper to the IOC Executive Committee: 'Berlin 2000 – Nolympic City!' The brochure includes illustrations of barricades on fire on the fight for occupied houses in Berlin and the Black Block. And once more warns of the consequences of choosing Berlin. More fire attacks happen during those days.

▪ **23 September 1993:** A decision is announced at the sports hall of the Louis II of Monte Carlo stadium, in Monaco: 'The winner is Sydney!' Berlin gets only nine out of the 88 IOC votes. In Berlin, at the Kreuzberg neighbourhood, champagne pops and some Olympic flags are burnt. Around a thousand demonstrators are gathered to follow the voting through a big screen. Hundreds more celebrate at the Tranenplalast off Friedrichstrasse.


### Retrospective of Berlin's failed candidacy to host the Olympics

The *Berliner Tagesspiegel* newspaper wrote of the failed candidacy:

"The fiasco of the candidacy for the biggest sports event in the world soon hit the headlines. Those responsible for the Olympics showed a far too confident attitude. The IOC members were invited and greeted with exaggerated generosity. The greatest scandal happened when it was uncovered that dossiers were being prepared on IOC leaders, including their sexual preferences. The Olympics question divided a city. In the end, the difficult reunification process and its resulting problems (like housing deficit and unemployment) contributed to the stress."<sup>66</sup>

The *Berliner Morgenpost* magazine, that doesn't normally mix with government critics, took a similar instance: "In the end, it is impossible to know if Berlin's candidacy really devoured the official number of 60 million Deutsche Mark or 250 million like the critics say. When years later a parliamentary inquest tried to investigate, the main documents had already been shredded."<sup>67</sup>

And so it was impossible to verify dozens of secret dossiers over the IOC members' intimacy made public by the TV magazine *Monitor*.



Campaign poster/promotion material

[65] Joachim Fahrur: "Wie dem Berliner Olympia-Bärchen das Grinsen verging". In: Berliner Morgenpost 2/4/2007.

[66] Sigrid Kneist: "Gelb geärgert". In: Berliner Morgenpost 9/22/2013.

[67]

Joachim Fahrur: "Wie dem Berliner Olympia-Bärchen das Grinsen verging". In: Berliner Morgenpost 2/4/2007.



From the book 'Volksport statt Olympia', published by the Berlin NOlympic City, Berlin 1993.

### Munich wants the Winter Olympic Games. But does everybody want the same?

“Munich gives it all. And fails”, sentenced the *Suddeutsche Zeitung* newspaper on 6 January, 2011. At the Convention Centre in Durban, South Africa, IOC members only needed one round to decide in 30 seconds: Pyongiang, the capital city of South Korea will host the 2018 Winter Olympic Games. Not even the former player Franz Beckenbauer’s clumsy speech helped. “People call me *Kaiser* (emperor)” he played his card. In vain!

The brilliant candidacy of Munich wrapped itself in unexpected traps. The traps came mostly from a little city located around 90km south, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, with a population of 25.901 inhabitants according to the last census of 2011, one of the most famous ski resorts in Germany, adjacent to the highest peak in the country, the Zugspitze. The Winter Olympic Games of 1936 happened there. And should happen again according to the wishes of the cities of Munich and Garmisch-Partenkirchen, holding ski championships and *snowboard*.

But its inhabitants didn’t like this idea. “Farmers and residents resist”, wrote *Stern* magazine on 10 August, 2010. Nobody liked to learn they should temporarily lend their land, or even worse permanently, for the realization of the event, despite receiving compensation. The irritation grew and

the residents gathered in movements and signature campaigns, finishing with the Bavarian capital Olympic planners’ intentions by refusing to lend the land.

But nonetheless, Munich could have imagined those little proper villages would be hard to play. Of conservative stock, local peasants and farmers don’t like anyone minding their ownership relations. Before that, the city of Oberammergau had already refused to host biathlon and long-distance race championships. That was when the Olympic Planning Centre chose Garmisch. As a result the residents there were against too. So, “Munich 2018” failed in Durban.

