Executive Board Column On 25 October, Lula da Silva won the run-off election in Brazil — it was a victory for democracy! Germany and the EU can be happy that Brazil remains a reliable partner. However, the conservative to far-right majority in Congress and the Senate will make it difficult for Lula to govern. All the more, Germany and the EU are called upon to act as partners.
Lula da Silva managed to gain almost 11 million additional votes in the second round — a decisive factor in this was the daily presence of his supporters on social media and on the streets. Orchestrated by MP André Janones via WhatsApp, this was made possible by his 10 million followers, mainly young people. Flávio Bolsonaro, by contrast, increased his vote share by fewer than four million votes and thus lost the election. His party, the Partido Liberal, has since acknowledged the defeat. Flávio continues to refuse to do so; he fled with his family to the US to avoid prosecution on corruption charges and money laundering.
What next? Lula will have to work with a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate that are critical of – or even hostile towards – his political environmental agenda: 409 of the 594 members of the two chambers hold right-wing views and explicitly oppose environmental and climate protection. Many belong to the so-called Bancada Ruralista, which has close ties to agribusiness and large-scale landowners. Both chambers will undermine Lula’s plans for social justice, climate protection and the rights of Indigenous peoples. Draft bills from the right-wing majority on all key issues in these policy fields have already been tabled and are ready for a vote. Preventing their implementation will demand enormous political skill and perseverance on Lula`s side. The quality of political communication from Lula’s cabinet and his advisers will also be crucial in this regard.
It is crucial for the EU that Brazil, as a diplomatic powerhouse and Latin America’s largest economy, will now neither fall in line with Donald Trump’s course nor join his ‘Shield of the Americas’ security alliance. Europe will continue to be able to count on Brazil as a partner in upholding the international order and international law, in global trade and climate action, and within the G20, even if differences (e.g. regarding Ukraine) remain. Within the BRICS group, Brazil will remain influential and, alongside Indonesia, South Africa, Malaysia, Nigeria and Thailand, will contribute to the diversity of views represented there.
However, Germany and the EU must also do their part to remain relevant partners for Brazil and thereby strengthen Lula as a partner.
Continue bilateral cooperation initiatives: Germany should take up and revitalise the cooperation initiatives in climate and environmental policy agreed upon in the bilateral government consultations, such as those carried out by the Federal Environment Agency and the Brazilian Forum for Sustainable Development in the run-up to COP30. Sustainable supply chains and the use of digitalisation and AI offer opportunities for economic activities that benefit both, people and the environment. The BMU and BMZ should continue cooperation projects to enable Indigenous peoples, Quilombolas and environmental activists to withstand the mounting pressure in the Amazon, Cerrado, Pantanal and Pampa, and in further regions rich in mineral resources. In this context, it is also essential to adopt a clear and unambiguous position regarding the primacy of human rights over access to rare earths.
Harnessing the leverage of the EU–Mercosur Agreement: Environmental, climate and social standards would gain nothing if the Mercosur region were to turn even more strongly towards China. The agreement was signed in January 2026, and its trade provisions have been provisionally in force since 1 May. Full ratification is still pending: the European Parliament has requested an advisory opinion from the European Court of Justice and is awaiting its response; in the German Bundestag, the partnership agreement was debated at first reading on 7 October. Precisely because parliamentary approval and ratification in all 27 Member States are still pending, Europe retains influence. It should make use of the following three levers.
- Market access as a means of advancing interests: Brazilian agribusiness has a tangible interest in the European market, which in 2025 was the second-most important export market, accounting for around 14 per cent of total Brazilian exports – behind China at 29 per cent – for products such as beef, poultry, sugar and ethanol, for which the agreement provides for capped import quotas into Europe. This interest acts as a counterbalance to the ideological alignment with Washington, for which there will still be many advocates in the Senate and the House of Representatives: by 2025, exports to the US will account for only around 11 per cent of the total. The EU should confidently uphold the principle that there is stable market access for reliable partners who comply with environmental standards.
- Insisting on standards and supporting compliance: the agreement commits both sides to climate action and forest conservation. Over the past four years, President Lula has successfully reduced deforestation by strengthening the relevant authorities and satellite monitoring. The EU should support Lula in combating opposition to this from congress and, in cases of doubt — as provided for in the agreement — request consultations and refer the matter to the independent panel of experts, whose report will be made public. This chapter does not provide for sanctions. The possibility of suspending trade benefits in the event of serious breaches of the Parliamentary Agreement is enshrined in the Partnership Agreement. Only in this way can it remain credible – both to consumers in Europe and to farmers who expect fair competitive conditions.
- Protecting democracy: The political dialogue under the Partnership Agreement, which is based on democracy, the rule of law and human rights, will only take effect once the Agreement has been ratified. In the run-up to this, the EU and its Member States should take diplomatic and financial action to support Lula’s efforts in this regard.
The EU–Mercosur Agreement is a key component of European–Brazilian relations. It fosters reliability, rules and cooperation in the interests of both sides.
On 25 October, Brazil chose Lula da Silva; this is a victory for democracy. In a world where power politics takes precedence over rules, Europe needs reliable partners — and these partners need a Europe that honors its commitments.