“Munich 2022!” Insisted the Olympic Planners, taking a decentralized concept from their waistcoats’ pockets, with games spread across Munich, Ruhpolding, Schonau am Königssee and Garmisch-Partenkirchen.

So, once more the planners tried to plan without consulting the residents. On the four cities mentioned, in all municipalities, again, movements started to form to force the government to hold a plebiscite. Which happened in 10 October, 2013. The outcome was clear: In Munich, 52% of citizens with voting rights said no. In Ruhpolding, 59%, In Berchtesgaden, 54% and in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 51%.<sup>68</sup> Almost all daily newspapers reported: “A sign against the IOC greed”.

[68] See among others <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/sport/abstimmung-zu-winterspielen-2022-muenchens-olympiaprojekt-geplatzt-buerger-sagen-deutlich-nein/9055808.html>. Accessed on 11/10/2013.

### Looking ahead: Mega events, protests and democracy

There were probably many things that could have given reasons to protests during the 2006 World Cup in Germany. But, as many problems due to or caused by the Cup didn't have serious consequences at local level as seen during the Olympic Games in Berlin or in Munich (quite the opposite, they seemed decentralized and spread across the whole country, with no direct visibility), these protests didn't happen during the Cup. Differently from what happens now in Brazil, where, according to reports from the Cup Popular committees more than 250.000 people are threatened with eviction, evacuation and exclusion by countless measures regarding the building of infrastructure, hotels and stadiums,<sup>69</sup> in Germany we didn't have these severe social consequences before or during the World Cup. From a total of 12 stadiums in Germany, only five were especially built. And in part, even before the Cup and on the same ground, the others were modernised. As the roads infrastructure, accesses, sub-urban trains, underground and buses were already in place, the building measures had less impact than in other countries and there was no social exclusion like in Brazil now, for instance.

In Germany in 2006, they didn't have, on the Cup context, the restructuring and the gentrification of entire neighbour-

hoods either, like is feared now in Brazil, because the process of urban valorisation begun some years before for the German cities, and is still going on today, but without direct links with the 2006 World Cup. But, as in the case of the Olympic Games (like Munich and Berlin expected) it is very likely there were some directly measurable effects between the event and the urban restructuring. These were the explicit reasons for the citizens of Munich and Berlin to have declared themselves against the Olympic Games (In Berlin at the beginning of 1990s and in Berlin again in 2013). Since the Olympic Games are the main event in a city, their urban effects are clearly more severe than in a decentralised event like the World Cup of 2006 in Germany, with games spread around the whole country and where there weren't any process of social exclusion.

Further than that, there are positive experiences of recent political phenomena in Germany. The plebiscite in Munich against the Olympic Games of 2022, the protests of crowds against mega projects like the underground train station "Stuttgart 21" or the anti-nuclear demonstrations show us there is potential for protests in Germany and the citizens don't accept everything without question anymore. They want to take part on the debate and the decisions, especially when concrete and local cases are in the arena and don't accept impositions from the regional capital or Berlin.



Flags for the World Cup of 2006  
(Russel C/CC)

The citizens of Munich have shown that, in the end of 2013, voting against the Olympic Games and the IOC greed.

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[69] Available on: [http://www.portalpopulardacopa.org.br/index.php?option=com\\_k2&view=item&id=198:dossi%C3%AA-nacional-deviola%C3%A7%C3%B5es-de-direitos-humanos](http://www.portalpopulardacopa.org.br/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=198:dossi%C3%AA-nacional-deviola%C3%A7%C3%B5es-de-direitos-humanos). Accessed on 12/03/2013.



# *Conclusion*

What is the purpose of the World Cup?  
Brazil, South Africa and Germany

Marilene de Paula







## Conclusion

Did the processes involving the hosting of the FIFA World Cup<sup>1</sup> happen the same way in developing and developed countries? What are the similarities and differences in their aspirations? Did law violations occur similarly in these countries? These were the key questions that lead us to undertake this book. Answering them is no simple task. However, the analysis of the authors Christian Russau, who wrote about the tournaments in Germany (2006), Laura Burocco, about South Africa (2010) and Glauca Marino, Mario Campagnani and Renato Cosentino, about Brazil (2014) could perceive the interests of the players involved, the complex and diverse law violations involving the Southern countries, and mostly, it was possible to see how the ambitions of FIFA, governments and corporate sponsors completely collaborated to create a framework for increasing commodification of urban space, having the city as an enterprise.

The enterprise-city is now the new paradigm of urban development. The city becomes a product and enters the competition roll with other cities in the developing world in order to become salable to the largest possible number of financial players. Large corporations, construction and real estate markets, determine the urban redevelopment. Thus, big business, allied to governments, increasingly exert power over the changes and decisions that affect cities.

The decisions are not made at the local

level, taking into consideration the rights to the city, but rather decided by the interests of capital, represented by a select group of national and international companies.

So for the three countries, the opportunity opened up to bring together different actors from the private sector and governments to cooperate starting from common interests. However, for Brazil and South Africa there was a thickening of rights violations at various levels, particularly for the poorest populations. Thus, for a comparison with Germany, a country in the North, first economy in Europe, with a consolidated state welfare, efficient transport infrastructure, stadiums within the standards required by international football, any analysis must be done from another viewpoint. However, the three countries share a common motivation: the ability to gain huge profits, political and/or economic, by using the successful FIFA formula: the World Cup.

### Symbolic expectations

The great party of fans and general public masks concrete motivations of the government-private sector partnership. Such a megaevent could not be viable without this alliance. However, there were also symbolic motivations linked to the possibility of change in the image of each country, or at least this was the government leaders speech.

Christian Russau narrates the “fairy tale summer”, describing the four weeks when Ger-

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[1] A Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) is an association ruled by Swiss legislation, founded in 1904 with headquarters in Zurich. It is composed by 208 national federations and has the objective, according to its statutes, of continuously improving soccer. FIFA has approximately 310 employees, from 35 countries and it is formed by a Congress (Legislative organ), Executive Committee (executive organ), General Secretary (administrative organ) and the committees (that aid the Executive Committee). Available at: <http://pt.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/>. Access on 10 feb. 2014.

many held the Cup. The patriotic demonstrations surprised even the Germans themselves and were the most discussed topic in German media. Patriotism, seen as negative because of the past that inevitably connects the German people to the Third Reich and the horrific images of the Holocaust, has completely changed with the Cup, becoming an important pretext to amalgamate the national euphoria around a new consciousness awakened by the moment. At that time in Germany, national identity, pride, patriotism were seen as negative concepts, even as a kind of taboo, coupled with a feeling of collective guilt in the postwar society.

But what was behind that time were also important events that occurred 10 years ago. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the end of the Cold War and signaled a wave of democratization in many parts of the world, followed by the reunification of the two Germanys in 1990. In 2000, when Germany was chosen to host the World Cup it had been 10 years after the reunification. To the specialist in German politics Christian Lohbauer, the costs of reunification had been high: “soon after the reunification, the government of Helmut Kohl [1982–1998, Christian Democrat] created the solidarity tax, which raised US\$1 trillion in a decade, a figure that was applied to the transformation of East Germany into West Germany”.<sup>2</sup> One of the biggest problems was transforming the obsolete East German industry into a productive one.

In a symbolic level, transforming its image was at stake, both internally and externally. In-

terior Minister Otto Schily said that the World Cup was a “*tremendous opportunity to show the best side of our country*,” and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998–2005) finished up by saying that “*we want to show that Germany is an open country, and friendly to visitors*.” The Cup slogan was “The whole world among friends” (*Die Welt zu Gast bei junge*, in free translation), alluding to the determination to show to the world another face of the German citizen. The Cup ball also symbolized this idea and was named *Teamgeist* (team spirit, in free translation).

Showing its economic, educational and intellectual superiority was also at stake. The slogan of the government, in partnership with the Federation of German Industries, was: “Welcome to Germany, land of ideas”, incorporated into an advertising campaign by the companies in the phrase “Invest in Germany, a land of ideas” with the German supermodel, Claudia Schiffer.

At last, the reunification costs contributed to an austerity moment, with several measures to reduce social benefits for the population. The reunification euphoria had vanished and it was necessary to definitely undo the tension coming from this process.

In the scenario described by Laura Burocco for South Africa, what was at stake in a symbolic level was to undo the past negative image and show that social and economic society mismatches could be overcome. In May 2004, when South Africa was announced as the host country for World Cup 2010 it would be 10 years from the end of apartheid. As advertise-

[2] Available at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/mundo/ult94u88291.shtml>. Access in 15 fev. 2014.

ment, the government highlighted the unique opportunity to showcase to the World the transition process advances in the country towards a democracy, and also legitimate itself as government, and not to be seen only as a national freedom movement. On President Jacob Zuma's declarations, it is also highlighted the desire to strengthen South Africa as a leadership on the region: "*Africa will now be the stage, with South Africa as the continent representative... bring the World Cup to our Country... this will restore Africa's rightful place in the Global stage*"<sup>3</sup>. Another important aspect of the President's speech was the desire to reposition the continent as a whole, represented by South Africa, in a movement to reclaim African self-esteem, strengthening a collective identity that associated them to the event.

For Brazil, when it was elected in 2007, it was at stake in a symbolic level showing another face of the country; not the one linked to high rates of violence and socioeconomic inequalities, but a country that was already "great" enough to do one of two major world events. Being the host country of the World Cup was related to projecting an image of a leader in the region, a safe country to do business with and getting the attention of the international media. On October 30, 2007 in the words of President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva<sup>4</sup> in his speech at the ceremony of announcement of Brazil to host the 2014 World Cup in Zurich, Switzerland, this perspective was clear:

*"Here we are assuming a responsibility as a nation, as the Brazilian State to prove to the world that we have a stable, growing economy, that we are a country that has reached stability. We are a country that has many problems, yes, but we are a country with determined men to solve these problems"*.

Everything seemed to work, because the city of Rio de Janeiro was elected in 2010 as the host of the 2016 Olympics. But throughout the process described in Chapter Brazil it is noted that the bill would come later for the poorest sectors.

An important aspect in the analysis of the three articles is to realize that South Africa exercises leadership in the region and shares a certain collective identity granted by Pan Africanism (we are Africans!); unlike Brazil, that despite its economic and political leadership in South America, that fact does not create elements for a common "Latin-American" identity given the complexity of historical processes involving the region and especially Brazil, in relation to its neighbors. So, the World Cup in Brazil does not mean a victory for the region. The same can be said for Germany given the role of several countries in Europe as well as internal disputes. Germany represented itself, strengthening its role in the global investment arena.

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- [3] Dawse, Suzanne. Power Play: International Politics, Germany, South Africa and the FIFA World Cup Occasional paper n. 82. SAIIA, maio 2011, 11p. Available at <http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/power-playinternational-politics-germany-south-africa-and-the-fifaworld-cup>. Access 10 feb. 2014.
- [4] Speech at the Announcement Ceremony of Brazil as Host of the World Cup 2014, in Zurich, Switzerland, in October, 30, 2007. Available at <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/discursos/2o-mandato/2007/2o-semester/30-10-2007discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-dasilva-na-cerimonia-de-anuncio-do-brasil-como-sede-dacopa-do-mundo-de-2014/>. Access in 14 feb. 2014.



Cover for Advertising Age  
(Publicity)

### The Economic Motivations: Mega-event = Mega-business

The three articles demonstrate that it is not only in the symbolic level that it is highly attractive to hosting FIFA World Cup, despite official discourses bringing this element as prominent, but alleged economic and media advantages. In this sense, the results for the whole society in terms of GDP growth and the number of jobs fell short of the forecasts.

If the World Cup is a brand – a marketing piece that a country shows to the world for four weeks – it is required to clean the city, to remove unwanted or hazardous elements such as the homeless, beggars, prostitutes, informal workers, etc., those who can bring danger to the event image. It happened in South Africa and it is happening in Brazil. Beyond that, stopping demonstrations, strikes, deaths of workers, fights in stadiums etc.

In 2013 the cover of *Advertising Age*<sup>5</sup>, one of the most important magazines in the marketing world, showed a picture of chaos and violence during the protests in Brazil in June 2013 and made a suggestive question: “*Imagine your brand in the middle of it?*”. The report discusses the concerns of the brands that will sponsor the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics in Brazil, since the advertisers will spend US\$1.6 billion in sponsorship and three times that amount in marketing.

Despite these concerns, throughout the Cups FIFA revenues continue rising. Only in 2013 there was a record on FIFA revenue total-

ing US\$1.386 billion (R\$3.2 billion). Subtracting the expenses, net profit was US\$72 million (R\$163 million). More than 20% compared to 2012 when the collection was US\$1.077 billion. Most of this revenue relates to the sale of TV broadcasting rights (US\$601 million) and marketing (US\$ 404 million). According to the entity projections, the 2014 FIFA World Cup will raise a total of US\$4 billion (R\$10 billion), making it the most lucrative for FIFA until today.<sup>6</sup>

FIFA General Secretary, Jérôme Valcke,<sup>7</sup> stated:

It's amazing to see how, even in a world with so many difficulties, there is a market for football. We are growing. We will earn more money in Russia 2018 World Cup, and then in Qatar in 2022. Because there is no relationship between earnings and the country where the World Cup is held, but the value of the tournament, which is a unique event.

Valcke's statement and the list of sponsors of Table 1 makes us realize that the FIFA and its World Cup have never been so useful to governments and businesses.

To Alvaro Ferreira, “capitalism had eluded its crises of over-accumulation through the production of space and thus new spatiotemporal adjustments will be achieved which will that support the socioeconomic model”<sup>8</sup>. A new spatial logic emerges as a result of this process. During the removal proceedings in Brazil and South Africa the undesirables must be removed to make way for a new city model,

[5] Available at <http://adage.coverleaf.com/advertisingage/20130722#pg1>. Access in 15 fev. 2014.

[6] Available at <http://oglobo.globo.com/esportes/copa-2014/fifa-anuncia-que-teve-lucro-recorde-no-anodo-2013-11946658>. Access in 10 mar. 2014.

[7] Idem.

**Table 1: World Cup Sponsors – 1990 to 2014\***

| 1990<br>Italy      | 1994<br>EUA       | 1998<br>France    | 2002<br>Japan/Korea     | 2006<br>Germany     | 2010<br>South Africa   | 2014<br>Brazil <sup>8</sup> |
|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Coca-Cola          | Coca-Cola         | Coca-Cola         | Coca-Cola               | Coca-Cola           | Coca-Cola              | Coca-Cola                   |
| Gillete            | Gillete           | Gillete           | Gillete                 | Gillete             | Sony                   | Sony                        |
| Fuji               | Fuji              | Fuji              | Fuji Film<br>Fuji Xerox | Fuji Film           | Seara                  |                             |
| Philips            | Philips           | Philips           | Philips                 | Philips             | Mahindra<br>Satyam     | Oi Telecomu-<br>nicações    |
| JVC                | JVC               | JVC               | JVC                     | Continental         | Continental            | Continental                 |
| Canon              | Canon             | Canon             | Budweiser               | Budweiser           | Budweiser              | Budweiser                   |
| Mars               | Mars              | Mars              | KT/NTT                  | Deutsche<br>Telekom | MTN                    | Johnson &<br>Johnson        |
| Vini Italia        | Snickers          | Casio             | Toshiba                 | Toshiba             | Castrol                | Castrol                     |
| Anheuser-<br>Busch | Mastercard        | Mastercard        | Mastercard              | Mastercard          | Yingli Green<br>Energy | Yingli Green<br>Energy      |
|                    | MacDonald's       | MacDonald's       | MacDonald's             | MacDonald's         | MacDonald's            | MacDonald's                 |
|                    | Energizer         | Adidas            | Adidas                  | Adidas              | Adidas                 | Adidas                      |
|                    | General<br>Motors | General<br>Motors | Hyundai                 | Hyundai             | Hyundai/<br>Kia Motors | Hyundai/<br>Kia Motors      |
|                    |                   |                   | Avaya                   | Avaya               |                        | Visa                        |
|                    |                   |                   | Yahoo!                  | Yahoo!              |                        | Garoto                      |
|                    |                   |                   |                         | Fly Emirates        |                        | Fly Emirates                |
|                    |                   |                   |                         |                     |                        | Centauro                    |
|                    |                   |                   |                         |                     |                        | Itaú                        |
|                    |                   |                   |                         |                     |                        | Liberty Seguros             |
|                    |                   |                   |                         |                     |                        | Wise Up                     |

[\*] FIFA has three categories of sponsors: partners; Cup partners (event) and national Cup partners.

[8] Ferreira, Álvaro. A cidade no século XXI: segregação e banalização do espaço. Rio de Janeiro, Consequência: 2011.

suiting to the demands of a globalized world. When Laura Burocco described the dwellings of “emergence” of Blikkiesdorp that became permanent (containers with poor electricity, no indoor bathrooms, made of zinc and rigidly aligned), the author states that they are no different than what happens every day in relation to housing rights violations in South Africa. However, the difference in this case is the immanent discourse in relation to these actions: we are building a city aligned with international standards! The maximization of profit, the privatization of public space, the increasing adoption of public-private partnerships (PPP) as a response of efficiency for business models that set the State as inefficient to manage cities are the thread of the analysis.

In Brazil, the statements of the City of Rio de Janeiro Mayor, Eduardo Paes, also go in this direction:

“What must we seize in this opportunity [realization of mega-events in the city]? Not lousy stadiums. It is the: “this country is transparent, it is planned, the institutions are strong, seriously, is a good country to do business, tourist who comes ...” It is the chance you have of selling your country.<sup>9</sup>

In this sense, the removal of the poorest populations from spaces coveted by the private sector, often in inner-city areas, mediated by the State is fundamental. In the case of Brazil, Cosentino, Marinho and Campagnani analyze the removal processes that have begun with the “excuse” of mega-events and the demands of

a cleaner, efficient city, without the undesirable, transformed into new investment territory. It was estimated that there are 250,000 people suffer or are in the process of removal in Brazil because of mega-events. Only in Rio de Janeiro, the City Hall stated that since 2009 have resettled 20,299 families, and that none of them was related with the World Cup, only 285 with the 2016 Olympic Games (in the Vila Autódromo, the west zone of the city). In South Africa it was possible to follow the case of merchants in Green Market Square, San Jose building and the TRA (Temporary Relocation Area). In those moments several forces of capital were mobilized, especially contractors and real estate to a new re-parcelling of urban areas. Thus, understanding the contemporary socio-dynamics is also to understand the motivations of countries to hosting the World Cup.

Regarding rights infringements, any analysis of the processes in Germany does not compare to the violations described by our authors from Brazil and South Africa, but even so there were cases involving the blocking of undesirables such as immigrants and prostitutes, as Christian Russau points. The rumor that appeared in the media trumpeting the arrival of 40,000 female prostitutes from eastern Europe, which would invade the host cities proved to be completely fallacious. In terms of exploitation and sex tourism, one of the items often associated with prostitution, according to the official report of the German government, there were 33 complaints investigated by the Federal Criminal Police Office, and only five cases were

[9] Ferreira, Álvaro. A cidade no século XXI: segregação e banalização do espaço. Rio de Janeiro, Consequência: 2011. Available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KxPIHlqUfkc>. Access in 15 mar. 2014.

[10] Council of the European Union. Experience Report on Human Trafficking for the Purpose of Sexual Exploitation and Forced Prostitution in Connection with the 2006 Football World Cup in Germany. Brussels, 19/01/2007.

directly related to the FIFA world cup.<sup>10</sup>

Keeping the country safe for carrying out the Cup is also a basic condition. In this sense, the World Cup is a great business for the security industry. Sophisticated security systems are used, with identifying suspects, control and information provision. In Germany not only data and local information was accessed, but there was also cooperation with other international surveillance systems. Two hundred databases containing over eighteen million data files were made available, in addition to security camera systems inside and outside stadiums, cameras, temperature sensors and various other equipments.<sup>12</sup> Security systems checked 150,000 people who applied to work for the tournament, as well as a background check of ticket buyers, since the entire system is computerized.

The database of violent criminals involved in sport (*Sport Gewalttäter*) was also used to banish people from stadiums and surrounding areas. The number of booked people rose from 6,500 in 2004 to 9,400 in 2006, a growing process. NGOs advocacy denounced an increase in repression during the period with further implications, so much so that in 2009 they were already 10,711. The police visited 8,450 hooligans in their homes or in their work; 3,200 were banned from the small towns, public areas and stadiums; 201 people were temporarily in custody; and 370 were refused visas for entry into Germany.<sup>13</sup> What can be seen as a security measure can also house other violations. Exceptions and expediting the granting of visas for foreigners in the German Cup did not

cover countries with “notoriously immigrant” populations, as Christian Russau points. This leads us to think about continuities in terms of racism and prejudice against immigrants in Europe, a controversial issue that has led many countries to tighten their policies.

In terms of security policy, mega-events in Brazil were the main fuel for the militarization of poor areas in the city. Cosentino, Marinho and Campagnani make a scathing criticism of the pacification processes of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. The installation of the Police Pacification Units (PPU), a project of permanence for the police in Rio’s favelas, attends a geography that focuses on strategic areas for mega events such as airports and routes to affluent neighborhoods of the city, and have little effect on the roots of violence. Moreover, the regulation of slums by police impose discipline and control of the population of these locations, with little or no significant contribution in terms of public policies linked to better health, education, leisure services etc..

The biggest violation complaints for countries like Brazil and South Africa, with limited means of social control by the population over the public budget, were the spending on infrastructure projects and other urban planning changes that were made without dialogue with the society. In many cases old urban projects were put into practice that, for political or economic issues, could not find space or consensus to be achieved. And in Germany no removal process was performed. The construction of football stadiums for the World Cup is an ef-

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[11] EICK, Volker. ‘Secure our profit!’ The FIFATM in Germany 2006. In: Colin Bennett and Kevin Haggerty (eds.), *Security Games: Surveillance and Control at Mega-Events*. New York: Routledge: 87–102.

[12] Idem.



Graffiti in Rio de Janeiro's downtown  
(Credit: Felipe Werneck)

[13] Available at <http://epocanegocios.globo.com/Revista/Common/0,,ERT220450-16418,00.html>. Access in 05/02/2014.

[14] Available at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/folhanacopa/2014/03/1428088-valor-de-assento-deestadio-do-df-e-62-mais-alto-que-a-media.shtml>. Access in 20/03/2014.

fective example of these asymmetries between countries.

### Stadiums: white elephants and profitable investments

The central and essential element for carrying out the Cup are the football stadiums and it is around them that are concentrated the largest expenses. In this regard, two aspects draw attention towards football stadiums constructed/renovated for the World Cup in the three countries. The first aspect concerns the percentage of public investment in the three countries. In Germany 37% of the stadiums were constructed / renovated with public funds; 90.3% in Brazil, and 100% in South Africa. The second aspect is the financial viability after the Cup, since many of them do not have the return on investment from government vaults, which was the case of Africa and some of the stadiums in Brazil, true “white elephants”. Only Germany managed to make them profitable.

In 2007, when Brazil was chosen host country, the president of the Brazilian Football Confederation at the time, Ricardo Teixeira, and president Luis Inacio Lula da Silva declared that this was the “Cup of private enterprise” and that the total cost of the Cup would be R\$5 billion. A survey conducted by the Court of Audit (in 2012 shows) shows that expenditures may reach, in fact, R\$23.5 billion. And most of the cost will be paid by the government bank BNDES (National Bank for Economic and Social Development) and CEF, responsible for

most of the investment in infrastructure projects for the event. However, until now the total number is unclear because each month a new sum is presented.

The private sector showed no direct investments in the event and the clubs linked to some stadiums that will host the Cup must invest R\$336 million, which equates to 1.43% of total investments.<sup>13</sup>

In Brazil the 12 World Cup stadiums are for 668 000 people in total and cost about R\$8.5 billion so far, an average of about R\$12,000 per chair. While in South Africa the value was R\$7.000 per seat and in Germany R\$6.500.<sup>14</sup> What raises questions about the role of the State, both in South Africa and in Brazil is how many benefits for the population in the service networks of basic health services, education and housing could be achieved with these resources.

### Strengthening the social participation and control mechanisms

The General Secretary of FIFA, Jerome Valcke said that many of the problems faced by the entity in Brazil are due to the decentralization of power:

“The main difficulty we have is when we enter a country where the political structure is divided, as in Brazil, on three levels: federal, state and county. There are different people, different dynamics, different interests. It is difficult to organize a World Cup under these conditions.”



And added:

“I will say something that is crazy, but less democracy, sometimes, is better to organize a World Cup. When you have a strong Head of State, which may decide, like Putin may be in 2018, it is easier for us, organizers, than a country like Germany, where you need to negotiate at different levels”.<sup>15</sup>

The suggestive statement by Valcke gives us the scenario with which social movements, trade unions and civil society in general faced in these countries. The procedures for such blatant violations of rights also gave rise to alliances and the resurgence of struggles against social injustice and demands to the government. In Brazilian cities, the construction of alternatives to removal proceedings made in popular communities and large demonstrations which also had as its theme the criticism of the World Cup; in South Africa the strengthening of resistance by groups of informal workers and strikes of civil construction; in Germany a campaign against the hosting of the Winter Olympic Games in Munich.

When we launched this publication there is a little over a month before the start of the World Cup in Brazil. It is still uncertain how the scenario will be during the World Cup, due to the dissatisfaction that led thousands of Brazilians to the streets in 2013. Brazilian euphoria by holding the Cup has decreased. Recent research<sup>16</sup> indicate that 50% of people are in favor of the event, the Cup is indifferent to 11% and 39% disagree. The last number is significant if

we think that Brazilians are one of the most fanatic people about football. The criticism is due to excessive spending on stadiums and urban mobility works, which are mostly paid for with public investments. The displeasure was the theme during demonstrations in June 2013 and continues until today, with posters of iconic phrases like “We will not have a World Cup” and “if your child falls ill, take him to a stadium.”

Analyzing the data and narratives presented by Christian Russau, about Germany (2006), Laura Burocco about South Africa (2010) and Glauca Marinho, Mario Campagnani and Renato Cosentino, about Brazil (2014) we can see that, comparatively, the processes involving the hosting of the World Cup deepen inequalities in Southern countries and strengthen highly exclusionary city projects to the poorest sectors of the population. At the same time, the World Cup in Germany had another character because the processes of gentrification and restructuring had taken place during the 1990s. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the German government it was a strategy of financial marketing to develop tourism and investment opportunities in businesses that proved successful.

The cost in social terms will always be lower for those countries that have actual mechanisms of social control and an active civil society, demanding effective action from the State. In the articles it also becomes obvious how certain social struggles were strengthened. Social movements, NGOs, trade unions and the general public will be outraged about overspending,

removals, legislative changes and other excesses of government and FIFA.

[15] Available at <http://esportes.terra.com.br/futebol/valckemenos-democracia-ajudaria-na-organizacao-da-copa,e881cdd88a83e310VgnCLD2000000ec6eb0aRCRD.html>. Access in 20/03/2014.

[16] Available at <http://www.brasil247.com/pt/247/bahia247/131258/Nordestinos-s%C3%A3o-os-que-maisaprovam-a-Copa.htm>. Access in 02/02/2014.





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